Pierre Hadot\u27s Holistic Philosophy of Communication by Crist, Jonathan
Duquesne University 
Duquesne Scholarship Collection 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations 
Spring 5-8-2020 
Pierre Hadot's Holistic Philosophy of Communication 
Jonathan Crist 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd 
 Part of the History of Philosophy Commons, Other Communication Commons, Other Philosophy 
Commons, and the Speech and Rhetorical Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Crist, J. (2020). Pierre Hadot's Holistic Philosophy of Communication (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne 
University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1893 
This One-year Embargo is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 





















In partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
By 


















































Jonathan Rawson Crist 
 





Pat Arneson, Ph.D. 








Janie Harden Fritz, Ph.D. 




Erik Garrett, Ph.D. 






















Jonathan Rawson Crist 
May 2020 
 
Dissertation supervised by Pat Arneson, Ph.D. 
 Pierre Hadot’s holistic philosophy of communication attends to the health of the self and 
community through practice of spiritual exercises for the transformation of one’s entire being, 
working at the nexus of mind, body, soul, and cosmos. The task is ever-incomplete, works in an 
understanding of “human being as essentially an exposure that lacks a closed identity” and 
“keep[s] sight of the opening, wound, or lack that remains at the heart of any community and all 
communication” (Butchart 136). This is responsive to the present moment experiencing 
disjointed experience of time and space, increased anxiety, underdeveloped capacity for 
attention, and cultural forms that privilege stimuli over reflection. These conditions make it 
difficult to recognize and form responses to fundamental questions: How do I live a good life? 





major themes in Hadot’s work and demonstrates how it offers insight into adopting and adapting 
ancient philosophical attitudes, working toward inner peace in shifting existential conditions, 
gaining perspective by taking  ‘a view from above’, and fostering a love of humankind all born 
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Hadot on Interpretation: Or, the Revealing of Ancient Philosophy 
 
 
It is through Hellenistic and Roman thought, 
particularly that of late antiquity, that the 
renaissance was to perceive Greek tradition. This 
fact was to be of decisive importance for the birth of 
modern European thought and art. In another 
respect contemporary hermeneutic theories that, 
proclaiming the autonomy of the written text, have 
constructed a veritable tower of Babel of 
interpretations where all meanings become 
possible, come straight out of the practices of 
ancient exegesis. (Hadot, Way of Life 67) 
 
 
 The centrality of interpretation in Pierre Hadot’s work goes hand in hand with the 
primary question that guides his writing: “Can modern man understand and even live by ancient 
texts?” Hadot places ‘understanding’ as central to this project: “For all kinds of reasons, of which 
chronological distance is not the most important, our understanding of ancient works has grown 
more and more dim” (Citadel vii). While there are extant translations and printings and 
introductions of ancient philosophical works (e.g., Platonic dialogues, Meditations of Marcus 
Aurelius, the Enneads of Plotinus, Aristotle’s Nichomechean Ethics)—what grows dim are our 
understandings of how the text in front us has come to be and the conditions under which it was 
originally produced.  
Michael Chase and Luc Brisson write that Hadot contributed to understanding philosophy 
in the present historical moment, “by reforming philosophical discourse to a way of life and 
resituating it within its original economic, social, political, and religious context—Hadot 
promoted a way of conceiving philosophy that was both very ancient and very new” (439). 





specialized activity of a professional group of people writing and teaching in universities. 
Hadot’s conception of philosophy has roots in his life experience. 
 The first section outlines Hadot’s intellectual background including his formative years 
spent in seminary and the priesthood of the Catholic Church and his philological training. The 
second section turns to the major phenomenon in Hadot’s work, philosophia. The final section 
reviews the practices of exegetical philosophy, specifically in the Neoplatonist tradition. This 
brings Hadot to focus on the centrality of interpretation and “creative mistakes” in understanding 
ancient philosophy and the task of the reader in the present historical moment (Way of Life 71, 
75). 
Intellectual Background 
Hadot’s development in his formative years, his primary education, and his interest in 
mysticism situated him uniquely to observe and address for his time and for ours the “great 
cultural event of the West, the emergence of a Latin philosophical language translated from the 
Greek” (Way of Life 54). This section introduces Pierre Hadot’s intellectual background with 
attention to his education with Paul Henri and Pierre Courcelle. 
Hadot was born in 1922 in Reims, France. He was born the youngest of three sons. His 
education began at an early age. He was directed toward the Catholic priesthood from the age of 
ten starting with his entry to the minor seminary in Reims. Hadot’s early interactions with 
religious education and philosophical instruction would provide lasting direction for his life and 
scholarship. Hadot was the youngest of three sons to stay at home. His mother and his father 
worked at a champagne production business. He was exposed to a rigorous Catholic environment 
and social structure with the parish priest as the “absolute master” in the geographical area of the 





relationship; following his birth his mother had suffered an illness that would no longer allow her 
to have children. The parish priest told his parents they could no longer sleep together in 
accordance with the Church doctrine that procreation was the only purpose of conjugal relations. 
Without the possibility of conceiving children, Hadot’s father grew apart from the Church and 
discontinued going to Mass for numerous years (3). Hadot’s mother remained stalwart in the 
faith so much so that she restricted the vocational choices for her sons all of whom were to be 
ordained as priests. Hadot was then sent to the minor seminary in Reims when he was ten years 
old (4). 
Hadot entered the Grande Séminaire in Reims at 15 where he was exposed further to 
Thomism as well as the heralded mystical authors of the Catholic Church such as Teresa of Avila 
(1515-1582) and Thérèse of Lisieux (1873-1897). At the time, Hadot also began his long interest 
in the work of Henri Bergson (1859-1941), whom Hadot said “had a considerable influence on 
the development of my thought, insofar as his philosophy is focused on the experience of a 
bursting forth of existence, of life, that we experience in ourselves in willing and in duration” 
(Happiness 9-10). Following Bergson, Hadot’s conception of philosophy was less the 
construction of a rational system of discourse and more a way of life brought about through inner 
transformation (Happiness 10). Hadot situated his interest in Bergson at the time as part of the 
larger intellectual environment in 1939 that was grappling with the “problem of the essence of 
philosophy” (Happiness 10). 
Hadot was ordained in 1944 at the early age of 22. This was due in part to the 
convergence of several factors. First was that the Grande Séminaire needed a philosophy 





third was his noticeable intellectual development whereupon Hadot was sent to complete 
concurrent degrees at both the Sorbonne and the Institut Catholique (Hadot, Happiness 19).  
Paul Henri (1906-1984) was a Jesuit and scholar working at the Institut Catholique at the 
time Hadot was a doctoral student there. Henri’s focus was on the thought of Plotinus and on the 
development of Neoplatonic influences in Western thought, and heavily influenced Hadot’s 
interpretation of ancient texts. Hadot notes from his time working with Henri on a critical edition 
of Victorinus (published 1960) that Henri served “as a model of scientific method” in 
investigating the meaning of texts (Hadot, Way of Life 51). Through Henri, Hadot explored the 
work of Plotinus (204-270 CE), who was a major influence in the flowering of Neoplatonic 
thought and practice. Hadot learned the rigors of the critical philological work of translation and 
commentary from Henri. 
Henri and Hadot also worked together on a project providing commentary on the works 
of Marius Victorinus (Way of Life 279-280). Victorinus (early 4th century CE) was a Neoplatonic 
philosopher who was known as a translator of Aristotelian works from the Greek into Latin and, 
following a late conversion to Christianity, had considerable influence on the work of Augustine 
of Hippo. In this work on Victorinus, Hadot attributed a section of that work to Porphyry of 
Tyre, a prominent student of Plotinus and teacher of Victorinus’s particular form of Neoplatonic 
spiritual and exegetical practices. This connection allowed Hadot to provide a context for another 
emergent Western cultural phenomenon at the time, the presentation of Christianity as a 
philosophy or way of life (Way of Life 280). 
Pierre Courcelle was another colleague, mentor, and friend who also helped train Hadot 
in the scientific approach to interpretation and the comparison of texts (Hadot, Way of Life 50). 





his own approach to comparing ancient texts: “[A] text should be interpreted in light of the 
literary genre to which it belongs” (Hadot, Way of Life 52). Courcelle was the first to put this 
approach forth in the philological community. In this way Courcelle traced the formation and 
development of common phrases associated with the western intellectual patrimony such as 
“know thyself” (52).  
The influence of Courcelle in placing the text in its literary genre and conditions of 
writing comes across in the whole of Hadot’s body of scholarship. On Courcelle’s influence 
Hadot wrote,  
It was surprising to see a philologist [Courcelle] attack problems in the history of 
philosophy, showing the key influence exercised on Latin Christian thought by Greek and 
pagan Neoplatonism, not only Plotinus but—this was an important detail—by his disciple 
Porphyry as well. Even more surprising, this philologist based his conclusions on a 
rigorously philological method that did not rely solely on shining light on analogies. 
(Hadot, Way of Life 51) 
Courcelle’s writings proved to be an important impetus for Hadot’s work. Hadot read ancient 
philosophical discourse in light of the genre and the environment, finding that the received canon 
of philosophical texts, primarily oral in construction and intent, is a support for the ‘art of living.’ 
The future of Hadot’s scholarship was thus set forth. 
The period from 1949-1960 proved to be fruitful for the direction Hadot’s life and 
scholarship. Several events led Hadot out of the Church: the “Oath Against Modernism” he took 
on his ordination, Humani Generis; the proclamation of the dogma of the Assumption of Mary 





years. He stepped further into his academic work at the Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique (CNRS) where he was researching the works of Victorinus. 
After leaving the priesthood, Hadot was a student at the Sorbonne for a year. He 
eventually graduated from the École Pratique des Hautes Etudes. During Hadot’s years as a 
university professor he published his dissertation Porphyre et Victorinus (Fr. 1968); and 
Plotinus, Or the Simplicity of Vision (Fr. 1963, Eng. 1993). Hadot was appointed directeur 
d’études of the fifth section of the École in 1964 as the chair of Latin Patristics where he 
remained for twenty years. He was then nominated by Michel Foucault to a chair in the College 
de France and was elected in 1982 to the chair of History of Hellenistic and Roman Thought.  
He retired from that chair in 1991. 
In addition to Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique (1981), a collection of essays 
translated into English as Philosophy as a Way of Life (1995), Hadot’s major works were written 
after his retirement when he was finally free “to write books that have been waiting for years to 
be written” (Hadot, Happiness 51). These works include The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of 
Marcus Aurelius (French, 1992, English 1998), What is Ancient Philosophy? (French 1995, 
English 2002), and The Veil of Isis (French 2004, English 2006).  
Hadot was exposed early to the Catholic intellectual tradition in the form of the 
philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Hadot’s own work manages to be clear, detailed, and accessible 
to a broad range of readers. He credited his own writing style in part to his early exposure to 
Thomism as a rigorous, clear, and systematic philosophy (Hadot, Way of Life 277). Amid his 
education in the Catholic tradition of 1930’s France, Hadot began to undergo experiences that he 
later identified as outside the Christian foundation (Hadot, Happiness 8). These experiences 





experiences would previously have been found only in the mystics such as Therese of Lisieux or 
John of the Cross. In other words, having an experience that did not fit within his Christian 
worldview or knowledge was disturbing not only to him but also to the Church. 
Hadot drew upon the work of Romain Rollard to describe the experience as “the pure 
happiness of existing” or “oceanic feeling” (8); “the oceanic feeling, as I’ve experienced it—
which is different from the sentiment of nature—is foreign to Christianity because it does not 
involve either God or Christ. It is something situated at the level of the pure feeling of existing” 
(8). Hadot’s experiences were an “immersion in the ‘whole’” (9). The reoccurrence of this 
experience in various forms encompassed and directed Hadot’s personal and professional life in 
encounter and scholarship (6). 
Philosophia as Starting Point 
 
Philosophy as an embodied practice uproots our current assumptions about philosophy as 
the result of “theoretical activity” (Ancient Philosophy 3). A current and prominent view of 
studying philosophy is that one stores up knowledge of different systems of thought—Neo-
Platonism, Scholasticism, Utilitarianism, Empiricism, Logical Positivism—and then leverages 
the relevant knowledge-pieces of the system that one has chosen to respond to questions that 
emerge such as What is a good life? What is death? How should I act in this situation? What 
laws am I bound to? What responsibility do I have toward others; toward this other? Hadot 
characterized this dominant theoretical version of ‘doing’ philosophy as a rarified activity 
reserved for the professional philosopher. Philosophy as a professional activity is primarily 
carried out under the aegis of universities, has a highly technical language, is transacted in print 
and at boutique conferences, and addresses issues (e.g., ethics, virtue, language) and their 





interpretation of the ancient phenomenon philosophia resonates with Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
questioning of the tasks of philosophy. 
MacIntyre is interested in what occurs when existential questions are asked outside of the 
professional context of philosophy. Uttered in different contexts, the questions What is it to live 
a human life well or badly? or What law, if any has authority over us? or What is the significance 
of death in our lives? take on different significance (MacIntyre 125). In a social setting the 
questions are usually asked with a certain amount of passion and anguish that elicits an awkward 
silence or quick attempt by the other person to move to something else in the conversation (125). 
Uttered in the context of a professional setting in tones appropriate to an academic lecture hall 
the questions “no longer sound naïve, they no longer evoke embarrassment” (125).  
MacIntyre further characterizes professional philosophical questioning and action as 
“self-alienating” (127). The activity of questioning only arrives with our figuratively stepping 
back from the immediate circumstances that instigated the questioning. What follows after 
attaining this distance shapes the activity. MacIntyre identifies two different routes a person may 
take after posing questions: first, the question and search may become a diversion along 
Pascalian lines, giving the illusion of activity; or second, the question demands a response by 
throwing the reader out back into one’s life to confront the issue. MacIntyre points to John Stuart 
Mill and Thomas Aquinas as examples of philosophical discourses that throw the reader back 
into the existential exigencies that prompted the questioning (128, 131). When philosophical 
questioning and writing leads the reader down the second route, the technical points of writing 
and professional philosophical activity are subordinated to the ends of the conversation at hand 
with another person (130-131). MacIntyre suggests that “perhaps the point of doing philosophy 





Hadot’s scholarship traces an understanding of philosophia as a way of life that comes 
about as an existential choice to carry out designated spiritual practices. A person’s existential 
choice to practice philosophia is a response to a particular “vision of the world” (Hadot, Ancient 
Philosophy 3). The execution of the practices work with one’s intention to change or “transform” 
how the practitioner orients oneself the lifeworld (3). This choice and these practices precede the 
learning and mastery of the texts. In other words, philosophic discourse—the received texts and 
fragments of the ancient world—is inextricably intertwined with the formation of the practitioner 
in philosophia.  
The primary purpose of philosophic discourse for Hadot is to support one’s existential 
choices and one’s view of the cosmos, not necessarily the construction or defense of a coherent 
system (Hadot, Ancient Philosophy 3). “Theoretical philosophical discourse is thus born from 
this initial existential option, and it leads back to it, insofar as—by means of its logical and 
persuasive force, and the action it tries to exert upon the interlocuter—it incites both masters 
and disciples to live in genuine conformity with their initial choice” (Ancient Philosophy 3, 
emphasis added). Hadot reopened a reading of ancient texts as he reshaped our understanding of 
the context and relationship between philosophic discourse and practitioner. What emerges when 
the received texts of ancient Western philosophy are placed in their literary tradition and in the 
context of their origins is a picture that privileges the needs of the practitioner in one’s continued 
re-orienting of oneself in the lifeworld in accordance with a particular view of the cosmos that 
utilizes both rhetorical and logical means for one’s chosen purpose. In other words, Hadot 







Exegesis of Philosophical Texts 
During Hadot’s inaugural address on the occasion of his election to the chair of the 
History of Hellenistic and Roman Thought in the College de France in 1982, he gave a brief 
excurses on excurses. Beginning with the Alexander the Great’s excursion and advent of 
Hellenistic culture, Hadot illumined the “historical distance” between 1) Greek culture and 
thought and Hellenistic thought, 2) Roman engagement with Greek texts, and 3) contemporary 
readers and of both of the preceding phenomena (Way of Life 53).  
Hadot explained, “We need to recognize from the outset that almost all of Hellenistic 
literature, principally its philosophical productions, has disappeared” (Way of Life 53). With the 
exception of several fragments from the 700 works of Chrysippus (c. 279- c.206 BCE), literature 
from that era has been lost to time (53). Due to this loss and historical distance, accessing ancient 
Greek thought requires “exploiting existing texts” of Greek philosophy and is inseparable from 
learning of the philosophical schools—Stoicism, Epicureanism, Platonism/Neoplatonism—
through the Latin authors, such as Cicero, Lucretius, Marius Victorinus, Augustine, and 
Boethius—that preserved Greek texts by copying them and liberally quoting from those now lost 
sources (53). In other words, the phenomenon of Greek and Latin philosophy that comes through 
the Medieval period to the dawn of the Renaissance and the birth of “modern European thought 
and art” emerges through a complex web of environmental and interpretive conditions (67).  
 Hadot’s understanding of this now distant event of original interpretation and translation, 
as well as subsequent interpretations of the phenomena philosophia and the texts of ancient 
philosophy, follows two broad interdependent lines. One is understanding the conditions of 
production of the phenomena. This includes an understanding of the life, teaching, and practices 





philosophy to the conclusion of the 16th century (Ancient Philosophy 55-171; Way of Life 71). 
Interwoven with the process of exegetical practices is the emergence of what Hadot terms 
“creative mistakes” (Way of Life 71, 75).  
Creative mistakes emerge as a result of the process of interpretation, translation, and 
transcription by hand in copying and transmitting texts. These practices, combined with the 
ravages of time and circumstance (e.g. repeated fires in the Alexandrian library, the sacking of 
Athens by Sulla in 86 BCE), account for the emergence of mistranslations and deformations of 
the authoritative texts of a school and practice in both structure and meaning (e.g. Marcus 
Aurelius’s Meditations). Likewise, those same mistakes were the creative gap through which 
came “the development of fresh ideas . . . new concepts, categories, arguments, and conclusions” 
(Way of Life 5). 
With an understanding of philosophy as a way of life—philosophia—Hadot reshaped an 
understanding of the exegetical practices of the ancient schools of philosophy which then 
reopened “our image of the history of philosophy” (Ancient 95). Exegetical exercises in the 
practices of philosophy in late antiquity, through Medieval Scholasticism, and up through the 
mid-18th century began with an authoritative founder of the school. In the case of the Athenian 
schools, Plato founded the Academy and Aristotle founded the Lyceum, Epicurus founded the 
Garden and Zeno founded the Stoa. The schools took on the names where the masters and 
students met for instruction and to engage in the way of life demonstrated by the participants 
including the “spiritual exercises” of attention, meditation, dialogue, consideration of death and 
physics (Ancient 98-99). Exegesis and commentary on the texts of the founder of the school, 





confirmation and choice of a way of practicing a way of life in congruity with a vision of the 
cosmos. 
 “Each philosophical or religious school or group believed itself to be in possession of a 
traditional truth, communicated from the beginning by the divinity to a few wise men” (Way of 
Life 74). The texts of the founder and their authority serve as the foundation of wisdom and that 
on which all other teaching in the schools is based (72). First and foremost, exegesis is an 
argument from authority. Not unlike a syllabus, there are references to a specific order in which 
the Platonic dialogues should be read by students so as to best prepare the way toward leading 
the life of the sage-exemplar (72). To that end the primary mode of instruction took place as 
commenting on the texts of the masters (72).  
 ‘Truth’ was thus considered to be accessible in and through those texts considered by 
authorities to be authentic (Way of Life 73). Commentary on the texts of the founders had a 
specific intent: to reveal the ‘truth’ that is encapsulated in the works of the masters albeit they 
might not be stated explicitly. The sometimes obscure “authentic” texts were thought to be a 
deliberate technique of a master to point at the vast content of the truth that could be glimpsed in 
and through their specific formulation (74). In this exegetical tradition so long as an 
interpretation was considered coherent with the doctrine thought to be that of the original teacher 
or sage it was considered “authentic” in that it illuminated the pre-existing ‘truth’ in the text (74). 
So which texts—or authoritative translations of texts—are authentic? 
 Works by Plato and his student Aristotle (referred to as the Philosopher by Thomas 
Aquinas) were the most prominent philosophers in antiquity. By the sunset of antiquity this list 
grew exponentially to include those scholars who offered works of revelation for pagans, 





Judaism and Christianity sought to present themselves to the Greek world as philosophies; they 
thus developed, in the persons of Philo and Origen respectively, a biblical exegesis analogous to 
the traditional pagan exegesis of Plato (Way of Life 72). Hadot here aligned the textual 
commentary of Medieval Scholasticism with exegetical practices of the ancient philosophical 
schools. 
With the intention of finding the pre-given truth in a text, exegetical philosophy considers 
how the problems arising from those texts were posed. As an example, Hadot provided his own 
translation of the problem of evil as posed by Plotinus in his first Ennead: “We must try to find 
out in what sense Plato says that evils shall not pass away, and that their existence is necessary” 
(Enneads I 8; Way of Life 73). Plotinus’s response to the question of whether evils pass away 
proceeds from the first principles of Neoplatonism, namely that of the preeminence of the Good 
and knowledge through the ideal forms, to work through the truth based on the ‘truth’ already 
contained in the works of Plato. The structure of question and response working through and 
from the authentic texts is paralleled in the structure of Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, a 
representative text of Medieval Scholastic philosophy.  
Within a milieu of exegesis, errors in exegesis—those that were outside of the pale of the 
doctrine of the founder—were taken to be the result of “misunderstandings and mistranslations” 
of the authentic text (Way of Life 74). According to Hadot, modern scholars of the history of 
philosophy have been correct to critique “arbitrary systemizations” that ancient commentators 
would construct from the out-of-context passages from a single author or even the different 
and/or contradictory ideas from different schools. In the first example, Hadot points to one 
instance when a “four- or five-tiered hierarchy of being was extracted from various dialogues of 





commentators were employing notions from Stoicism and Platonism (75). What Hadot finds 
most interesting and most fruitful is when these ‘mistakes’ in translation supply the opening for 
new ideas to emerge. 
 Hadot’s description of “creative mistakes” is a primary contribution to the understanding 
of philosophia (Way of Life 71, 75) In paving the way for the examples in this section, it is 
important to first situate Hadot’s interpretive approach. The crux of his approach is what he 
terms a “coincidentia oppositorum,” that is, being beholden to two opposing demands that are 
equally incumbent (Nietzsche 76). The opposing interpretive demands involve objectivity and 
subjectivity. The interpreter, in coming to an understanding of the texts and the “historical 
reality” that comes in the encounter, is responding on one hand to the need for “a conscious and 
complete engagement of the ego, and, on the other, a complete detachment from the ego, a 
deliberate effort at impartial objectivity” (76). In this crux an “existential meaning” can be given 
(76).  
In his writing, Hadot placed this position in the historical context of 19th and 20th century 
history and hermeneutics in an introduction to Nietzsche: Attempt at Mythology Nietzsche: 
Attempt at Mythology (1918/2008). Ernst Bertram’s (1884-1957) influential study on Nietzsche 
was originally published in 1918, was republished in French in 1990 with Hadot’s introduction, 
and then translated into English in 2008. In his introduction, Hadot outlined his hermeneutic 
approach to texts. 
Textual translation was a topic that dominated the discussion of the circle of scholars 
around Stefan George (1868-1933). Hadot characterized the George Circle’s approach to 
historical research as a response to 19th century scholarship that privileged objectivity in the 





the lifeworld, from the historical picture they were putting on display (Nietzsche 74-75). The 
George Circle, which included Hans-Georg Gadamer, swung the pendulum back the other way 
by eschewing historical objectivity entirely (75).  
The kind of “historical vision” that emerged from the George Circle is for the purpose of 
edification that acknowledges the historian’s situatedness in the present moment (Nietzsche 74-
75). An approach to history that searches into the past is a formative experience for the 
historical/interpreter. This is not a novel approach. Hadot highlighted the Lives of Plutarch (46 
AD-c. 120 AD) and the works of Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) and Johann von Goethe 
(1749-1832) as representative of this understanding. Formative ‘histories’ written in this vein can 
and did veer into hagiography, as in the versions of the lives of the Christian saints that 
emphasize the stories of miracles with the purpose of highlighting a specific practice or virtue, 
the imitation of which would be edifying to the emulator. Hadot characterized the 19th century 
development of a “rigorous historical method” as a response to the hagiographical tendency 
(Nietzsche 75). The pendulum thus swung back with the hermeneutic theories and practices of 
Nietzsche, George, Martin Heidegger, and Gadamer’s response to the “withering positivism of a 
purely scholarly attitude” (76).  
Quoting Bertram’s Nietzsche, Hadot identified the phrase “One and the same text permits 
innumerable interpretations—there is no ‘correct’ interpretation” as the starting principle of the 
George Circle (Nietzsche 76). Identifying a starting point where historical objectivity is not 
possible, Hadot observed that methods of interpretation can lead to “genuine aberrations” by the 
dismissal of authorial intention (76). This is important for understanding and ignoring the 
situatedness of the text within its historical moment and conditions of production. Sharing the 





method, Hadot warned against dangers. “Nietzsche was wrong. We must firmly maintain the 
opposite principle: ‘the same text cannot license all interpretations. There are valid 
interpretations and inadmissible interpretations’” (76). Hadot situated his own position of the 
coincidentia oppositorum as a position that acknowledges the position for a philological and 
historical rigor when one interprets and comments on texts.  In Hadot’s volume on the 
Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, he briefly summarized this fluid starting point. 
  To be sure, it is fashionable nowadays to affirm that, in any case, we cannot know 
 exactly what an author meant, and that moreover, this does not matter at all, for we can 
 give the works any meaning we please. For my part, and without entering into this 
 debate, I would say that before we discover ‘unintentional’ meanings, it seems to me both 
 possible and necessary to discover the meaning with the author intended. It is absolutely 
 indispensable to go in the direction of a basic meaning, to which we can then refer in 
 order to uncover, if we should so wish, those meanings of which the author was perhaps 
 not conscious. It is true, however, that this reconstitution is extremely difficult for us, 
 because we project attitudes and intentions proper to our era into the past. (Citadel ix) 
A reader cannot ‘know’ what the author meant, which allow creative unintentional meanings to 
arise in the interpretation of a text. 
 Hadot likened the project of interpretation to that of the Stoic spiritual exercise of 
considering a representation and then making a judgement and then ascribing value to a text 
(Happiness 68). The first requirement for Hadot is coming to an “adequate and objective 
judgment” of the text. This is achieved by having objectivity as a goal (68). Once an objective 
judgment is made, any meaning that may be found in one’s subjective life can then be discovered 





moreover, attempts to elevate itself to a universal perspective” (68). The act of interpretation 
then becomes a spiritual exercise that is intended to transform the self. Using objectivity as a 
goal and placing the ancient text back in its originating “praxis” there emerges the possibility of 
revealing authorial intention (68). Hadot makes an important distinction between authorial intent 
and the revelation of an “historical psychology” (65). 
 Hadot’s framework ascribing an “historical psychology” to the works of an author 
emerged from his study of the Renaissance. In the Renaissance a work of art—a novel or 
painting for example—could be considered an unbounded expression of the ‘real’ individual 
(Happiness 65). Especially with regard to understanding ancient texts, ignoring the literary 
context in which the work was produced thus ignores the constraints placed on an author by the 
literary genre in which he was writing. The literary genre reveals those constraints and the 
purpose for which the author was writing. 
 In ancient philosophical schools there were rigorously codified rules for the presentation 
and use of terms in different literary genres. The author’s intention could be gleaned through the 
“way in which he has been able to play with all the rules that imposed themselves” on the author 
and his use of language (Happiness 65). One such constraint is the intimate intertwining of the 
written word and the efficaciousness of the spoken word with primacy given to the latter (Way of 
Life 61). In the case of the de Rerum Natura by Lucretius—a representative work in the 
Epicurean tradition—Hadot explained that the oral constraints of rhythm and meter prevented the 
full use of the technical vocabulary of the school that would otherwise have made an appearance 
in his work (Way of Life 62). This distinction in conjunction with the interpretive approach of 
coincidentia oppositorum and an understanding of creative mistakes locates the Meditations of 





 Hadot’s work The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius can be understood 
as a book length exposition of a series of creative mistakes involving the reception of the content 
of the text, locating the literary genre in which the content was written, and the subsequent 
interpretations of the text.1 The opening chapters of that work gives a glimpse into the operation 
of placing a text into its praxis, in turn paving the way for Hadot’s understanding of creative 
mistakes. 
 In the opening chapters of the Inner Citadel Hadot categorizes the ways in which the 
present day reader faces difficulties in approaching the texts of antiquity. Before the printing 
press, texts were transcribed by hand. Through this copying words have been miscopied and 
sections lost. Fortunately, there has been a long continuous work to catalog ‘errors’ in the 
process. In the specific case of Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations Hadot recounted the full recorded 
history of the text, the title and structure, and dominant assumptions of the literary genre up to 
the present moment. The text as contemporary readers have come to know it is broken into 
chapters. In the earliest extant text there are no divisions (Citadel 23). 
In addition, the title Meditations was a later attribution, not one given by Aurelius. The 
work has been referenced by various titles throughout history including “Exhortations,” 
“Writings Concerning Himself,” “Private Writing,” “About Himself and to Himself,” “Notes 
which He Wrote for Himself,” “Moral Thoughts,” “To Myself,” “Conversations with Himself,” 
and “Paths toward Himself” (Citadel 24-25). Hadot located the literary genre of Marcus’s 
writings as hypomnēmata, or notes taken for himself. In this ancient literary genre, notes of this 
sort were to be on hand for regular use in exhorting oneself. In the Stoic tradition, these notes 
 





were written according to formulas and language that were provocative and used the three part 
Stoic system for conditioning one’s inner discourse. By this way then Marcus aimed,  
 to strive to always have the essential rules of life present in one’s mind, and to keep 
 placing oneself in the fundamental disposition of the philosopher, which consists 
 essentially in controlling one’s inner discourse, in doing only that which is of benefit to 
 the human community, and in accepting the events brought to us by the course of the 
 Nature of the All. (Citadel 31) 
One can benefit oneself as well as the all of humankind by controlling one’s inner discourse in 
the face of daily occurrences. 
 While written to adhere to a Stoic system, hypomnēmata as a literary genre assists the 
philosopher practitioner in cultivating an inner attitude and an external response to the existential 
demands of life in the manner of the school and its cosmic vision. Thus classified, Hadot pointed 
out the mistake of approaching the apparently disorderly texts as either broken fragments in what 
otherwise would have been a systematic treatise, or as a recording of the “outpourings of one’s 
heart,” an interpretation prominent to 19th century Romanticism (Citadel 25-27). Replacing the 
texts within their literary genre, especially with regard to ancient texts, reveals what an author 
was constrained to say by the rhetorical rules and intentions of the genre.  
Hadot placed the utmost importance on understanding that the ancient literary rules of 
production were much more codified than a modern reader’s current approach. Arnold Davidson 
succinctly summarizes Hadot’s approach: 
 Hadot’s studies of the history of ancient philosophy and theology have always included 
 the analysis of ‘the rules, the forms, the models of discourse,’ the framework of the 





 ancient author are expressed. Such analysis is necessary in order to understand both the 
 details of the work, the exact import of particular statements as well as the general 
 meaning of the work as a whole. Literary structure and conceptual structure must never 
 be separated. (7) 
Situating the text in its original praxis in conjunction with a rigorous philological approach to 
texts brings Hadot to identify creative mistakes. 
Translation errors occurred in exegesis. Mistranslations and misunderstandings emerged 
through a number of factors, both environmental and exegetical. Having completed the rigorous 
work to establish that errors occurred in translation and exegesis across historical moments, 
Hadot’s question became How do we understand the interpretations and exegesis that follows 
from those errors? Hadot characterized his position in response to a dominant attitude in 
historical research that considered all exegetical thought to be rooted in mistakes. However, 
rooted in misunderstanding, the exegetical edifice built from a mistake does not meet modern 
standards of reasoning (Way of Life 75). Based in error the exegesis could be dismissed as faulty. 
Regardless of the judgment, Hadot reasoned the researcher is also “forced to admit one fact: very 
often, mistakes and misunderstandings have brought about important evolutions in the history of 
philosophy. In particular they have caused new ideas to appear” (75). One such new idea 
emerging from Neoplatonic exegesis is the development of the distinction between an infinitive 
“being” and participle “being” (75). 
 Hadot traced this distinction to Porphyry of Tyre’s (a student of Plotinus) exegesis of 
section 142b of the Platonic dialogue Parmenides.  
Plato had asked: ‘if the One is, is it possible that it should not participate in being 





this second One participates in ousia, he reasons, we must assume that ousia is prior to 
the second One. Now, the only thing prior to the second One is the first One, and this 
latter is not in any sense ousia. Thus, Porphyry concludes that, in this passage, the word 
ousia designates the first One in an enigmatic symbolical way. The first One is not ousia 
in the sense of ‘substance’; rather, it is being (être) in the sense of a pure, transcendent 
act, prior to being as a substantial object (étant). L’étant, then, is the first substance and 
the first determination of l’être. (Way of Life 75) 
The consequences of this exegesis by Porphyry would reverberate throughout the Middle Ages 
in Scholastic theological exegesis on the nature and ‘substance’ of the Trinity and the Eucharist. 
Heidegger would then again take up the question of being in the monumental volume Being and 
Time (1927). Hadot devoted his final book to another fruitful creative mistake, the Heraclitan 
fragment “Nature loves to hide.” 
 The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature (Fr. 2004, Eng. 2006) was 
Hadot’s final published volume. In that work he traced interpretations of the Heraclitan aphorism 
“Nature loves to hide” through historical moments. This became the jumping off point for 
Hadot’s description and analysis of the two broad attitudes that humankind has taken in relation 
to nature, the Promethean and the Orphic. In broad strokes the Promethean attitude understands 
nature as a keeper of secrets. The secrets are those that undergird the operation of the cosmos. 
The means to discovering these secrets is through experiments that force nature to disrobe 
herself, thus revealing the logic of its operations. These operations are thought to be a repeatable 
logic that can be expressed in mathematical or mechanical terms. The logic of nature can then be 
harnessed for humankind’s use. The Orphic model understands the secrets of nature to be best 





Integral to this final work is Hadot’s execution of the principle of ‘creative mistakes’ in 
interpretation. An illustrative example of this comes in a chapter on the personification of Nature 
in imagery of Isis and Diana of Ephesus (Veil 233). Hadot noted that the statuary of Nature has 
been adorned with what appear to be multiple breasts. He elaborated, 
According to some modern scholars, what the ancients took to be breasts might in fact, 
like the rest of the goddess’s attributes, be the sculpted reproduction of the clothes and 
decorations with which the goddess’s state was adorned. The statue would have been 
made of wood and covered with adornment. It was the custom in Asia Minor and Greece, 
to dress goddesses; in fact, this was an essential part of daily worship. On this hypothesis, 
the form of the statues corresponds to the sculpted representation of the adornments that 
covered the wood statue. What had been assumed to be breasts would thus be jewels, or 
chains with pendants. Alternatively, they could be the testicles of bulls offered to the 
goddess on the occasion of the sacrifices that took place in her honor. It would thus be a 
mistaken interpretation—once again, a creative misunderstanding—that led people to see 
a personification of Nature in Artemis of the many breasts. (Veil 235) 
Hadot’s interest was with how interpretation is framed by assumptions within a particular 
historical moment. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has introduced the life and work of Pierre Hadot. Hadot asks the question, 
“is modern man still able to understand the texts of antiquity, and live according to them” (Way 
of Life 278).  As we have seen, Hadot’s formative years in the Catholic culture and seminary 
coupled with his later philological training under Paul Henri and Pierre Courcelle uniquely 





exposed early to the systematic work of Thomas Aquinas and the great mystics of the Catholic 
Intellectual tradition. This put him in a position to read ancient texts within their own context to 
revisit the phenomenon of ancient philosophy, or philosophia. 
 The second section introduced philosophia the central phenomenon of Hadot’s 
scholarship. Philosophia is an embodied way of life, lived out in community of practitioners, that 
has attendant spiritual practices for the intention of forming the “inner attitude” and orienting the 
practitioner in the life-world (Way of Life 59). This way of life is an existential choice and is 
rooted in a particular understanding and view of the cosmos (Ancient 3). In the present historical 
moment, the texts that have come to be understood as the texts of philosophy were produced for 
the support of this initial choice of a way of life and living by it in response to the many and 
various existential exigencies of the day. Hadot finds therefore that ancient philosophical texts 
are not constrained by the purpose of the creation of a fully coherent system of thought. Rather 
they serve in the always ongoing formation of the human being. 
 Central in responding to the primary question is his inquiry into the received texts of 
ancient antiquity. The final section detailed Hadot’s re-shaping of our current understanding of 
how the current forms and interpretations of ancient philosophical texts have come to be. Hadot’s 
understanding and practice of interpretation affirms the goal of working toward objectivity in the 
process of interpretation. A person engaging with the text is certainly situated in their own 
moment, however they can, with rigor, place the text in question back in its literary genre, 
environment, and culture in working out what the author intended to convey.  Approaching this 
becomes more possible, Hadot explains, because the rules of production for ancient authors are 
rigid, much more so than the contemporary moment. The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius being 





chapter division) and errors in translation of the Meditations throughout the years.  Replacing it 
in its literary genre and context of Stoic philosophia displays the Meditations as hypomnēmata or 
a support in exhorting Marcus to live by the tripartite Stoic life of ethics, physics, and logic.  
 While some mistakes are errors there are some that have been shown to be fruitful in 
opening up gaps for new meaning. Hadot regards these errors as “Creative mistakes” (Way of 
Life 71, 75). are those mistranslations, misinterpretations, and deformation/losses of the texts 
that, while mistakes, are what allowed for the emergence and work of exegetical philosophy 
(Way of Life 71, 75). Perhaps the most consequential example of the result of a creative mistake 
is the emergence of the distinction between infinitive “being” and participle “being” from Plato’s 














The Philosopher and the Sage 
 
“In Greece, the Archaic and Classical periods 
instead marked a time when training was broad, 
when arts were intricately interwoven, and when 
mind and body moved and thought together.” 
(Hawhee 4) 
 
 In her book Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece Debra Hawhee works 
on the premise that a mind-body division is a lens later placed on understanding the habits and 
practices of ancient Greek rhetoric, athletics, philosophy and politics. Hawhee’s project and 
Hadot’s project run parallel with one another in outlining the interconnections of the arts— 
philosophy, rhetoric, athletics, politics, drama, poetry—in Ancient Greece for the purpose of 
practicing the good as a member of a city and community. This chapter gives attention to how 
Hadot traces the shifting understanding of wisdom, knowledge and the figure of the person of 
wisdom and the seeker of wisdom, the sage and the philosopher respectively, in the overall 
project of unearthing philosophy understood as a way of life. 
 Hadot’s understanding and interpretation of sophia and sophos has reconnected the 
received texts of philosophical discourse and the way of life as practiced within a philosophical 
school. This way of life is habituated through spiritual exercises in accord with a vision of the 
cosmos. Common to the various schools this meant living in accord with universal Reason or 
Logos. Hadot brings his readers to question what is being highlighted and learned in reading the 
ancient discourses. If the reader is taking philosophical discourse as a dialogic mode of 
expressing a system of thought that is coherent, constructed in the abstract, and can withstand 





content of the interlocutors. In other words, the content and actions of the participants in the 
dialogue are separated wherein each could be treated as separate entities. Working out of the 
construct that philosophia is a way of life that is practiced in the “customs and conventions of 
everyday life” Hadot traces philosophy as embodied action oriented toward achieving a state of 
wisdom (Way of Life 58).  
 Working through a detailed explication of Socrates as he appears in the Platonic 
dialogues and other descriptions by Xenophon and Plutarch, Hadot brought out the inextricable 
nature of conceptual conversation and dialogue embodied in the interlocutors. In the actions, 
words, and content of the dialogue is highlighted the primary purpose of philosophia: to 
transform the “inner attitude” of the practitioner (Way of Life 59). This, in turn feeds from and 
forms the spiritual exercises (dialogue is a common spiritual exercise in the Greek schools) and 
engaging with the existential exigencies that confront personal and communal life. In this 
explication we see Hadot practicing philosophy as a way of life as he brings in a regular object of 
everyday life in his own historical moment in describing the movement of theory and existential 
choice—the lamp on a bicycle: 
Theoretical reflection goes in a certain direction as a result of a fundamental orientation 
of inner life, and this tendency of inner life is specified and takes shape as a result of 
theoretical reflection. . . In the night one needs a light that illuminates and allows one to 
guide oneself (this is theoretical reflection), but in order to have light, the generator has to 
turn by the movement of the wheel. The movement of the wheel is the choice of life. . . In 
other words, theoretical reflection already supposes a certain choice of life, but this 






Hadot’s work contributes to an understanding of philosophy as fundamentally communicative 
involving philosophical discourse, individual formation, and primacy of human communication 
between practitioners for effecting the conversion of the self. 
 The first section introduces Hadot’s clarification of the ideal of the sage and the 
generative relationship with the situatedness of the philo-sophos in everyday life. The section 
also reviews his discussion on the words sophia and philo-sophos or lover of wisdom. The 
second section turns to the figure of Socrates as the pre-eminent model of the philo-sophos in the 
Western Intellectual Tradition. Through irony, dialectic and erotic, Socrates brought about the 
birth of a consciousness awake to its present state of lack of wisdom and innate desire toward the 
good. The final section situates Hadot’s distinction between philosophy and philosophical 
discourse in an environment of primary orality. 
The Philosopher and the Sage 
 The Heraclitan fragment “Men who love wisdom must be good inquirers into many 
things indeed,” according to Charles Kahn, may be the first utterance of philosophos or “men 
who love wisdom” (105). In Kahn’s seminal interpretation and commentary on the fragments he 
elaborates: “philosophoi andres admits a secondary reading: ‘men who want to become sages’ . . 
. . It would be in character for him [Heraclitus] to introduce the theme of wisdom in the 
compound philo-sophos, as the object of ardent desire” (105). As something desired, wisdom is 
not yet achieved and may not be achieved in the lifetime of the practitioner (Way of Life 58). The 
desire and practice toward wisdom is what sets the philosophers in tension with the “customs and 
conventions of daily life” (58). ‘Wisdom’ or sophia in Hadot’s account of philosophia does not 
admit of a strict delineation between theoretical and practical aspects of life (Ancient Philosophy 





Hadot ties philosophia to a pre-Socratic notion of paideia. Paideia is the “desire to form 
and educate” and, according to Hadot, is “a fundamental demand of the Greek mentality” 
(Ancient Philosophy 11). The lover of wisdom is atopos: disconnected from the common habits 
of the everyday, “strange, extravagant, absurd, unclassifiable, disturbing” (Ancient Philosophy 
30). Each philosophical school identified an ideal way of living in this productive tension with 
the everyday. This way of life was exemplified in the figure of the sage. The sage takes on 
different characteristics depending on the school – Socratic, Neo-Platonic, Stoic – of which one 
is a part. Though in slightly different ways the commonalities of the sage across schools include 
cultivating an inner disposition and living in a state in accord with the creation-principle of that 
school, e.g. Stoic Reason. These raise the sage out of subjection to the “customs and conventions 
of daily life” (Way of Life 58).  
 Throughout his body of work Hadot produced two book-length studies on individual 
practitioners in the model of the philo-sophos in different schools with variations in the model of 
the sage toward which they practiced: the Neo-Platonist Plotinus (204–270 CE) and the Stoic 
Emperor Marcus Aurelius (121–160 CE). The Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius is indebted to 
Epictetus (50–135 CE) who exampled and exhorted a way of life that holds the choice of the 
moral good as absolute (Citadel 73). For the Stoic, choosing the moral good would put a person 
in complete accord with Reason and the Cosmos (Way of Life 58). For Plotinus, the sage is the 
one that progresses through the levels of reality by means of ascetic physical and spiritual 
practices toward becoming the Intellect (Ancient 166). Once reached the practitioner is fully 
transparent and subsumed back into the All from which all distinctions initially derived. “To 
become Intellect is thus to see ourselves, and all things, within the totalizing perspective of the 





rarely occurs if at all. The Stoics thought that perhaps there were one or two sages that appeared 
(Citadel 76). For Plotinian Neo-Platonism the state of identification with the All is a rare and 
fleeting experience (Ancient 160). Both schools admitted to this possibility of achieving this 
state, thus allowing for the possibility of progress toward wisdom. Being on the path is the 
middle way of the philo-sophos, not a sage but awakened to their lack of wisdom and their desire 
to live a life in practice and preparation toward wisdom. Socrates is the pre-eminent example and 
influence of the middle way of the philo-sophos in the Western Intellectual Tradition. 
 Common to both models of the sage and associated ways of life is the figure of Socrates 
and the coincidence of virtue and knowledge. Hadot’s research into the figure of the sage, that is 
those that have reached the ideal form of life, as in living in complete accord with the logos, 
leads immediately to the figure of Socrates wherein the model of the sage, the wise-person, 
becomes consistent with the philo-sophos, a person who is lacking wisdom, knows they are 
lacking wisdom, and desires toward wisdom. As part of understanding the notion of the sage and 
the philosopher, Hadot traces the development of the concept and occurrences of sophia (Ancient 
17-20). Hadot brings to life a picture wherein practices in knowledge in all fields—politics, art, 
music, nature, cosmos, biology—are combined efforts in practice toward wisdom. In other 
words, knowledge for the sake of knowledge was a goal only insofar as it assisted the person and 
community in being good. The fundamental philo-sophos as sage in the Western tradition is the 
figure of Socrates.  
Of “knowing how to do good” Hadot asks: 
Was the person who was Sophos one who knew and had seen many things, had traveled a 
great deal, and was broadly cultured, or was he rather the person who knew how to 





mutually exclusive. In the last analysis, real knowledge is know-how, and true-know-how 
is knowing how to do good. (Ancient 18)  
In What is Ancient Philosophy? Hadot goes further in discussing the type of knowledge and the 
change this presents to the understanding of sophos. In particular, the shift expands to include the 
Socratic imperative on moral intent. Knowledge is intrinsically tied to moral action, which 
includes human communication, which is the goal and desire of the philo-sophos. This comes out 
in the spiritual exercises practiced by the schools of philosophy. More will be said on the 
spiritual exercises in later sections. 
Hadot wrote that the call of philosophy is misunderstood generally and particularly in the 
figure of Socrates. The desire to live a life in accord with the logos and the response are the 
central and flourishing tensions of the way of life that is portrayed as the philosophical life. The 
desire for wisdom assumes one does not have wisdom. The sage—the ideal life that admits of 
varying levels of attainment across the schools—is removed from the burdens and conventions 
of daily public life. The philo-sophos on the other hand remains continually in the world aware 
of the desire to be outside of it. The “call and possibility” of Socrates to step aside and examine 
oneself could, to a portion of Athenians, therefore be considered a decision to disengage from 
public life and the duties of a citizen, and worse, encourage the youth to do so as the accusers of 
Socrates do in the Platonic dialogues (Way of Life 162; Ancient 37). Coming from the atopos 
figure of Socrates who stands seemingly outside the city, Hadot ventured, “Might not Socrates be 
the prototype for that image of the philosopher—so widespread, yet so false—who flees the 
difficulties of life in order to take refuge within his good conscience” (Ancient 37)? The figure of 






 Hadot returned to the words and actions of Socrates in showing that these two pursuits 
are not mutually exclusive. “Care for the self is thus, indissolubly, care for the city and for 
others” (Ancient 37). On the eve of the emergence of Socrates onto the Greek stage the words 
sophia and sophos indicate an array of meanings (Ancient 18-19). Prior to the emergence of 
Socrates, Hadot outlined two approaches to knowledge, identified as aristocratic and democratic. 
By the aristocratic variety Hadot painted a picture of knowledge and wisdom as possessed or 
accessed by only a select few people and was decidedly separate from and set against the 
ignorance of the “mob” (Ancient 26). Associated with the aristocratic variety are fragments such 
as those of “Parmenides, Empedocles, and Heraclitus” (26). On the other hand, the Sophists were 
associated with the democratic approach to knowledge in that it was available and able to be 
taught to anyone that could afford the fees, collectively represented by the Sophists (26). As was 
the custom, to witness wisdom meant to associate with a master and begin participating in the 
physical and spiritual exercises of the community (school) that formed around the master.  
In each school, students are striving and practicing toward that ideal form of wisdom that 
is modeled in the figure of the sage (Way of Life 57). Students work toward a life defined by the 
ideal of wisdom as expressed by the sage. “Each school . . . has its corresponding fundamental 
inner attitude . . . and its own manner of speaking. . . But above all every school practices 
exercises designed to ensure spiritual progress toward the ideal state of wisdom, exercises of 
reason that will be, for the soul, analogous to the athlete’s training or to the application of a 
medical cure” (Way of Life 59). “Knowing how to do good” is the constant theme Hadot 
identifies as the goal and practice of philosophia.  
Through his recovery of the philo-sophos Hadot repeatedly brought his readers back to 





actions of ancient authors. Philosophia indicates a mode of life and the practices, physical and 
spiritual, that a practitioner strives to achieve in a productive tension amidst the “customs and 
conventions of daily life” (Way of Life 58). That ideal life was given shape in the model of the 
sage, particularly the influential and mythical figure of Socrates. “It is true that this transcendent 
ideal will be deemed almost inaccessible” (Way of Life 57). As previously mentioned, for some 
schools sagacity is an achievable moment that is both fleeting and rare, for other schools those 
who have achieved it have been limited to one or two, and then in other schools, no one yet has 
lived the ideal (Way of Life 57).  
Socrates as Model Philo-sophos 
 The sage who fit no model of the sage before him was Socrates. When referencing 
Socrates, Hadot is doing so not to call attention to any so-called historical Socrates but instead to 
the image of the sage as received in the Platonic dialogues and other descriptions set forth in the 
discourses such as Xenophon and Plutarch (Ancient Philosophy 22). As the Western model of the 
sage Socrates refuses to be classified into a specific category, e.g. sophist, poet, dramatist, and as 
Hadot points out, even the sage. “Although philosophy is a tearing away from this everyday life, 
it nevertheless remains inseparable from this everyday life” (Happiness 179). As the preeminent 
image of the atopos philo-sophos in the Western philosophical tradition, Socrates is intimately 
enmeshed in the everyday life of the city. Philosophia and the philosopher are immediately 
identifiable by a way of life that sets them apart but is definitely a part of the community. 
Philosophy is a way of life that is both practice of and preparation for wisdom (Ancient 
Philosophy 4).  
 At the crux of philosophia is the practice of a life that is integrally communicative in 





exercises associated with the different schools. Preparing the way for that discussion is an 
understanding the role of the figure, or myth, of the sage and the way in which ‘philosophical 
discourse’ is understood within the context of philosophia. At the core of the Western tradition 
of philosophy lies the myth of a man that never wrote anything down and whose historical figure 
remains elusive yet enduringly impressed as an event in Western thought. Hadot comes to an 
understanding of the sage as philo-sophos that seizes on the example of his life that comes 
through what is received as the myth of Socrates (Happiness 124).   
Hadot often points to Plutarch’s illustrative description of Socrates. This description 
highlights the relationship between wisdom, the philosopher, and the “customs and conventions 
of daily life” (Way of Life 58).  
“Socrates at any rate was a philosopher, although he did not set out benches or seat 
himself in an armchair or observe a fixed hour for conversing or promenading with his 
pupils, but jested with them, when it so happened, and drank with them, served in the 
army or lounged in the market-place with some of them, and finally was imprisoned and 
drank the poison. He was the first to show that life at all times and in all parts, in all 
experiences and activities, universally admits philosophy.” (Plutarch 26d) 
In the example of Socrates in the Apology responding to a question about the morality of acting 
in such a way that put him in danger of death he responds that this is of no matter because he is 
not in a position to know about the goodness or badness of death. Not knowing about death, 
Socrates does know about actions, “committing injustice and disobeying my betters, whether 
God or man, is bad and shameful. Therefore, I shall never fear or flee something whose badness 





Ancient Philosophy 33). What one does not know one cannot fear; when one knows one can, and 
perhaps should, fear. 
 For Hadot, Socrates’ position on wisdom accepts first that all people are capable of 
wisdom, and second that all humans have a desire to wisdom or to do the good. The “innate 
desire” for wisdom in and through good actions in the “Socratic mission” within each person 
must be cultivated. This cultivation brings meaning to life; “at the basis of Socratic knowledge is 
love of the good” (Ancient Philosophy 34). This love of the good simultaneously forms the 
“inner attitude” of the practitioner and identifies that toward which the practitioner strives. As 
the case of Alcibiades in the Symposium the choice to do good is one that can be ignored while 
attending to the work of everyday affairs. This is also a question that afflicts him bodily and 
intellectually when he encounters Socrates (Symposium 216a-c). “And there is only one good and 
one value: the will to do good. This implies that we must not avoid constantly and rigorously 
examining the way we live, in order to see if it is always guided and inspired by this will to do 
good” (Ancient Philosophy 35). In wisdom—considered as “knowing-how-to-do-good”—moral 
intent is brought to the forefront. 
 The relationship between the theoretical reflection and the existential choice to do good 
in the face of the demands of everyday life is interdependent with the way in which one acts in 
the face of existential demands, including death. In the Phaedo as Socrates is nearing the time to 
drink the hemlock Crito asks what arrangements should be made regarding to his children and 
other affairs and especially, “What can we do that would please you most?” (Phaedo 115b). To 
which Socrates responds, 
Nothing new, Crito . . . but what I am always saying, that you will please me and mine 





do not agree with me now, but if you neglect your own selves, and are unwilling to live 
following the tracks, as it were, of what we have said now and on previous occasions, 
you will achieve nothing even if you strongly agree with me at this moment.” (115b-c) 
Socrates exhorts his death-bed companions to continue to live as they have—conversing, 
drinking, wrestling, soldiering—and to continue to take care of themselves. Hadot puts front and 
center that taking care of oneself is caught up in the constant rigor of questioning the self. The 
choice of a life must be renewed. Taking care of oneself, that is continuing to make the 
existential choice to live by a certain way of life, involves nothing new and is an ever present 
event. Socrates as the model philo-sophos demonstrates philosophia as an inextricable 
intertwining of reason and passion, life and death, Dionysus and Eros.   
 Socratic irony is at play for understanding the figure of Socrates as the primary and 
generative model of the philo-sophos in the Western philosophical tradition. Hadot undertook to 
describe Socratic irony, dialectic, and erotic, and their relation to the “movements of 
consciousness” in dialogue with Socrates’ dialogue partner. The figure of Socrates as a lover of 
wisdom seems at once at odds with his buffoon-like physical appearance and his repeated claims 
to ignorance (Way of Life 148). “It is a paradox of highly Socratic irony that Socrates was not a 
sage, but a “philo-sopher”: that is, a lover of wisdom” (147). In other words, the premier 
example of wisdom is a figure who was aware of the fact that he knew nothing, who looked like 
a buffoon, talked about earthly subjects, and refused to answer questions. This is a radical 
reshaping of knowledge in Greek culture at the time (Ancient 26).  
 In Hadot’s reading this reshaping moves the abstract understanding of concepts to the 
background of what is understood as being knowledgeable. Prior to Socrates, the idea of 





everyday life of the city—administering justice, honoring the gods (piety), educating the youth—
and the poor state of the interlocutor and his need to address himself in order to administer public 
life. The figure of Socrates altered this understanding. He worked as a mediator and midwife at 
the only place where knowledge—that one is aware that one knows nothing—is rooted, in 
reflection on the self and constant choices one makes about what one knows and how one acts. 
The irony of Socrates is at play in the generation of the soul of his interlocutor.  
 Hadot described Socratic irony as a rhetorical speech strategy that is at work in the 
dialogue within the soul of the interlocutor themselves, as well as the vehicle of coming to 
wisdom—becoming aware that one knows nothing—for the interlocutor (Way of Life 153-154). 
Eironeia is the Greek word for the rhetorical figure of irony. Hadot characterized eironeia both 
as a psychological mood and as a discursive action. Socratic dialectic irony combined “false” 
self-deprecation and making the argument of one’s opponent for him (Way of Life 152). The 
direction of Socrates in his ironic engagement of others through questioning is to bring them to a 
conversation wherein one would be forced to confront their own ignorance. Hadot pointed to 
Alcibiades in the Symposium as expositor of this disturbing yet attractive experience. “I was in 
such a state that it did not seem possible to live while behaving as I was behaving. . . . He forces 
me to admit to myself that I do not take care for myself” (qtd. in Ancient 31). Rather than 
achieving a certain literary effect or an intentionally false position-taking to achieve some sort of 
upper hand in the dialogue, Socratic irony is a form of humor that cuts to the core of Socrates’ 
mission. This irony is in play in the language and topics of discussion Socrates used in a 
dialogue. Socrates investigated the highest of ideals such as courage and justice through the 
actions of earthly forms of action, such as soldiering, tanning, blacksmithing, shoemaking, and 





resemble or are used as a mask to conceal his true purpose—talking with others the principles of 
living a good life and Socrates’ mission to bring his interlocuter to awareness and desire for 
wisdom. 
 Alcibiades compared Socrates to the image of the Sileni (Way of Life 148). According to 
Hadot, the Sileni were emblems of the opposite of civilization. They appeared in a buffoon-like 
manner and were concomitant with acting in accord with the instincts in opposition to reason 
(148). Likened to the Sileni, Socrates is a disturbing sight and dialogue partner. But, just like the 
small figures of these creatures which once broken through revealed a smaller statue of a god, 
Socrates’ humor and questions were also a mask. “Socrates pulled off his enterprise of 
dissimulation so well that he succeeded in definitively masking himself from history. He wrote 
nothing, engaging only in dialogue. All the testimonies we possess about him hide him from us 
more that they reveal him, precisely because Socrates has always been used as a mask by those 
who have spoken about him” (Way of Life 148). Socrates goes after the interlocutor, someone 
who is beautiful as in the case of Alcibiades in the Symposium, and is at first shown to approach 
the interlocutor as a lover would approach a beloved. 
 Socrates is a figure that clearly does not fit with any of the Greek models of beauty, 
whether physical and/or heroic, that were sung about in poems or immortalized in speeches. And 
it is exactly his atopos, his disconnection from everyday life, that is attractive and desirable and 
draws the interlocutor to Socrates both intellectually and physically. Hadot identified Socrates 
the philo-sophos, as presented in Platonic dialogues most notably in the Symposium, with the 
characteristics of Eros and Dionysus. Hadot marked the importance of noting that the love 
presented is homosexual love as fits in the context of being a formative love (Way of Life 158). 





institution formed in “archaic warrior education” (158). This kind of “virile friendship” took 
place in order to teach the young man the noble virtues (158). Hadot pointed out that the master-
disciple relationship of the Sophist period is also modeled on this same example and similarly 
described erotically (158). In the dialogues Socrates is displayed as seeking after love and 
wisdom from his youthful and beautiful interlocutor. Eros is at play on the levels of both a 
personal relationship and in the form of dialogue as in the case of dialectical irony.  
 Through his questioning and refusing to answer questions Socrates remains seductively 
just out of reach of the interlocuter (Way of Life 149). Simultaneously the interlocuter remains in 
the dialogue and grows more disquieted by the path down which he is being led (Way of Life 
149). The interlocutor is slowly led to the point of crisis—the point in an illness after which the 
body moves toward health or toward death. The interlocutor becomes bereft of confidence and 
the dialogue is in danger of moving toward decline. In this moment, the crisis point, Socrates 
becomes the mask for the reader. Socrates takes on the mantle of following the path and thus the 
responsibility of keeping up the dialogue. Through Socrates the interlocuter receives a picture of 
oneself. Socrates takes up the doubts and hesitations thereby returning the interlocuter to 
“confidence in the dialectical research and in the logos itself” (149). The primary purpose is not 
to ‘win’ the dialogue or even to be right but to continue and further the practice of an 
interlocutor’s way of life and continue to bring them toward health, i.e., practicing the 
philosophic life in private and in the community thus confirming or improving their initial way 
of life.  
 As seen in the previous segment, dialectical irony involves a splitting of the self for the 
purpose of reflecting on the self. Socrates comes in as one that will take on the risk and 





interlocutor questioning one’s own self. The dialogue partner thus hides behind Socrates as the 
investigation into one’s way of life and the reasoning on which this way of life rests. Once one’s 
own ignorance is revealed Socrates as mask is removed. Once the dialogue partner is converted 
to Socrates’ understanding of wisdom and love, the interlocutor finds oneself not in love with 
Socrates himself but with the same lack of knowledge and pursuit of wisdom in which Socrates 
is engaged. The roles of lover and beloved have shifted so that the beloved is now the lover. As 
lover the interlocutor becomes keenly aware of his lack as they simultaneously suffer the pangs 
of desire for the beloved. As Hadot summarized, the interlocutor’s beloved is shown to no longer 
be Socrates, but wisdom:  
“He suffers from being deprived of the plenitude of being, and he strives to attain it. 
When other men fall in love with Socrates/Eros—that is, when they fall in love with love, 
such as Socrates reveals it to them—what they love in Socrates is his love for, and 
aspiration toward, beauty and the perfection of being. In Socrates, they find the path 
toward their own perfection” (Way of Life 162). 
As in dialectic irony so too in erotic irony; Socrates as the mask and lover steps aside revealing 
the state of being of the interlocutor. Socrates brings his dialogue partner to the point of love 
with the pursuit of wisdom and the way of life that best fits his partner (Way of Life 163).  
 The process—the practice of dialogue—is what is creative and generative for those 
engaged with Socrates. Much less important is the construction of a coherent system of thought 
than the formation of the “fundamental inner attitude” of the practitioner (Way of Life 59). This 
philosophical life is not separated from the body and the irrationality of desire, which carries 
with it not only the desire to attain the beloved but also to participate in generation of a philo-





nature of the irrational element in existence. This element, which Hadot identified as the daimon 
or the demonic or passion finds a description in Johann von Goethe as the “motor force 
indispensable for all creation; it is the blind inexorable dynamic which we cannot escape, but 
must rather know how to use” (quoted in Way of Life 164). In the figure of Socrates, the 
generation of wisdom is of a way of life.  
 The daimon is inextricable and of itself is neither good nor ill. In describing the daimonic 
element in Socrates, Hadot winds his way through the works of both Friedrich Nietzsche and 
Goethe in contextualizing the daimonic as an “ambiguous and ambivalent” element (Way of life 
164). Without being of intrinsic value, the individual must take action in response to the 
existential communal demands of a life that give outline to this otherwise irrational element. 
Hadot brings into view the “absolute value of moral intent” of Socrates as philo-sophos (Ancient 
32). Forming moral intent is then what becomes the primary pedagogical operation of the irony 
of Socrates/Eros. 
 The moral intent must be generative in the way of life of the practitioner. The point, then, 
is not to be able to define what justice/piety/love is or is not in language, but for the person to 
experience and practice justice/piety/love. At this point Hadot marks out the limit of language in 
philosophy and the relationship between philosophy and philosophical discourse (Way of Life 
155, Ancient 173). At a certain point in Socratic questioning, “The individual thus finds himself 
called into question in the most fundamental bases of his action, and he becomes aware of the 
living problem he himself represents for himself” (Way of Life 155). The dialogue as a spiritual 
exercise must bring the interlocutor through the play of dialectic and erotic irony to the 
awakening of their inherent desire toward the good. The interlocutor is formed in dialogue, in 





Better yet, he has been Socrates himself. And Socrates is interrogation, questioning, and stepping 
back to take a look at oneself; to take a look at, in a word, his consciousness” (Way of Life 154). 
Acting as a midwife Socrates guides the interlocutor as the interactants split into two and reflect 
on their current approach to life and actions and recognize what should be guiding their actions. 
In closing this section I quote Hadot at length and follow the lead of Arnold Davidson who 
introduced Hadot to the English speaking world, as a lifelong friend and dialogue partner in 
Hadot’s final published volume of interviews. In the introduction to Plotinus or the Simplicity of 
Vision Davidson resorts to quoting Hadot at length “because they [his writings] brilliantly 
articulate the major concepts and stages of Plotinus’s spiritual itinerary” (Davidson, Introduction 
to Plotinus 5). The following lengthy quote is no less brilliant in portraying the middle way of 
the philo-sophos: 
“[The philosopher] knows that the normal, natural state of men should be wisdom, for 
wisdom is nothing more than the vision of things as they are, the vision of the cosmos as 
it is in the light of reason, and wisdom is also nothing more than the mode of being and 
living that should correspond to this vision. But the philosopher also knows that this 
wisdom is an ideal state, almost inaccessible. For such a man, daily life, as it is organized 
and lived by other men, must necessarily appear abnormal, like a state of madness, 
unconsciousness, and ignorance of reality. And nonetheless he must live this life every 
day, in this world in which he feels himself a stranger and in which others perceive him 
to be one as well. And it is precisely in this daily life that he must seek to attain that way 
of life which is utterly foreign to the everyday world. The result is a perpetual conflict 
between the philosopher’s effort to see things as they are from the standpoint of universal 





between the life one should live and the customs and conventions of daily life. This 
conflict can never be totally resolved” (Way of Life 58).  
The philosopher’s efforts are guided along by a teacher and lived and practiced within a 
community of practitioners. The philosopher also had the aid of philosophical discourse, and the 
writings and notes regarding the way of life of philosophy that aids in re-confirming and 
justifying the existential choices of his way of life. The two are not the same nor are they able to 
be considered apart from one another.  
Philosophical Discourse and Orality 
 Hadot again and again brought his readers back to the existential choice and consequent 
way of living as the definitive mark of a philo-sophos who is atopos, that is outside the order of 
everyday life. There are numerous examples of people recognized as philosophers that wrote 
little or nothing. In addition to the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition, Hadot identified the 
Cynics, Roman statesmen Cato of Utica, Rutilius Rufus and Quintus Mucius Scaevola Pontifex, 
Marcus Aurelius (this was before his Meditations had come to be widely circulated), and 
Plotinus (Ancient 173). Hadot borrowed the Stoic distinction between philosophy and 
philosophical discourse as example of the general understanding of the relationship between the 
“incommensurable and inseparable” phenomena (Ancient 172).  
The Stoics had a three-part system of ethics, virtue, and logic. These three parts had 
corresponding discourses written in question and answer format that were presented to students 
in a particular manner—of which there were several theories—that was thought to be the best for 
taking on the habituation of these practices by the student (Citadel 80-81). Discourses written on 
the theories tended toward explanations about the movement of the cosmos (physics) and of 





abstractions. The latter were examples of “discourse concerning philosophy” (Citadel 81, 
original emphasis). “In philosophy itself . . . the exercise of wisdom, physics, ethics, and logic 
are mutually implicated within and interior to one another, in that act—at once multiple and 
unique—which is the exercise of physical virtue, ethical virtue, and logical virtue” (Citadel 82). 
Theory production was put at the service of acting when circumstances called for a 
communicative response. Primary orality as the environment of production helps further 
highlight the purpose of philosophy and the supportive role of philosophical discourse. 
 Eric Havelock (1903-1988 CE), a Cambridge trained classicist, along with Walter Ong 
(1912-2003 CE) and Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980 CE), is one of the foundational scholars 
associated with the field of media ecology. Havelock’s work gives emphasis and clarity to the 
organizational capacity and force of orality in ancient Greece. His writing opens the way and 
supports Hadot’s distinction between philosophy and philosophical discourse.  
 Eric Havelock in Preface to Plato (1963) describes the extent to which the experience of 
orality was organized and embodied. Orality, being the primary carrier of tradition and of Greek 
experience, required the ‘content’ of the tradition and the act of teaching/learning to adhere to 
established forms of rhythm and meter which privileged regularized categories of organization 
(e.g., hero, orator, blacksmith, shipbuilder) for easy recall. Havelock identified this process with 
the poetic. Transmission of the tradition called for mimesis, which required full bodily and 
physical capacities to be taken over or hypnotized, in order to be able to take on and recall 
(imitate) the content for future performances (Havelock 26-27). Havelock points out, through 
Plato, that the poetic requires a disposition of mind and body that could not provide the 
consistency necessary for scientific precision in any field, be it technical or moral ( 6-27). 





philosophos and model of wisdom in the Republic as a “shock” (281). Havelock described this 
person in similar terms as Hadot, “Phil- is the label of a psychic urge, a drive, a thirst, an all-
consuming desire. The ‘philosoph’ then is a man of special instincts and energies” (281). Sophia, 
that which is sought after, is “a cognition of those identities which ‘are’, and ‘are forever’, and 
are ‘imperceptible’; these are the Forms” which requires a different psychological method 
utilizing a capacity for abstraction (282). Havelock’s account of Socrates only adds to his atopos 
nature (302-303).  
Socrates required his interlocuters to think in constructs so as to respond to questions 
such as ‘what is justice?’ In Havelock’s description, Socrates’ method is both stretching the 
Greek psychological activity into abstract thought while simultaneously remaining “fully 
embedded in oral methodology, never writing a word so far as we know, and exploiting the give 
and take of the market place” (Havelock 303). The primacy of orality in learning and forming the 
practitioner is the central distinction for Hadot in clarifying the relationship between philosophia 
and philosophical discourse. Hadot moved written discourse to the background, considering how 
philosophical discourse, or the received writings and fragments of Antiquity, fit within the goal 
of living a way of life and interior formation in preparation for wisdom. 
 Hadot recalled that his initial engagement with this subject began as a question of 
coherence. “Why do ancient philosophical writings generally give the impression of being 
incoherent? Why is it so difficult to recognize their plan” (Happiness 59)? Having located the 
genre and environment of production of the texts in question, the questions open onto the 
relationship of orality and written discourse. Hadot remarked that in the current understanding of 
philosophy dominated by philosophical discourse “there is the partial but very real loss of the 





the personal and the communal aspect of philosophy” (Happiness 56). The therapeutic, the 
personal, and the communal aspects were all an inherent part of philosophy as it was carried out 
in the spoken word. 
  Responding to this question then Hadot focused on two points. First, that orality is 
privileged in learning and practice and, second, that the philosophical experience cannot be 
expressed in words. The conversion and ongoing formation of the “inner attitude” is the primary 
purpose of practicing philosophy (Way of Life 59). Hadot is influenced in his understanding of 
the movement the practitioner takes in that formation as he is influenced by John Henry 
Newman’s notion of “real assent”—a movement of one’s whole being in agreement to a 
proposition in such a way that one’s way of life would be changed (quoted in Happiness 58).  
 As Socrates showed in words and action, the formation of the inner attitude is akin to 
birthing the soul, involving the inextricable workings of both logical reasoning and irrational 
passionate desire. Instruction in the ways of philosophy were primarily oral, for it is only through 
oral speech that the dialogue is possible. As in the model of Socrates, the irrational embodied 
desire is inextricable with the reasoned question and answer process. Only the spoken word in a 
living conversation brings dialogue to its full pedagogical potential (Happiness 54). The spoken 
word is living and is part of an extended conversation between the teacher and his auditors, who 
could respond in a manner consistent with the doctrine of the school. The interlocutor’s reply is 
also a situated response, which could be more or less vivid according to the needs of the 
practitioner (Happiness 53-54). For Hadot, then, philosophical discourse is tied to the question 
and answer format and is written with the presumption of an ongoing living conversation. This 
approach helps to explain parts of ancient texts (Way of Life 62). Quite often the work proceeds 





hesitations, and the repetitions of spoken discourse. Or else, after re-reading what he has written, 
the author introduces a somewhat forced systematization by adding transitions, introductions, or 
conclusions to different parts of the text. (Way of Life 62) Hadot, in explicating the Stoicism of 
Marcus Aurelius, pointed out the inherent orality in the composition of written discourse, which 
extends even to temporal considerations. Presenting and teaching the discourses on a particular 
point of theory (ethics, physics, logic) took a period of time. Arguments were posed, questions 
were asked, and chains of reasoning reviewed; this all took place in “logical time” (Citadel 80). 
However, the goal was the inner formation of the practitioner and the shaping of his life in 
accord with Stoic ethics, logic, and physics. Hadot remarked that this stage of learning brought 
into consideration the student’s “spiritual progress” (80). This time was different for each student 
as he took on “inwardly and spiritually” the doctrine at hand. Hadot referred to this time as 
“psychological time” (80). 
 Philosophy in antiquity upends the contemporary historical moment’s understanding of 
the relationship between philosophical discourse and the distinctive activities that mark one as 
being a philosopher: choosing and following a way of life and taking part in the accompanying 
spiritual exercises. In several examples Hadot showed that the experience of philosophy runs up 
against the limits of language in which philosophical content can be expressed. Following in the 
manner of Socrates in the Symposium the purpose of studying philosophy was to prepare the 
student to live a way of life in preparation for an experience of wisdom that was incommunicable 
in language. For example, the Plotinian unity with the One and Phaedrus’ viewing of the forms.  
 Setting aside the primacy of orality in all of ancient discourse, Hadot identified two 
trends that could be understood as two opposing poles of philosophy (Happiness 60). At the one 





(Happiness 56). This takes the shape of a discourse that aims at “originality” or the production of 
a novel system of thought (56). This pole of philosophy has become increasingly formalized and 
specialized (Ancient 260). For an illustrative example of this pole Hadot observed this formality 
especially in the current state of philosophy in university education. This course of study 
involves the preparation for a narrow set of skills to be utilized in a narrow range of careers: “to 
train them [university students] for careers as clerks or professors—that is to say, as specialists, 
theoreticians, and retainers of specific items of more or less esoteric knowledge” (Ancient 260). 
Similarly, the Sophists in antiquity sought to make themselves known through elegant displays 
of their capacities in order to attract paying students (Happiness 60). The other pole is 
philosophia and the way of the philo-sophos wherein “pleasure in talking” can happen but is 
rather oriented toward the end or goal of choosing and practicing a way of life (Happiness 60). 
Conclusion 
 This chapter reviewed the distinction between those who love wisdom (philosopher) and 
those who have achieved a state of wisdom (sage). Hadot revealed this distinction in two book-
length studies of philosophers; Plotinus (Neoplatonism) in Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision 
(1993) and Marcus Aurelius (Stoic) in The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius 
(1998). For Plotinus the sage-experience is fleeting and rare. For Marcus Aurelius and the Stoics 
sage status had been achieved but only by one or maybe two people. However, both schools 
admitted that achieving the wisdom of the sage was possible and so likewise was spiritual 
progress. The person on this middle way between ignorance and wisdom could be readily 
identified by their existence as disturbing or outside of the conventions and customs of daily life 





wisdom. This middle-way of lack, desire, and atopos way of living is most vivid in the received 
figure of Socrates. 
 The figure of Socrates as the prototypical philo-soph in the Western intellectual tradition. 
The historical Socrates eschewed writing, choosing rather to be both embedded in the everyday 
life of the city—fulfilling obligations, the religious rites, soldiering, drinking, and being in 
conversation with friends as Plutarch’s definition attests. As an individual, Socrates’ actions and 
ideas were considered dangerous for the development of the youth, leading them astray from 
care of the city. Hadot drew attention to Socrates’ words and actions to show that care for the 
soul and care for the public life are not mutually exclusive tasks. Care for the soul takes place in 
the conversations that happened at celebrations and in the markets of Athens that occurred in the 
usual realm of conducting life in the city. Socrates’ search for wisdom was to engender souls that 
were awake to their own lack of knowledge. The figure of Socrates is revealed and hidden in the 
play of dialectic and erotic irony. This irony is at play in bringing the soul of the interlocutor to 
life. 
 For Hadot the figure of knowledge that comes through the descriptions and dialogues of 
Socrates is that the desire for the good; to perform the good is a latent possibility for all people. 
A defining role of Socrates then is to act as a midwife and help birth the soul into awareness by 
reshaping knowledge that foregrounds one’s reflection of self. The use of irony in conversation 
was a mask and a vehicle for bringing the soul to its latent desire for the good and to perform the 
good. Hadot showed irony at work in the execution of the dialogue along a logical line of 
reasoning and in the impassioned seduction that Socrates builds and finally re-directs in his 
speech and actions. As dialogue partner, Socrates takes on the role of risk and responsibility of 





the lover pursuing the young boy, to the beloved as the boy chases after him. In both cases the 
interlocutor hides behind the mask of Socrates as both pursuits continue simultaneously. At the 
point of revelation, Socrates stepped aside, revealing at once the interlocutor’s lack of knowledge 
and their love for the pursuit of wisdom (Way of Life 162).  
 The dual identification of Socrates with Eros and Logos points to the inextricable nature 
of reasoned speech and irrational bodily desire. The irrational plays a role in the primary purpose 
of forming the “inner attitude” of the practitioner (Way of Life 59). Hadot introduces the daimon 
or the demonic as the creative and generative force at play in the figure of Socrates and the 
dialogue. The daimon force is neither good nor bad and cannot be ignored (Way of Life 64). 
What gives shape to the daimonic force is one’s moral intent. Thus, Hadot brings us around to 
the formation of the moral intent motivating one’s actions and words via dialogue and seduction 
as Socrates’ primary pedagogical mission. Working through Hadot’s understanding of the 
mission of Socrates as aimed at the transformation of one’s whole being opens up a distinction 
between philosophia and philosophical discourse that is fundamental in Hadot’s work. 
 The final section reviewed Hadot’s understanding of primary orality in antiquity and the 
structure and format of written philosophical discourse. Hadot noted in an interview with Arnold 
Davidson that he had approached the problem from a literary perspective, wondering why it is 
that philosophical writings appeared to be incoherent and lacking a specific plan (Happiness 59)? 
Placing the fragments back in the context of the demands of the structure and forces of primary 
orality and in the context of the overall purpose of practicing a way of life, Hadot’s work could 
then be said to reframe the question as follows: how does philosophical discourse serve the 
purpose of the formation of the “inner attitude” and actions in preparing for wisdom (Way of Life 





limits of language. There is a presumption of an ongoing and living conversation between 
teacher and students. This helped explain the question and answer format, word choice, and 
temporal considerations. The final part of this section introduced Hadot’s analogy of two 
opposing poles to identify two trends in the history of philosophy. On one side is the 
formalization of philosophical writing and discourse done for the sake of itself or that aims at 
originality or the explicit production of a new system of thought (Happiness 56). Hadot ventures 
that formalization enters in the 17th and 18th centuries in the Western world. On the other side is 
philosophia and the way of the philo-sophos and the aim of living a way of life in concert with a 








“Ancient philosophers thus developed many 
varieties of therapy of the soul, which were 
practiced by means of various forms of discourse: 
exhortation, reprimands, consolation, instruction. . . 
philosophical spiritual guidance utilized rhetorical 
techniques in order to provoke conversion and 
bring about conviction.” (Ancient 217) 
  
 The purpose for practicing spiritual exercises is to transcend the “egoist self” and cohere 
with the universal principle and/or residing in and/or experiencing the state of wisdom as defined 
by that school (Happiness 86). Guiding the practitioner toward wisdom is the ideal embodied in 
the figure of the sage. The existential choice of a way of life that responds to and with a vision of 
the cosmos is lived out in and through the spiritual exercises. A life of ‘exercise’ is a life of 
philosophy. 
 “Equanimity of soul, absence of need, and indifference to indifferent things” are habits 
common to the various models of the sage that mark him as acting in accord with logos or 
Reason (Ancient 222). As recounted in the preceding chapter the middle way of the philo-sophos 
and the life of exercise is exemplified in the myth/figure of Socrates. This way calls upon both 
reason and passion and begins in the simultaneous realization that one both lacks wisdom and 
carries an innate desire for the good (Ancient 34). The life of the philo-sophos is lived in a 
productive tension between desiring to live out the life of the sage while remaining enmeshed as 
member of the city taking part in its daily life and habits (Way of Life 58). Pierre Hadot 






 Socrates took part in functions of the city, even to the point of submitting to the 
judgement and sentence of death by the city but was also recognized by all as outside the city, or 
atopos. The philosopher is both embedded and atopos. He is part of the city but also strange and 
“unclassifiable” (Ancient 37). The strangeness of Socrates was in part due to the adherence to a 
regime of spiritual exercises. Identifying the habits of the philosopher as atopos also points to 
those phenomena with which the philosopher wrestled: The habituated fabric of city-life, the fear 
and anguish that can come from the uncertainties of war, political upheaval, natural disasters, 
worry over the future or the past, etc. with which each person struggles (Way of Life 221-222). 
This is contrary to a tendency to view ancient society as less fraught and uncertain than the 
present one. Hadot remarked on this tendency: “It does seem, then, that the Greeks paid 
particular attention to the present moment. This, however, does not justify us in imagining—as 
did Winckelmann, Goethe, and Hölderlin—the existence of an idealized Greece, the citizens of 
which, because they lived in the present moment, were perpetually bathed in beauty and 
serenity” (Way of Life 221). Hadot subtly but firmly applied a corrective in conceptualizing 
ancient societies—the Greeks and Romans in particular—while explicating the phenomena of 
the spiritual exercise of attending to the present moment. This corrective coincides with his 
striving for objectivity in coming to re-situate philosophical discourse within the environment 
and genre of its production. Hadot did not advocate that contemporary readers should “slavishly 
imitate” the “spiritual itinerary” of the ancients (Plotinus 113). Rather, the combination of 
interpretation and explication of philosophical discourse and spiritual exercises are attentive to 
the “original economic, social, political, and religious context” of the historical moment that 
opens up the possibility for a contemporary reader to encounter and engage the resources of 





meaning such as ‘What is the significance of death in our lives?’ (Brisson and Chase 439; 
MacIntyre 125). 
 This chapter fills out a picture of the practice of philosophia that weaves together body 
and the spoken word, the irrational passions and reasoned logos, internal and external discourse, 
and the personal and communal. This first section in this chapter reviews Hadot’s definition of 
the spiritual exercises, their therapeutic function, and brings further emphasis on their being 
embodied exercises lived through internal and external discourse and dialogue in the assumption 
and interactions of community. The next section is a review of the major common points of 
spiritual exercises across all the schools. Throughout Hadot’s scholarship the phenomenon of 
spiritual exercises has been presented with variations that serve to emphasize different aspects of 
the general phenomenon. 
Hadot’s most recent organization of the spiritual exercises presented them as two 
“opposed but complementary” ways of training the soul: “concentration of the self” and 
“expansion of the self” (Ancient 189; Citadel 118). For example, exercises such as examination 
of conscience and meditation has as their focus bringing attention to the self. Exercises such as 
contemplation of death, and physics expanded the soul to be able to move beyond themselves 
toward a union/immersion with the cosmos (Ancient 193). Each of the common ‘movements’ 
assume and assist the practitioner’s progress via exercise of the other. For example, examination 
of conscience and meditation—concentration movements—are also preparatory exercises for 
attaining a cosmic viewpoint. In turn, this “cosmic consciousness” nourishes one’s exercise of 
meditation as it brings an increasingly clearer picture of oneself and it’s integral and humble part 







 Hadot has given several versions of the definition for spiritual exercises: “voluntary, 
personal practices intended to cause a transformation of the self” (Ancient 179-180), and again, 
though slightly different in The Present Alone is Our Happiness, “voluntary, personal practices 
intended to bring about a transformation of the individual, a transformation of the self,” (87), and 
“By this term [spiritual exercises], I mean practices which could be physical, as in dietary 
regimes, or discursive as in dialogue and meditation, or intuitive, as in contemplation, but which 
were all intended to effect a modification and a transformation in the subject who practiced 
them” (Ancient 6) and another variation on the theme, “But above all every school practices 
exercises designed to ensure spiritual progress toward the ideal state of wisdom, exercises of 
reason that will be, for the soul, analogous to the athlete’s training or to the application of a 
medical cure” (Way of Life 59). And, from Philosophy as a Way of Life, “the word ‘spiritual’ is 
quite apt to make us understand that these exercises are the result, not merely of thought, but of 
the individual’s entire psychism” (82). Arnold Davidson gives a poignant summary that relays 
the totality of the phenomenon: 
“Spiritual exercises were exercises because they were practical, required effort and 
training, and were lived; they were spiritual because they involved the entire spirit, one’s 
whole way of being. The art of living demanded by philosophy was a lived exercise 
exhibited in every aspect of one’s existence.” (Introduction 21, original emphasis)  
Spiritual exercises are undertaken out of an already-made choice to live a certain way of life, 
they privilege the spoken word, they are embodied and the practitioner had the intention to 





formation of the whole self, they were to continue to bring the person to ‘health’ and to 
constantly practice the philosophical way of life on the model of the sage.  
 Associated with the figure of the sage are the possibility of mystical experiences. This 
experience was generally considered to be one of transcendence beyond the boundaries of the 
self, such as in Platonic transcendence to the vision of the forms, Plotinian union with the 
Intellect, or Stoic coherence of human reason with universal Reason, played a role in orienting 
the path of the philo-sophos (Happiness 81; Citadel 73; Way of Life 59).  Aware that one 
simultaneously lacks wisdom and desires it, one practices spiritual exercises in working toward 
wisdom which on may potentially communicate to others. Situated as a North Star, a mystical 
experience may occur or be attained but it is not the experience by which one’s progress is 
validated. “If . . . [mystical/ecstatic experiences] occur, in one form another, it is true that they 
can open perspectives on the mystery of existence for the philosopher, but they cannot be an end 
in itself, and seeking to provoke them would be useless” (Happiness 82). In Neoplatonism the 
state of wisdom is not sustainable and in the Stoic and Epicurean philosophia the vagaries of life 
in the body and in the sensible world will draw one’s reason away from coherence with universal 
Reason. The life of self-consciousness and engagement of the exercises was the path of the 
philo-sophos (81).  
 One’s striving to live the philosophical life can be frustrated by the physical, cognitive, 
social, political vagaries part of the human condition. With “equanimity of soul, absence of need, 
and indifference to indifferent things” as a general mark of the sage who has achieved perfect 
coherence with the Intellect or Universal Reason exhibiting thereby identical judgements, desires 
and actions of the same then the things which bring potential for “suffering, disorder, and 





disturbed through external and environmental interactions such as city politics, war, and sickness 
(Way of Life 221). However, the primary causes of disturbance were generally considered the 
passions which manifested in overgrown desires and fears (Way of Life 83). Regular practice of 
spiritual? exercises helped to bring the soul back to health.  
 In Philosophy as a Way of Life Hadot has provided a list of the various spiritual exercises 
practiced in the ancient world combined from several ancient references to the practices. They 
include the following:  
“research (zetesis), through investigation (skepsis), reading (anagnosis), listening 
(akroasis), attention (prosoche), self-mastery (enkrateia), and indifference to indifferent 
things. . . reading, meditations (meletai), therapies of the passions, remembrance of good 
things, self-mastery (enkrateia), and the accomplishment of duties.” (Way of Life 84). 
“Beneath this apparent diversity, however, there is a profound unity, both in the means employed 
and in the ends pursued. The means employed are the rhetorical and dialectical techniques of 
persuasion, the attempts at mastering one’s inner dialogue, and mental concentration” (Way of 
Life 102). Hadot has identified the common undergirding characteristics of the exercises 
constituting philosophia. In ancient philosophy they are cultivating attention (prosoche), 
meditation, conditioning of inner discourse, dialogue, contemplation of death, and focus on the 
present moment. In considering the interconnection and interrelatedness of these elements in 
practicing a life, it is well to keep in mind that the contemporary vantage point retains resonances 
of Cartesian dualism. The separation of the mind and the body had not yet occurred as 





interwoven, and when mind and body moved and thought together” (4).2 So too Hadot 
repeatedly points out that philosphia comes to full pedagogical efficacy in the embodied 
interaction of reason and passion carried out in and through the spoken word (Ancient 56). In this 
interaction and spoken word the “inner attitude” is conditioned (Way of Life 59). Through the 
embodied spoken word the practitioner gives one’s full “real assent” to the originary choice of a 
way of life through the always ongoing process of transformation (J. H. Newman qtd. in 
Happiness 58). The spiritual exercises were situated in this context as they called upon the 
resources of reason as in the case of dialogue or logic, sensibility in the case of lived physics, and 
imagination as in the case of meditation, and the practice of considering one’s death (Way of Life 
82). For the purposes of this project the next section discusses the underlying elements as 
resources that work together for the purposes of conditioning the practitioner to meet the 
precipitous moment in each of “life’s difficulties” (Way of Life 85). In an attempt at a 
contemporary analogy we could think these exercises in a similar fashion of emergency 
service/military/fire personnel carrying out ‘live’ training exercises for the purpose of existing in 
a state of ‘readiness’ to meet the ‘call’ if and when it arrives. 
 As Hadot reminded his readers,  the existence of the spiritual exercises in ancient culture 
presuppose that each person lives in “a state of unhappy disquiet” or a condition of “alienation, 
dispersion and unhappiness” before one makes the existential choice of living out the 
philosophical life. This condition has its roots in the common embodied human passions of life. 
 
2 Albeit Descartes’ Discourse on Method is generally referred to as the entry point in the Western tradition of the 
mind/body split Hadot asserts the same text was constructed in the form of a spiritual exercise akin to the ancient 
philosophical practices (Ancient 264). Additionally, Hadot had found the understanding of philosophy as involving a 
choice of a way of life in Descartes’ Letters to Princess Elisabeth insofar as they exhibit “spiritual guidance” 





“The origins of the soul’s worries can be highly diverse. For Plato it is the body, which 
through its desires and passions, brings disorder and worry to the soul. Yet there are also 
the cares of private life, and especially of political life. Xenocrates is supposed to have 
said that ‘philosophy was invented in order to erase the worries that caused the cares of 
life.’ The Aristotelian contemplative life, which remains far from the business of politics 
and the uncertainties of action, brings serenity. According to Epicurus, people’s worries 
are caused by vain terrors…” (Ancient 224-225).  
The overabundance of the passions and the exaggeration of fear and worry that fueled the 
formation of inadequate value judgments through inadequate representations lead to living an 
inauthentic life that is “darkened by unconsciousness” (Citadel 101, 54; Way of Life 83). 
Philosophy was the “method” by which one’s fears and desires could be regulated (83). These 
could be regulated through the spiritual exercises as their practice effected “a profound 
transformation of the individual’s mode of seeing and being” (Way of Life 83). In this way the 
practice of the spiritual exercises are considered to be a form of therapy.  
 The Epicureans and the Stoics likened the exercises, especially meditation, to a “healing 
of the soul” (Way of Life 87). As we have seen, philosophia is an intricate intertwining of body 
and speech, reason and passion, the internal and external, and the personal and communal. Hadot 
has pointed out that this also shows up in the language and approach of the spiritual exercises in 
ancient philosophia. The name of the school founded by Plato, the Academy, was adopted from 
the location where they met, the gymnasion. For athletes the transformation of body was 
achieved through continual conditioning of the body through training exercises for the purpose 
of completing the specific task—wrestling or running, for example—with increasing mastery 





the spiritual exercises wherein he, “develops his strength of soul, modifies his inner climate, 
transforms his vision of the world, and, finally, his entire being” (Way of Life 102). Just like 
Socrates at the end of the Symposium whom without sleep and having bested all of his 
companions in drinking proceeds, “into the Lyceum, washed up, spent the rest of the day just as 
he always did, and only then, as evening was falling, went home to rest” so too does the 
philosopher spend their days as Socrates by continuing to awaken self-consciousness through the 
practice of spiritual exercises (Symposium 223d). 
Attention and Meditation 
 Various practices have been classified by Hadot as constituting a concentration on the 
self, as the first movement of consciousness. Hadot used the term examination of conscience as a 
general umbrella term of which attention and meditation are the primary exercises (Ancient 198). 
This term is a familiar concept in Christian spiritual progress that was borrowed from ancient 
philosophical exercise. Examination one’s conscience is the exercise perhaps most associated 
with Socrates – looking at oneself and coming to the awareness that one knows nothing – and is 
the starting point for philosophy as a way of life (198). In the healing process it is easy to focus 
on what remains to be accomplished to return to health, however, as the exercises of meditation 
and attention show, they are also to be used to become aware of one’s progress (199). 
 Meditation works in conjunction with the cultivation of one’s attention to the present 
moment, and is a common spiritual exercise connected to ancient philosophy as a way of life. 
“The exercise of meditation is an attempt to control inner discourse, in an effort to render it 
coherent” (Way of Life 85). Attention to the present moment was a way to liberate one from fear 
and worry of the past and the future (Way of Life 85). These two ‘times’ should not worry us; 





is always bearable and controllable” (85). The mode of attention (prosoche) was a pillar for both 
the Stoic and the Epicurean way of life. In ‘attention’ the practitioner was ever self-conscious 
(87). Hadot pointed out a critical distinction within the definition of ‘present moment’ for the 
Stoics. In one sense the present moment could be theorized to function as a line of demarcation 
between the future and the past (Ancient 192). The second approach is experiential and ties the 
present moment to “human consciousness; it then represented a certain thickness and duration, 
corresponding to the attention of lived consciousness” (192). ‘Attention’ as a spiritual exercise 
should be carried out in this second approach. The Epicurean exercise of attention is also taken 
up in relation to the exaggerated fears and desires in regard to phenomena that should not be 
feared and “desiring things which it is not necessary to desire, and which are beyond their 
control” (Way of Life 87). For the Epicurean, attention is brought to bear on distinguishing the 
desires in their categories as natural-necessary, natural-unnecessary, or not-natural-not-
necessary. This would bring one back to the present moment and the pleasure of existing in that 
moment (87). 
 Thus, attuned to the present moment the philosopher is able to form “appropriate” 
responses to life’s situations by keeping the fundamental Stoic principle of distinguishing 
between what does and does not depend on us “constantly in view” and always “at hand” 
(Citadel 35; Way of Life 84). This knowledge, as discussed in chapter two, is “knowing how to 
do good” (Ancient 18). With the attempt to transform one’s “personality,” the exercise of 
keeping this knowledge to hand recruits all those techniques of reason, logic, and rhetoric to 
form the whole being (Way of Life 85). This recruitment happens in the exercises of meditation 





 In the practice of meditation (praemeditatio malorum) the practitioner presents to himself 
the various sufferings of life such as flooding, disease, social/financial/family ruin, poverty, and 
death. All of these events can happen and when they do, they will occur as part of the regular 
course of universal Reason, as is everything in the Stoic system. Bringing these to mind 
habituates the self to practice choosing how it will present the event and how it will choose how 
to judge, desire, and act (Way of Life 85). To change one’s vision of the events occurring to them 
a Stoic will call on the use of “striking maxims” in the form of dogmas (85). Dogmas are 
shortened and imaginative formulas of the fundamental principle(s) of a school (Citadel 37). 
Bringing these maxims or dogmas to bear on the imagined situation guides one in achieving an 
“adequate representation” of the situation, thus attuning one’s judgement of it, desires for the 
situation, and one’s responsive actions (101). Memorization and meditation combined to train the 
person to understand the fundamental principles of the school and to bring them continually to 
hand for the purpose of transformation and preparedness for the moment of existential need. 
Hadot turned to the formulations in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius are representative: 
“From all eternity, all things have identical contents, and pass through the same cycles 
(II, 14, 1). 
Everything is of the same kind, and of identical contents (VI, 37). 
From all eternity, all things are produced with identical contents, and for all infinity there 
will be other things of this kind (IX, 35). 
In a sense, a man of forty—if he is not devoid of intelligence—has seen all that has been 
and all that shall be, once he recognizes that all things have identical contents (XI, 1, 3).” 





Here Aurelius has taken the fundamental principle of the eternal return of the universe – that all 
things in the universe and the universe itself are brought into being, unfold in existence, and 
return to the originary fire in period cycles – and formulated several different versions of dogmas 
that are striking and bring to hand the way in which he should live his life in the moment he is 
confronting (Citadel 41).  
 The exercises of reading/listening, research and investigation were supportive exercises 
as they nourished the meditation and memorization (Way of Life 86). Reading/listening was an 
umbrella term that could cover the practices of private reading (typically done aloud) of 
supportive philosophical discourses and the practice of listening to an exegesis from a master on 
a certain point. The two terms of research and investigation covered practices of employing the 
language of the school in the act of describing phenomena, e.g., Aristotelian biology and the 
description of the cosmos in the Timmeaus (Way of Life 85; Ancient 82-83). The exercises were 
prescribed for the purpose of daily practice for one’s concentration on the self. With attention to 
the present moment the inexhaustible value of the present moment begins to lead one to “cosmic 
consciousness” (Way of Life 85). The expansion of consciousness in the cosmic vision allows 
one to bring their vision in line with nature or the universal view (Way of Life 85).3 The 
“opposed but complementary” movements are also exercised through inner discourse and 
dialogue. 
Dialogue and Internal Discourse 
“To find a very simple example of discourse, it is enough to remember an essential point 
for the Stoics: there is no good but moral good, and there is no evil but moral evil. . . 
 






Once [these formulas] . . . are received [in external discourse], however, they must be 
realized and applied, and this is where internal discourse comes in. The goal was to 
interiorize or to assimilate the teaching. To achieve this, it is not enough to remember that 
there is no good but moral good, and no evil but moral evil, but this formulation must 
really become attractive, so that it induces one to say, for example, ‘I am suffering, but it 
is nothing compared to moral evil; it is not an evil compared to moral evil.” (Happiness 
180). 
Living out the Stoic philosophical life the maxims and dogmas initially embodied in the 
instructional conversation between master and student were intended to be regularly re-embodied 
in the student’s training. The best-known examples of a student’s training via the spiritual 
exercise of re-embodying speech are the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. 
 In the published interviews conducted near the end of his life, Hadot confirmed and 
clarified the essential intertwining of philosophical discourse, spiritual exercises, and living out 
an existential choice of a way of life in concert with a vision of the cosmos. “In fact, all of 
philosophy is an exercise—instructional discourse no less than the inner discourse that orients 
our actions” (Happiness 88). In Hadot’s rendering of ancient philosophy ‘inner discourse’ is 
understood simply as the internal dialogue of an individual—the words said to oneself. Inner 
discourse is associated with the spiritual exercises through which one acts on oneself, such as 
short maxims or dogmas that are repeated to oneself to habituate one’s disposition (Happiness 
88; Citadel 38). Hadot has located the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius in the literary genre of 
hypomnēmata or notes to oneself (Citadel 31).  
 Hadot pointed out that ancient dialogue, philosophical discourse, and exegesis were much 





the school were beholden to the argument from authority, tradition and the requirements of 
primary orality. Hadot pointed to the De Rerum Natura of Lucretius as a primary example – the 
oral and the poetic play as much of an important role in forming the discourse that the Epicurean 
technical vocabulary could not be employed to its furthest extent (Way of Life 62). In other 
words, the formation toward a way of life was the dominate purpose in the formation of the 
models and use of language. “Each logos [discourse/performance of a discourse] is a ‘system,’ 
but the totality of logoi written by an author does not constitute a system” (Way of Life 105, 
original emphasis). Written philosophical discourse always assumed the requirements of 
embodied conversation between author and reader, the tempo, tone, context and specific 
relationship of author and audience (105). This is reflected in the formulaic construction of Stoic 
dogmas in the Meditations. 
 In Hadot’s explication of the Meditations he asserted, with the exception of the first book, 
(I) the entire work is dedicated to the imaginative, striking, formulaic repeating of the 
fundamental principles of living the Stoic life. Each rendering is concise and imaginative and “in 
the form of a simple proposition” (Citadel 37). Marcus’ formulations presume that in the course 
of his philosophical instruction that the truth and efficacy of the dogmas have been sufficiently 
demonstrated. The contents of the Meditations were constructed so that the psychagogic effect of 
that demonstration could again be evoked, not necessarily the demonstration itself (37). For 
instance in  Book II, I, 3, “The nature of the good, he says there, is moral good (to kalon); while 
that of evil is moral evil (to aischron)” Marcus during the act of writing itself is evoking within 
himself again the “resolution to do good” (38). While Aurelius could not choose what occurs in 
the course of the unfolding of the universe, he could choose his intention to judge, desire, and act 





coherence with Universal reason, of which human reason is a part, is the uniquely human 
exercise for the Stoic: “voluntary accord with oneself coincides with the tendencies of universal 
Reason, which not only makes each living being into a being in accord with itself, but makes the 
entire world as well a being in accord with itself” (Citadel 75). As with Socratic dialogue or 
Aristotelian “discussion of problems” the Stoic process of formulating and writing out the 
dogmas were considered more efficacious than any of the perceived results of the dialogue. The 
purpose was in practicing, thus forming the intention to do good (Ancient 88).  
  The exercise of dialogue was an experience itself as it was an embodied participation in 
the logos carried out in the spoken word as well as the practice of reasoning itself. The general 
prescriptions of dialogue in the schools were: 
“(1) recognize the other’s right to self-expression; (2) to recognize that if something is 
obviously true, one gives one’s assent to it, which is often difficult when one is wrong; 
and (3) recognize the norm, above the interlocutors, of what the Greeks call logos—an 
objective discourse, or at least one that aims to be objective.” (Happiness 89) 
Attention, meditation, dialogue, and the formation of inner discourse overlapped in the practice 
of a fundamental attitude of being in “authentic presence, to oneself and to others” (Way of Life 
91). For authentic self in dialogue was only possible for someone who could be authentically 
present to themselves, i.e., cultivates attention and meditation. Hadot has noted that meditation 
was considered as “dialogue with oneself” (91). Conversely an authentic encounter with oneself 
was only possible for the person who could bring authentic presence to dialogue with an 
interlocuter (91). Socrates again serves as the example of the relationship between internal 





caught up in himself in meditation on the neighbor’s portico fully present to himself. He then 
entered and is the honored guest and speaker fully present to his interlocuters.  
 Authentic embodied present was essential for the practice of dialogue. Ancient 
philosophia acknowledged and leveraged the efficacy of the spoken word in the formation of the 
“inner attitude” (Way of Life 50).  Insofar as Socratic and Platonic dialogue was an “itinerary of 
thought” with “circles, detours, endless divisions, digressions, and subtleties,” dialogue 
eventually comes together on a single track of guiding the interlocuter to the cultivation of an 
attitude (92). Socrates often brought his interlocutors to a point of crisis in coming to the point 
where his dialogue partner consented to look at themselves and their positions such as Alcibiades  
“[Socrates] makes me admit . . . I am neglecting all the things that are crying for attention in 
myself” (Symposium qtd in Way of Life 90). Socrates gave help by stepping in as a mask, yet for 
the essential change to occur the dialogue had to function as a dialectic. As mentioned above for 
dialogue, as for all the other spiritual exercises, to be efficacious the transformation must occur 
at the level of being, it cannot be ‘forced’ from a distance (92, 93). The interlocutor must give 
consent – must “desire” – the change from within. Externally, or with another person, one is 
“battling” the soul of the interlocutor. This also took place within the soul of the individual. The 
philosopher brings attention to his soul and meditates, or rather dialogues, thus doing battle with 
himself (91-92). The movement toward wisdom in the Socratic and Neoplatonic tradition was the 
separation of the soul from the body, separation of the eternal and incorruptible from the 
temporal and corrupt. A criticism of the Neoplatonic tradition is that it is a philosophy of escape 
from the duties and obligations of daily life. Yet, Hadot has severally noted that the model of 





dwelling with others (Plotinus 111). The ‘death’ constituted by this separation is another exercise 
in “lucidity” and expansion of the self. 
Training for Death 
 In both the Platonic and Neoplatonic context contemplation of death brings clarity. Death 
is the detachment of the soul from the body. Contemplating this moment accomplishes the 
Socratic task of bringing the philo-sophos to a realization of all to which he is currently attached. 
Those attachments are what keep the soul from realizing oneself. The exercises of attention to 
the present moment, to others, to the self, meditation, and dialogue in the Platonic and 
Neoplatonic context are also concurrently a spiritual exercise of contemplating death. The 
spiritual exercise of death was also practiced to re-align one’s soul to the ever-fruitful value of 
the present moment (Ancient 190-191). 
 Contemplating death was also a practice in liberation from two attachments already 
mentioned, worry of the future and worry of the past. For the Stoic and the Epicurean, though 
differently, the only time in which we live is the “infinitely small” present (Meditations qtd in 
Ancient 192). “…[O]ne instant of happiness is equivalent to an eternity of happiness, and that 
happiness can and must be found immediately” (Way of Life 222). To evoke the possibility 
heightened the “value and seriousness” of each moment (Ancient 193). The Stoic overlapped the 
exercises of attention, meditation (dialogue with oneself) and exercise of death in the form of a 
constant tension or vigilance of one’s actions. For the Stoic the soul was a part of the cosmos and 
was birthed, existed, and returned to the original fire (Veil 25-26). The activity of choice was to 
voluntary exercise the soul to cohere in and with the universal Reason. For the Stoic, then, 
happiness resides in the present moment, because in all of the cosmos it is that which “depends 





and future through the exercise of the choice in the present moment. “Act, speak, and always thin 
like one who might depart from life at any moment” and “Accomplish each of life’s actions as if 
it were your last, keeping yourself far from all frivolity” (Meditations qtd in Ancient 193). The 
Epicurean philosophy of ‘pleasure’ also engages the exercise of death in heightening awareness 
of the present moment. 
 For the Epicureans liberation from the worries of future and past occurred in relaxing and 
suppressing the worries and fears (Way of Life 222). The spiritual exercise of death thus worked 
to clear away the fears as opposed to trying to place them within a conception of universal 
Reason. “Epicureanism asserts that the soul does not survive the body, and the death is not an 
event within life” (222). Pleasure in the Epicurean sense is not associated with hedonism. Rather, 
spiritual and physical exercises work to clear away and cause of anguish. Those things that cause 
us anguish are fear of the gods, unsatisfied desires, and “the moral uneasiness caused by the 
concern to act out of perfect purity of intention” (222). Thus, the most pleasurable orientation to 
time is going to be the present moment which carries the least worry. As Hadot  rendered it, 
Epicureanism stripped down the priority of desires to those that “are indispensable for the 
continuation of our existence” culminating in the three categories mentioned above – natural-
necessary, natural-unnecessary, and not-natural-not-necessary (222). The sense of the primacy of 
the present moment was developed in Epicureanism to such a degree that the experience of 
pleasure was understood to stand outside of the constrictions of time (222).  
This is different from the example of the Stoics, the Platonic and Neoplatonic 
philosophies of striving. Epicureanism held that the experience of pleasure is itself perfect and 
attainable in the present moment. Happiness is the antidote to the two primary causes of anguish 





the present moment and the Epicurean has certain methods for achieving happiness; satisfaction 
of desires. The exercise of death both imparts the urgency and brings attention to the possibility 
of immeasurable pleasure in the present moment (Way of Life 224-225). With this perspective of 
death, life and a moment of pleasure seems to be of “infinite value” (226). Epicurean spiritual 
exercise of death thus revealed the infinite and complete value of the present moment and 
learned to live as if it were the last and welcome pleasure as if it were the first experience (225-
226). As with the Stoic exercises, striking maxims were used to keep the knowledge to hand, 
cultivate attention, and further meditative practice 
“While we were talking, jealous time has fled. So seize the day” (Horace qtd in Way of 
Life 224). 
“Believe that each new day that dawns will be the last for you: Then each unexpected 
hour shall come to you as a delightful gift” (Horace qtd in Way of Life 225) 
“I have had all the pleasure I could have expected” (Horace qtd in Way of Life 225). 
 Happiness 162, 104-105 
The exercise of death, like examination, attention, meditation, and dialogue, concentrates and 
expands the soul in an exercise of wisdom. 
 Hadot has explicated other spiritual exercise in his scholarship, such as “reading” and 
“accomplishment of duties” and given detailed accounts of the exercises of the Stoicism of 
Marcus Aurelius in the Inner Citadel and of Neoplatonic exercises through the life of Plotinus in 
Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision. The exercises highlighted here, along with physics 
(addressed in the next chapter), are those to which Hadot repeatedly returned as the underlying 
commonalities across all the schools, thus further contextualizing a contemporary reading and 





phenomena of spiritual exercises, Hadot addressed the links between ancient philosophical 
spiritual exercises and spiritual exercises of Christianity.  
Christianity and Spiritual Exercises 
 Hadot’s scholarship is subtle and complex exhibiting both depth and breadth. Arnold 
Davidson broadly characterized Hadot’s scholarship as possessing that “rare combination of 
prodigious historical scholarship and rigorous philosophical argumentation that upsets any 
preconceived distinction between the history of philosophy and philosophy proper” (Introduction 
1). This quality of Hadot’s scholarship is on display as he outlines the fate of ancient 
philosophia—the inextricable intertwining of an existential choice of a way of life, the practice 
of spiritual exercises, and philosophical discourse—as it enters the Middle Ages and encounters  
an emerging Christianity being presented as a way of life (Ancient 253). Though tenuous the 
attitude of philosophy as a way of life has not gone completely dormant. This section does not 
provide an exhaustive review of the history of philosophy and Christianity. This section marks 
the major touchpoints in Hadot’s account that furthers an understanding of how the phenomenon 
of spiritual exercises became more commonly associated with religion, specifically Christianity 
in the West.  
 Christianity presented itself in its infancy as, “a way and a choice of life—a life 
according to Christ—which implied a specific discourse” (Ancient 253). Not the least of those 
presentations being the flexibility of meaning with the word logos (Ancient 238). Christianity 
was able to define logos as a mediator between the eternal and the temporal, “between God and 
the World” (Ancient 237). Being able to define Christianity as a philosophy had the benefit of 
being able to be understood within the Greco-Roman environment. In the Christian deployment 





Living a way of life in accord with reason became living a way of life in accord with the life and 
teachings of Christ (Ancient 239). The exegetical explication of texts following the argument 
from authority is another example. 
 The schools of Christian philosophy engaged in similar exercises and in similar contexts 
as the schools of ancient philosophy. For example, consider the interaction between a master and 
disciples working toward wisdom engaging exercises such as dialogue, meditation, attention, and 
the exercise of death. Christianity as a way of life borrowed much from ancient philosophy. 
However, Christianity becomes distinct in the monastic phenomenon wherein a person or group 
of persons drew away from the community to “attain Christian perfection through the heroic 
practice of Christ’s evangelical advice and the imitation of his life” (Ancient 242). In the 
monastic exercises rigorous dietary restrictions were practiced along with emphasis is placed on 
being attentive to one’s self and the relation to the overarching order of the universe, i.e., God’s 
Kingdom. Hadot set out a detailed account of the heavy influence exerted on the way of life of 
Christianity by the practices of the schools, especially those of the Neoplatonic. Augustine of 
Hippo (354 – 430 CE) is perhaps the most well-known example of the influence of Neoplatonic 
philosophy influencing the early formation of Christian philosophy and theology (Ancient 250-
252). The rise of the universities and a thriving Christianity the Middle Ages saw the decoupling 
of philosophy as a way of life and philosophical discourse. 
 In the Middle Ages as in antiquity, the social structures and the philosophical schools 
were intimately interrelated (Ancient 259). The philosophical schools shaped the “conception of 
philosophy” in a social structure by delimiting its place and purpose (259). By the Middle Ages 
the ways of life particular to the ancient schools, such as Epicureanism, had mostly fallen out of 





Christian way of life” (Ancient 254). Yet the philosophical discourse remained and continued to 
be widely used in helping to reconcile human reason with the revealed truths and doctrine of 
Christianity. This reconciliation occurred in the newly formed universities and cathedral schools 
in the 13th century CE whose primary purpose was to train young men for service in the Church. 
Philosophy, then, became associated with the exercise of philosophical discourse and dialectic 
for the purpose of preparing a monk for theological study, and a life lived in the spiritual 
exercises of the Church regulated and codified in the liturgy. From this Hadot has located the 
beginning of a conception of philosophy as a manipulation of discourse undertaken in a 
professional environment (Ancient 260).  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has extended the discussion begun in chapter two by further examining 
Hadot’s understanding of spiritual exercises practiced in the different schools and their 
fundamental commonalities. Chapter two grounded the discussion on philosophy as a way of life 
of the philo-sophos guided by the model of the man of wisdom, the sage. This chapter turned to 
Hadot’s explication of the lived exercises of the practitioner. 
 This review of the phenomenon of spiritual exercises began by further situating them in 
the context of philosophia. In that context practicing spiritual exercises was identical to living a 
philosophical life. This is consistent with the practice of acknowledging those as philosophers 
who did not write any ‘philosophy’, e.g. Socrates, Plotinus, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius 
before his Meditations were widely available. 
 Hadot has given several definitions for spiritual exercises. The two definitions of 
“voluntary personal practices intended to cause a transformation of the self,” and “exercises 





will be, for the soul, analogous to the athlete’s training or to the application of a medical cure” 
highlight the voluntary, transformative, and therapeutic function of the spiritual exercises with 
the ancient historical moment (Ancient 179-180; Way of Life 59). The spiritual exercises 
functioned as a therapeutic by responding to the human condition—“a state of unhappy disquiet” 
or of “alienation, dispersion and unhappiness” (Way of Life 102; Ancient 198). The disruption of 
the soul’s movement toward wisdom was continually hampered through the human condition, 
especially one’s passions. The transformative potential of the exercises could be realized only 
through daily practice. Preceding taking up these practices was the already-made existential 
choice of a way of life. The exercises confirmed this presence in their practice.  
 The next section reviewed the commonalities of exercises across the schools: attention, 
meditation, dialogue, inner discourse, and training for death. The exercises overlap with each 
other in exercising two movements soul in coming to self-consciousness: bringing attention to 
itself and to expanding the self toward a “cosmic consciousness” (Way of Life 85). For example, 
as meditation brings attention to the present moment—a concentration of the self—the 
inexhaustible value of the present moment opens onto a cosmic view—an expansion of the self. 
 The final section addresses a potential issue in understanding spiritual practices from a 
contemporary historical moment: the close association of spiritual exercises with religion, 
specifically Christianity in the Western Tradition. Hadot provides a subtle and complex 
treatment of the de-coupling of philosophical discourse and philosophy as a way of life through 
the rise of universities and a burgeoning Christianity. As the way of life practiced fell away or 
was subsumed in Christian spiritual exercises the philosophical discourse remained becoming the 
handmaiden to theology in the university structure of courses. Through his rendering of spiritual 





practical activity but also as a transformation of our way of inhabiting and perceiving the world” 









Nature Loves to Hide 
Dark-matter physicists work at the boundary of the 
measurable and the imaginable. They seek the 
traces that dark matter leaves in the perceptible 
world. Theirs is hard, philosophical work, requiring 
patience and something like faith: ‘As if’ – in the 
analogy of the poet and dark-matter physicist 
Rebecca Elson – ‘all there were, were fireflies /  
And from them you could infer the meadow.” 
(Macfarlane 57-58) 
 
 For the philosopher, the lover of wisdom, the ever-incomplete task of orienting oneself in 
the lifeworld and social complex is intertwined with an understanding of his relation to nature 
and the cosmos (Arneson 77). Garnet Butchart argues that “communication . . . is the mode and 
means through which human being makes sense of the experience of having-to-be, its 
ontological abandonment to language as sovereign” (12). As people are abandoned to language 
so they are also abandoned to inhabitation of the terrestrial and celestial universe.  
 Humankind’s relationship to nature and the cosmos is mutually formative. Robert 
Macfarlane describes the mutually formative relationship in the context of the vast terrain 
beneath the surface of the earth, “The underland is vital to the material structures of 
contemporary existence, as well as to our memories, myths and metaphors. It is terrain with 
which we daily reckon and by which we are daily shaped” (Macfarlane 13). The Earth epoch of 
the Anthropocene is characterized by the formative impact that human action has on the contours 
of the Earth contributing to experiences of disjointed time and place (75). Nature and cosmos 
thus influence human discourse as personal and social ways of life change to respond to shifting 
ground that was once thought to be permanent raising questions, anxieties and fears over past, 





 Spiritual exercises and their efficacy as therapeutics work to bring peace to the 
philosopher’s dispersed thoughts through training of inner discourse (and dialogue) in practice 
for the moment of action/interaction with others as part of a field of terrain and as a part of the 
larger cosmos. As meditation and attention to the present moment work to concentrate the soul, 
both practices simultaneously lead to the soul’s expansion, transcending the ego achieving a 
view from above (Ancient 189; Citadel 118).  
 Taking a view from above opens the philosopher to see the grand context against which 
his actions seem infinitely small. However, this view also opens him up to see himself and others 
as part and expression of the Whole. For the Stoic especially his existential choice to exercise his 
uniquely human capacity for choice to bring his reason in accord with universal Reason is 
motivated by a love for humankind as his perceptions, desires, and actions, as well as his inner 
and external discourse, are framed in recognition of and for interaction with the expression of 
universal reason in others (Happiness 117-119; Citadel 311-312). 
 Coming to the view from above is supported by an understanding of the philosopher’s 
place in and the operations of nature and the cosmos. Physics, or inquiry of nature and the 
cosmos, was itself considered a spiritual exercise insofar as it aided the formation of the “inner 
attitude” (Way of Life 59). Pierre Hadot has shown that the philosopher assumes the human 
person in the whole, the mind and body is part of nature and the cosmos and part of the process 
of becoming, or what generally is referred to with the Greek word phusis.  
 A study of the cosmos and of humankind’s relationship to it are inextricably intertwined 
in Hadot’s rendering of philosophy as a way of life. Hadot works this theme throughout his 
scholarship, especially in the volumes on Plotinus (Plotinus) and Marcus Aurelius (The Inner 





philosophy as a way of life in The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature 
(2004, English 2006). The Veil of Isis traces the Heraclitan aphorism “Nature loves to hide” 
through historical moments. This becomes the jumping off point for Hadot’s description of the 
two attitudes that humankind has taken in relation to nature: The Promethean and the Oprhic.  
In broad strokes the Promethean attitude understands nature to be a keeper of secrets. 
Nature’s secrets are those that undergird its operations. These operations are thought to work 
from a repeatable logic that can be expressed in mathematical or mechanical terms. Experiments 
force nature to reveal its logic so it can be harnessed for humankind’s use. The Orphic model on 
the other hand understands the secretes of nature to be best understood as a song, discourse, 
and/or poem whose proper reception comes by way of contemplation. “Nature’s language is not 
a discourse in which the words are separate from one another. What natural phenomena reveal to 
us are not the maxims of formulas of Nature but configurations, sketches, or emblems, which 
require only to be perceived” (Veil 203). Both approaches to humankind’s relationship to nature 
agree that nature and the cosmos held an unknowable aspect that could be revealed. The only 
difference being the process of witnessing that aspect. With the physical sciences increasingly 
taking on the role of observing, measuring, predicting, and explaining the appearance and 
operations of physical phenomena, “poets and philosophers” turned—rather re-turned—their 
attention to understanding the “mystery of being” that tracks more closely with an ancient 
concept of phusis (Veil 318, 314). 
Coming to an understanding of the mystery of being, nature and the cosmos is integral to 
the formation of the inner attitude as it supports the philosopher in transcending his individual 
egoist perspective coming to a view from above. From a view from above the concerns and 





Meanings of those interactions can then be renegotiated in the mode of communication in 
humility with others also abandoned to the terrestrial and celestial realms. 
The Development of Phusis 
 Phusis underwent a transformation from a mixture of meanings to being associated with 
an absolute that “designates the process of formation or its result, taken in general or an abstract 
way” (Veil 19). Plato made the shift and designated the pre-Socratic “investigations on nature,” 
which took into account the convergence of the elements—earth, fire, water, air—that occur 
“spontaneously” or “without the intervention of thought” in their processes, for instance the 
changing of the seasons (32). In the Platonic vision of the universe the Soul was primary as “the 
movement that moves itself” (22). The “blind” processes of nature, of which the result may be 
visible but not the process itself, are not the primary and are subject to the process of phusis (22).  
Hadot credited Plato with making the distinction that was to have everlasting 
consequences for understanding the relationship between nature, art and human-being. “For 
[Plato], phusis is precisely an art as well, but one that is divine: ‘I would suppose that the works 
said to be of nature are the works of a divine art, and those that men compose with them are the 
work of a human art’” (Veil 22; Plato Sophist 265e3). As the processes of phusis are not 
disclosed and are of the order of transformation they cannot amount to a science for Plato (Veil 
23). Human art—shipbuilding, pottery, metal work, etc.—is also a movement that transforms the 
materials that is initiated by the artist and imposed on the materials, a process which can be 
known. The tensions in the analogy of understanding nature as the “art of nature” and its relation 
to human art is a constant theme throughout all historical moments. The relationship has ranged 





nature” (23). Hadot situated Aristotle’s understanding of nature and art as a guiding analogy 
while simultaneously setting out clear boundaries of how nature and art are unalike.  
 Nature and art were similar for Aristotle insofar as both nature and art are processes by 
which “matter” is “molded and formed” (Veil 24). Significant differences emerge quickly in 
further trying to compare the two. These differences are in the initiation of motion, the ‘location’ 
of the form toward which the process strives, relationship with reason, and the force with which 
the process works. For the work of art, the process of transformation is initiated and imposed on 
the materials, the form is ‘located’ in the thoughts of the artist, thus external to the matter being 
molded. Bringing his form toward its end the artist stops and reasons his way through the 
operations and any obstacles or unforeseen movements that arise in that process. Matthew 
Crawford in The World Outside Your Head describes the complex planning and visualizing 
sessions of glassblowers, which can here serve as an example of the Aristotelian description of 
the process of art. The glassblowers undergo a detailed planning session on the intended 
movements of each artist and the overall form to be achieved before they begin to mold the glass. 
Throughout the process they continue to communicate and reason together with one another as 
they work in giving shape, in accord with their already agreed upon vision, to the constantly 
moving materials (131-134). The work of human art involves a certain amount of force to bring 
about the transformation to meet the model: “Art is imposed on matter with violence” (Veil 24). 
According to Aristotle the processes of nature work differently 
 Hadot described Aristotle’s definition of nature as “a principle of inner motion inside 
each thing. Each concrete individual has within it a concrete nature that is proper to its species 
and is the principle of its natural motion” (Veil 23). In nature, then, the transformation of 





brought to the its proper telos, to which the matter  is already oriented, by virtue of the fact that 
that movement is proper to the form (Veil 24). What is initiated in the philosophical discourses of 
Aristotle is the analogy of nature as the “more perfect art” as it perfectly performs all the steps in 
the method of the artist (25). Hadot marked these steps as the emergence of the idea that nature 
behaves according to a method. “This idea of a method proper to nature was to play a very 
important role in the scientific representations of all of Western thought” (25). The Stoics, for 
Hadot, drew from the exercises and discourses of the Greek schools in coming to a guiding 
vision of the cosmos. 
 Hadot wrote, “One can say that Stoicism was born of the fusion of three traditions: the 
Socratic ethical tradition, the Heraclitean physical and ‘materialistic’ tradition, and the dialectical 
tradition of the Megareans and of Aristotle” (Citadel 73). These three parts are interdependent in 
the Stoic philosophical way of life—understanding one’s place in the cosmos and one’s 
relationship to nature and to others was integral in acting ‘appropriately’ in that moment when 
called upon to do so. That moment is, “at once multiple and unique—which is the exercise of 
physical virtue, ethical virtue, and logical virtue” (Citadel 80-81). Stoic philosophy posits a 
universe that is in constant and continuous transformation that has its beginning and end in the 
“original fire” (Citadel 74; Veil 25). All things are located in the originary fire and are 
“engendered” in the direction of phusis which “proceeds systematically and methodically” in the 
cyclical return to the originay fire (Veil 25).  
 As with Aristotle the Stoic vision of the cosmos locates the “principle of motion” to be 
both a part of the larger reality of things and within each thing (Veil 25). The universe goes 
through periodic cycles, emerging from and returning to the original fire. Hadot showed the 





directs transformation and the coming to be of all things (26). Phusis along with “Nature, God, 
Providence, and divine Reason” are all present and identical in and with the original fire (26). 
Once the cycle of the universe is begun again, Nature—phusis—sets about its work, a work that 
is brought about from within and always directed toward the continuation of the cycle of the 
universe in accord with Universal Reason (Veil 26; Citadel 75). Phusis in the Stoic vision is 
identified with both the original formation of the universe and with every point in its 
transformation and return to the original fire (Veil 26). The Stoic with this vision of the 
movements of the Whole could understand himself and others as part and expression of the 
Whole. He was better able to gain more ‘adequate’ representations of phenomena—physical, 
cosmic, other people—as he discerned what actions would be good for himself and the 
community insofar as they were in accord with universal Reason.  
The Secrets of Nature and the Mystery of Being 
 Contemplation of nature and the cosmos, taking the view from above, or in Aristotle’s 
school the observation of, reflection on, and discussion of the observations had a formative 
purpose (Ancient 88). As with Socratic dialogue “for Aristotle the discussion of problems was 
ultimately more formative than their solution” (88). The same problem discussed from different 
perspectives was a training and practice of collaborative research in seeking knowledge as part of 
a community. This itself was living the philosophical life of Aristotle’s school (87-88).  
 A key moment in Hadot’s development of the transformation of meaning of the 
relationship between humankind and nature was the identification of nature as phusis. This 
prepared the way for the personification and divinization of nature (Veil 26-27). Accompanying 
this shift is a decline in the formative purpose of collaborative research as a spiritual exercise as 





 Hadot traced the twists and turns in meanings of phusis and the aphorism “Nature loves 
to hide” throughout historical moments. On the tail end of the ancient moment the idea of the 
secrets of nature begun to take hold. Explanations of nature that identify the gods as the causes of 
visible phenomena—such as earthquakes, thunderstorms, the changing of the seasons—meant 
that these events were at the mercy of the capricious directives of the divine. Already within 
antiquity the meaning of phusis had been identified with the invisible, yet regular and methodical 
force behind and/or guiding the transformation. The invisible force of phusis understood in 
Antiquity morphed into the concept that nature had secrets to withhold or reveal. Evidence of 
this emerges in late antiquity but becomes widespread in the Medieval moment. That nature held 
secrets sets up an opposition between humankind and nature. “the idea of secrets of nature 
always presupposes an opposition between the visible, what appears, or the phenomenon, and 
what is hidden beyond that appearance, or the invisible” (Veil 33). The “idea of secrets of nature” 
as a guiding construct for interpreting and understanding our collective terrestrial and celestial 
habitation is built on this fundamental opposition between the invisible secrets of nature and 
humankind (33).  
 Hadot identified the tradition of the secrets of nature as integral to the processes and 
methods by which those secrets could be revealed. Here is marked a transition in the 
understanding of phusis as being divine and unknowable for Plato, and invisible yet regular for 
Aristotle. For example, the Platonic understanding that nature had mysterious properties that 
were carried in each physical phenomenon.  
 In the Middle Ages the process of revealing took place by the human hand with the help 
of the “pseudo-sciences” of magic and alchemy (Veil 35). “As the objects [the secrets of nature] 





were to become in this way the object of the new physics, mathematics, and mechanics” (35). 
Since Nature has the prerogative to hide or veil its secrets, philosophers have taken two 
approaches. One was to ignore the invisible secrets of nature as beyond our understanding and 
therefore of no concern. Hadot associated this with Socrates and the Skeptical Platonic tradition 
notably of Arcesilas (315-240 BCE) (91). In this tradition, turning away from these concerns was 
a simultaneous turning toward the affairs of the philo-sophos the administration of the city and 
conducting a moral life (91). For these schools “there is no ‘physical’ part of philosophy, since 
physics is precisely the study of nature (phusis)” (91-92). The other approach believed the 
secrets could be revealed and were the purposes of the sciences and philosophy. In the ancient 
tradition this is seen in the philosophy of Antiochus of Ascalon (125-68 BCE) for whom the 
inquiry of physical philosophy included “‘nature and secret things’” (92). The Promethean and 
the Orphic approaches to the secrets of nature were both developed within the latter general 
approach. 
 The Promethean and the Orphic attitude held a pre-understanding of the relationship 
between humankind and nature: 
 “If man feels nature to be an enemy, hostile and jealous, which resists him by 
hiding its secrets, there will then be opposition between nature and human art, based on 
human reason and will. Man will seek, through technology, to affirm his power, 
domination, and rights over nature. 
 If, on the contrary, people consider themselves a part of nature because art is 
already present in it, there will no longer be opposition between nature and art; instead, 
human art, especially in its aesthetic aspect, will be in a sense the prolongation of nature, 





The occultation of nature will be perceived not as a resistance that must be conquered 
butt as a mystery into which human beings can gradually be initiated.” (Veil 92) 
Hadot placed Prometheus as the patron of this attitude. In Greek mythology Prometheus stole 
fire from the gods giving it to humankind bringing along with it the improvements of 
“technology and civilization” (95). The Orphic approach considers humans already a part of 
nature. The latter approach Hadot placed under the ‘patronage’ of Orpheus, whom in Greek 
mythology seduced and coerced all things, human and otherwise, through music and song (96). 
Hadot cautioned readers to understand the distinction between the Promethean and the Orphic in 
similar terms as the Stoics undertook the distinction between philosophic discourse and the 
moment of acting philosophically (Citadel 80-82). While the two orientations are opposed to 
each other they are only separated for Hadot’s overall purpose of setting out the progression of 
humankind’s relation with nature. Hadot made clear that the two orientations are both “equally 
essential” and often found to co-appear—comingled or appear successively—in the same person 
or in the same experiment or discourse (Veil 98).  
 For Hadot the Orphic and Promethean continue to co-appear up to the present moment. 
The Promethean and the Orphic are both frameworks for orienting oneself in the lifeworld and 
social complex (Arnett and Holba 9; Arneson 77). The Promethean framework privileges 
‘power’ and ‘dominance’ as interpretive framework for relations between human being, nature 
and the cosmos. The Orphic model privileges ‘community’ and ‘collaboration’ for relations 
between human being, nature and the cosmos. 
Promethean 
   Within the Promethean framework knowledge is gained through power in the form of 





itself to be power in the sense that knowledge of the secrets of nature allows one to bend nature 
to the will and purposes of humankind (Veil 101). The Promethean approach to all of nature 
carries with it the potential for an interpretation of all of nature, including other people, as 
potential tools for use in some end, be that end knowledge for knowledge’s sake or for a 
political, militaristic, or economic end..  
 Consistent with the nature-as-hostile approach is the presence of mechanics in ancient 
Greece, the model of which experimental sciences are the inheritor (102-103). Situated in this 
approach, the object of mechanics is to “trick” or divert the normal course of affairs to benefit 
the practical needs of humankind and otherwise alleviate ever-present human suffering (102). 
Mechanics in antiquity rested on the assumptions or “logoi of nature” itself—in other words the 
means by which to trick nature to give up her secrets were inherent in the reasoning of nature 
itself (103). For example, the construction of an aqueduct that diverts the course of nature or the 
construction of a siege machine that is used as an instrument of power, to work, requires the 
deployment of knowledge based on mathematics and physics. Hadot noted that mathematics and 
mechanics flourished across ancient Greece and Rome; most closely associated with these 
developments was the Pythagorean school—especially Archytas of Tarentum (428-347 BCE)—
and under the patronage of the Ptolemies in Alexandria (104). In addition to ‘tricking’ nature by 
using nature via mechanics is ‘tricking’ as the phenomenon of magic. 
 Tricks of magic shared the endpoint of mechanics; to force nature to reveal its secrets in 
order to act on nature for the purposes of benefitting or satisfying human interests (Veil 106-
107). In the magical approach to manipulating nature, the fundamental position was “that natural 
phenomena are brought about by the invisible powers—gods or demons—and that it is therefore 





accomplish” (107). Other natural phenomena were used such as plants or animals in rituals that 
were intended to in some way influence the god or demon by calling on it by its particular name 
(107). The tradition of magic continues into the Middle Ages under the phenomenon of natural 
magic. Natural magic differs from magic in that it holds that the “occult virtues” of natural 
phenomena are capable of being known by humankind (109). In other words, no demons/gods 
were required. The secrets of nature were thought to be extracted or put into motion through an 
understanding of the occult properties/qualities/movements of the plants/animals/cosmos and 
their interactions (109).  
 A primary example and culmination of this literature is the work of Roger Bacon 
(1219/20-1292 CE) in On the Secret Works of Art and Nature (1260). Hadot painted Bacon as a 
figure that lies at the intersection of the traditions of natural magic and mechanics as forebearers 
of contemporary experimental science in one sense and completely removed from that 
intersection in another. On the one hand Bacon “sketched the program of an ‘art that uses nature 
like an instrument,’” that would garner much better results than the magic of the demons/gods 
(Veil 115; Bacon qtd in Veil). Bacon could also be thought of as that employing an art of nature 
to “transform [the world] and place it in the service of mankind” (Veil 116). On the other hand, 
Bacon’s vision and assessment of the tools of natural magic have to be situated within his 
environment and context as an Oxford professor and Franciscan working on the assumption that 
the appearance of the Antichrist was near, thus the transformation of the world was “to hasten 
the conversion of the entire world to Christianity” (115). This particular understanding of phusis 
allows for an understanding of the purpose of all inquiries into nature and the cosmos as 





interpretation of interactions with others in a community as essentially missionary that is 
coherent with a Christian worldview. In the 16th and 17th centuries magic gave way to machine. 
 With the advent of the work of “Francis Bacon, Descartes, Galileo and Newton” (all 
working in the late 16th to 17th century CE) the Promethean attitude of dominating the earth was 
to experience a decisive move in the concretization of the scientific method and rigorous analysis 
of sensible data (Veil 123). The development of mechanics allowed for further observation and 
exploration, for example, the development of lenses and the microscope and the telescope. This 
moment of the late 16th through 17th centuries saw the scientific revolution flourish with three 
trends that bolstered and extended the metaphor of nature as a machine. 
  First, knowledge was now limited to the demonstrable and repeatable and constituted a 
turn away from using ancient authors as authorities to support one’s conclusions. This in turn 
was closely linked to the second trend in this moment, which was the “democratization of 
knowledge” (Veil 124-125). Access to knowledge no longer required years of study of ancient 
manuscripts or initiation into magical rituals. This democratization also accomplished a division 
of labor as observation and experimentation could be carried out by groups of researchers 
working together (124-125). To wit, “Francis Bacon in his Novum Organum and Descartes in his 
Discourse on Method consider that the method they propose is an instrument that enables any 
mind to accede to scientific knowledge” (125, emphasis added). The third trend Hadot attributed 
largely to Galileo made mechanics—the study of the movements and/or workings of natural 
phenomena—synonymous with mathematics (Veil 125).  
 As mechanics was the model and practice of putting the laws of nature to work for human 
purposes, Galileo’s instruments that were used for the further observation of nature were 





decisive turn toward the mathematization of nature, the way was open for the possibility of the 
evolution of science toward modern physics” and, “The scientist therefore operated like an 
engineer, who had to reconstruct the gears and functions of the machine known as nature” (128, 
126). In this vein the invisible forces of nature, identified with phusis as the invisible force that is 
part of or consistent with the engendering and formation of the natural phenomena of the visible 
world came to be identified with nature having secrets. The secrets are discoverable and can be 
represented in mathematical form which in turn can be used to recreate through the fabrication of  
artificial machines the natural ‘mechanics’ of the “great machine of the world” for service to the 
interests of humankind (129).  
Orphic 
 The Orphic framework privileges ‘community’ and ‘collaboration’ over ‘power’ and 
‘opposition’ for understanding and practicing in and through communication the relationships 
between human beings, nature and the cosmos. The question remains the same in the Orphic 
model, ‘how is knowledge, or rather the secrets, of nature to be understood?” In this model 
knowledge takes shape as a “physics of contemplation” represented through the modalities such 
as painting or other “pictorial arts,” philosophical discourse, or the poetic discourse (Lenoble qtd. 
in Veil 95,155). As the Promethean model developed tools useful in coming to know the secretes 
of nature, the Orphic model is equally limiting; the only ‘tool’ is the faculty of perception (Veil 
155). The Orphic model approaches the secrets of nature in the understanding that one is already 
a part of it, interpreting or re-presenting nature through various modalities of the human arts is 
participation in the secrets of nature. This “physics of contemplation” is consistent with physics 
practiced as a spiritual exercise as in the case of Plato, Aristotle, and the Epicureans and the 





more so than the Promethean, is emphasized “mankind’s existential and ethical relation to nature 
and to existence” (Veil 95, 200). This model and approach begin with the positions of Plato, 
Aristotle, the Neoplatonists and the Stoics all of whom affirm that the secret processes that bring 
the universe into being are not able to be known; “Whether in the domain of terrestrial bodies, 
which are subject to becoming, or of celestial bodies, we must be content with what is 
approximate, for we reside very far away and very low within the universe” (Veil 161). What 
was most important was engaging in spiritual exercises, in the cultivation of “equanimity of soul, 
absence of need, and indifference to indifferent things” assisting the philosopher in orienting 
himself in the cosmos (Ancient 222). This orientation in the cosmos aided him in acting morally 
in the face of the existential demands of the “customs and conventions of daily life” (Way of Life 
58). 
 Ancient physics was conceived and constructed in the exegetical model working out of 
the argument from authority (Veil 163). For example, Hadot looked to the early descriptions of 
the movement of the stars. Believing the movement of the stars to be of divine origin they had to 
be circular because that shape is regular and perfect (163). Yet the appearance of their movement 
was irregular and seemingly without reason. This model allows for the emergence and 
engagement of simultaneous and varying explanations of a single phenomenon that would 
resolve at the intersection of the theoretical and sensible (162). Contemplation as opposed to 
extraction is the mode of access to nature unveiled. “In this case, the truth under discussion is a 
determinate truth that is unveiled: the enigma is solved, and there is no longer anything to search 
for” (178). Important to note that this is not opposed to research and investigation. Rather, within 





 As a spiritual exercise in Stoic philosophy physics was a practice of understanding and 
contemplating the cosmos so to better align oneself with the movement of universal Reason. This 
helped one to cultivate a disinterestedness in those matters over which the practitioner had no 
influence—such as the engendering, creation, and movement of the universe. In Plato and 
Aristotle this is a pleasurable exercise. For Stoicism and Epicureanism (though differently) 
contemplation of the cosmos helps the practitioner bring serenity to the soul (Veil 184-186; Way 
of Life 222). An ethics of objectivity and disinterestedness becomes definitional of the Oprhic 
attitude of contemplation of nature. “Just as ethics in not choosing any other end than virtue, and 
in wanting to be a good person without seeking any particular interest, so science demands that 
we not choose any end other than knowledge, and that we seek knowledge for itself, without any 
other utilitarian consideration” (Veil 185-186). Whereas the Promethean model broadly 
understands nature to act in a rational, economical, and logical manner the Orphic model 
generally understands nature as “joyful, prodigal, and exuberant” therefore privileging aesthetic 
perception (200).4  
Aesthetic perception was a favored model for understanding, representing, and 
participating in the secretes of nature in the Orphic approach. When the burdens of utilitarian use 
and the “conventions and customs of daily life” are stripped away from one’s perception the 
practitioner is then able to perceive the secret of nature that has itself has always been “in broad 
daylight” which is “the movement by which nature makes itself visible” (Veil 215). In the Orphic 
model the distinction between art and nature is closed; nature is thereby able to be known 
through the aesthetic experience as it occurs in various forms—philosophic discourse, poetry, 
 
4 The Orphic and Promethean, while opposed, cross and co-appear at many times throughout historical moments. 
Thus while Aristotle and the Stoics acknowledge a universal Reason that guides the purposes of nature, they both 
also acknowledge that appearances are sometimes without reason. Thus, “Nature did not always aim at usefulness, 





art, music, etc. (218). Aesthetic vision and participation unveils the secrets of nature in allowing 
the artist/poet/philosopher to view the apparent “forms”—such as “polarity and ascent,” and 
“spiral and serpentine line” by which nature operates and also by opening up a chance at 
becoming “immersed within Nature’s creative impulse” which would allow entry into the secrets 
through identification with Nature (220, 222, 218). Hadot identified the work of Goethe as both 
central to understanding the Orphic model and as a turning point in the transformation of nature 
as the ‘mystery of being.’ 
 The philosophers and the poets of the present moment are the inheritors of the Orphic 
approach to understanding the secrets of nature. Hadot marked Johann Wolfgang von Goethe as 
the beginning of a trend to understand the secrets of nature as “mysteries in broad daylight” (Veil 
260). For Goethe, all that can be discovered of natural phenomena  is in plain sight, all that is 
needed to see it is to train the senses and to remove the mistaken belief that there is a ‘reality’ 
behind the appearance (253).   
“For Schelling, Heraclitus’ aphorism ‘Nature loves to hide’ means that Nature originally 
represents a resistance to evolution, insofar as it is a will to remain within itself. ‘Nature’s 
modesty’ was to become the mystery of being, and this mystery was distressing and 
terrifying. Goethe and Schelling thus seem to [Hadot] to be at the origin of a tradition in 
which there is an impenetrable mystery of existence that provokes anguish. The goal is 
no longer to vanquish the difficulties and obstacles that Nature opposes to our knowledge 
but to recognize that it is inherent in nature—or the world, or being-in-the-world, or 
Being—to be inexplicable, so that one of the essential dimensions of human existence 
will henceforth be both wonder and anguish, the ‘sacred shudder,’ as Goethe and Kant 





The general effort and project of observing and explaining physical/material/natural or visible 
phenomena has been given to the technology and experimentation of science and could be 
considered the inheritors of the Promethean tradition of unveiling nature (Veil 318). Astronomy 
is an example of this is the field-switch. Astronomy—the study of the movements of the stars 
and planets—was initially a conjectural science on which the discourses were probable based in 
the understanding that the secret processes were not able to be known by humans, such as in the 
Timaeus.  Hadot posited that with Galileo and Kepler “Astronomy and physics met” combined 
under ‘nature’ and thus the province of “verifiable experimental science” (164). On the same 
token, the philosophers and poets of his contemporary moment—Hadot included Schelling, 
Goethe, Rilke, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein in his account—are re-turning in their discourse 
and poetry to paths new and ancient in experiencing phusis as the “inexplicable surging forth of 
reality” (314).  
 The Orphic and the Promethean frameworks function together “in that act—at once 
multiple and unique” which is the moment of living out a vision of the cosmos as part of the 
social complex (Citadel 82). Physics as the coming to awareness that one and others are part and 
expressions of the Whole, and what that means for self and others, is negotiated through relations 
of communication (Happiness 96). For example, Robert Macfarlane’s Underland (2019) opens a 
new understanding of the cosmos through investigations into the world beneath our feet.  
Macfarlane’s insights are gained from Promethean observations and experiments conducted in 
tunnels built and sites excavated for the purpose of mining precious metals and other elements. 
As well, his insights are combined with Orphic descriptions of the root systems that connect all 
trees in a forest—the “wood wide web”—that can be used to gather and deliver nutrients from 





place and time are renegotiated in embodied communication as he and those with him gain a 
contemporary ‘view from above’ by going low.5  
Physics as a Spiritual Exercise 
 Arnold Davidson captured the depth and breadth of spiritual exercises when he stated, 
“The art of living demanded by philosophy was a lived exercise exhibited in every aspect of 
one’s existence” (Introduction 21, emphasis added). This includes the human conditions of being 
abandoned to language and to terrestrial and celestial habitation (Butchart 12). Philosophy as a 
way of life was a life of exercise.  
 Physics as a spiritual exercise or “the realization of the presence of the world and of our 
belonging to the world” of, with, and for others in relations of communication assisted the 
philosopher in taking the view from above. This allows for the renegotiation of meanings of 
actions and interactions within an interpretive framework of a universal belonging (Happiness 
96). 
Hadot summarized this relationship of the spiritual exercise of physics with the Stoic way 
of life exhibited in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius:  
“We must, then, not only act in conformity with the theorems of the art of living and the 
fundamental dogmas, but also keep present to consciousness the theoretical foundations 
which justify them. This is the ‘science of Nature,’ because, in the final analysis, all of 
life’s principles merge in the knowledge of nature. Without this, the formulations of 
dogmas will become devoid of sense, no matter how often they are repeated.” (Citadel 
42)  
 






In other words, the efficacy of the spiritual exercises, thus the philosophical way of life of the 
school are dependent on an operative vision of the cosmos, the formation and continual 
imagining of which is itself a participation in the Logos or the All. This section turns to Hadot’s 
oft utilized examples in explicating physics in this manner. The first example is Plato’s Timaeus 
and the second is the Stoic example in which Hadot found the most fully developed and 
practiced form of physics as a spiritual exercise (210).  
Plato’s Timaeus 
 The approach of the Orphic model was in the understanding that one was already 
embedded within nature thus providing a framework for interpreting relations with nature and 
the cosmos privileging ‘community’ and ‘collaboration’ (Arnett and Holba 9; Arneson 77). 
Across the schools and in varying degrees, human art was understood as both representation and 
participation as one becomes “immersed within Nature’s creative impulse” (Veil 218). One such 
development of the orphic model was in the conception of the universe as a poem (205). 
Participation in the universe is a recruitment of one’s full being as he recruits the rational and the 
irrational in and through relations of embodied communication with the purpose of orienting self 
with others in nature and the cosmos. In other words, this interpreting and participating in poetic 
creation was a spiritual exercise.  
 Within the framework of a spiritual exercise Hadot characterized the Timaeus as “an 
artistic game that imitates the artistic game of the poet of the universe known as the divinity” 
(Veil 201). The state of wisdom for the Platonist was achieved in the separation of the eternal 
part from the temporal part, the soul from the body. Socrates again served as the model in 
choosing the authentic life in death over the continued existence of the body (Way of Life 94). 





individuality in and through an identification with the Logos (95). Practicing this in the spiritual 
exercises of inner discourse, dialogue, and especially of death, the practitioner achieves a lucid 
vision from the universal perspective, and “greatness of soul” (95,97). “[T]he whole of the 
philosopher’s speculative and contemplative effort becomes a spiritual exercise, insofar as he 
raises his thought up to the perspective of the Whole and liberates it from the illusions of 
individuality” (97). Contemplation becomes participation as through human art the philosopher 
imitates the creative force and rhythm of the cosmos. 
 Hadot placed Plato’s Timaeus under the category of “theological physics” (Veil 39). 
Remember that for Plato the study of the natural processes of development, or phusis, did not 
reach the rigors of a science because the causes and movements of it were only known to the 
gods, and because it dealt with subjects and processes that were in “perpetual transformation” 
(23). The starting points of physics then, were observations that were not able to be proven as in 
hypotheses, engaging in descriptions of the cosmos was an attempt at presenting a “likely” and 
“reasonable” demonstration (159,160). “Whether in the domain of the terrestrial bodies, which 
are subject to becoming, or of celestial bodies, we must be content with what is approximate, for 
we reside very far away and very low within the universe” (161). As noted above, this perpetual 
transformation allowed for the flourishing of several explanations for a single phenomenon, such 
as the creation of the world (161).  
 The closest thing we have to achieving knowledge in this arena is in discourse. The 
discourse must match the subject. The Socratic dialectic had the following features: question and 
answer, requiring assent of one’s partner to a proposition before proceeding to search for clarity, 
and the inclusion of a crisis point. These all had their purpose for Socrates to bring his dialogue 





humankind in the Timaeus finds appropriate the discourse of myth or “likely fables” that bring a 
diversionary joy to the philo-sophos and his partners. The setting for the Timaeus takes place in 
the setting of a festival for Athena and in praise of the city (Veil 182). In this type of discourse, 
inextricably linked were, “play, celebration, and the search for divine secrets . . . For Plato, at 
any rate, human play responds to divine play” (183). The play of conjectural discourse carried 
out in the spoken word on the origins of the cosmos and humankind is an imitation and a 
participation,  
“But a man who has given his heart to learning and true wisdom and exercised that part 
of himself is surely bound, if he attains to truth, to have immortal and divine thoughts, 
and cannot fail to achieve immortality as fully as is permitted to human nature. . . There 
is of course only one way to look after anything and that is to give it its proper food and 
motions. And the motions that are akin to the divine in us are the thoughts and 
revolutions of the universe . . . When that is done we shall have achieved the goal set us 
by the gods, the life that is best for this present time and for all time to come.” (Timaeus 
90d) 
The Timaeus then is both a discourse and a poem, and is poiētic, or a participation in the creative 
force of the play of the universe imitated in the poetic form in this case. The secrets of nature can 
be known in matching the divine part of one’s self through discourse suited to match the divine 
dance. Hadot has noted the similarity in the Stoic practice of physics insofar as it displays the 
theme of identifying with that which is beyond the egoist self. 
The Stoic Discipline of Desire 
 Hadot illumined the Stoic vision and practice of the philosophical way of life in his 





Citadel (1998). In that work Hadot situates Marcus’ Stoic practice in the teaching of Epictetus 
(50?–135 CE) who was highly regarded as a philosopher in his own time (Citadel 59). The four 
volumes of the Discourses of Epictetus that have made their way through to the present historical 
moment were recorded by his student/disciple Arrian of Nicomedia, for Epictetus himself had 
not written anything (60). It is through Epictetus’ vision, practice and exposition of the 
disciplines of the Stoic system that the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius makes sense as a way of 
life (59). “Human reason is an emanation or part of this Universal Reason. It can, however, 
become obscured and deformed as a result of life within the body, owing in particular to the 
attractions of pleasure” (76). The exercise of Stoic philosophy was an exercise in a way of life 
aiming to bring back into coherence one’s human reason with universal Reason (76). 
 Physics as spiritual exercise takes shape within the Stoic distinction of the “fundamental 
principle” between what is and is not within our sphere of influence (Way of Life 85). What 
humans can influence are what are designated “acts of our soul” as they are not dependent on 
other constraints and are considered acts of free choice (Citadel 83). Coming to awareness of the 
fundamental distinction between what does and does not depend on us illumines in the self the 
hēgimonikon, “the guiding principle,” or “the principle which directs all being. This is that 
principle of thought and judgment which makes us independent of the body, and the principle of 
liberty” (49). The hēgimonikon is that within the self that both resembles and participates as part 
of the All. 
  The acts of the soul are consistent with the three actions that do depend on the person: to 
judge or not judge, to desire or not, and the impulse to act (Citadel 83). Outside of these actions 
of the soul are those things which are not dependent upon us. “Epictetus lists our body, honors, 





nature” (83). The three disciplines of assent, desire, and action work together to bring 
“equanimity to the soul” by training perception/judgements, desire, and the impulse to act 
(Ancient 222). 
 The disciplines of assent, desire, and action each had a purpose in habituating the 
individual toward living a good life. With the majority of what occurs in the universe out of the 
reach of influence of the human person, the good toward which the Stoic could work was in 
forming the inner attitude to intend to do the good in all situations (Citadel 179). The study of 
physics, then, has as its end a moral purpose. Briefly, the discipline of assent corresponded to the 
faculty of judgement as it assents, or not, to the images that occur to our soul that come through 
the senses (84). This in part forms the inner discourse, so the exercise of discerning and clearing 
away the influence of the passions on those representations assisted in forming the inner attitude 
of detachment or objectivity (44). The discipline of desire works to discipline one’s reason to 
come aware of, and to cohere and consent to the will and actions of universal Reason (141). 
Within the human realm—“the customs and conventions of daily life”—demand one to act in 
relation with other human beings, who in due course will provoke the passions (183). The 
discipline of action is to keep to-hand the vision of the “common Reason” of “human Nature” at 
home in all of us and act in its service in interactions with others, thus maintain the coherence of 
the All (183).  
 The human desires can be exaggerated beyond the boundaries of what depends on us, 
causing us frustration and disruption of the soul (Citadel 137-138). Remembering that for the 
Stoic the only good is moral good, the only evil is moral evil. Therefore, that which should be 
desired is the good. With those things that do not depend on us we must remain indifferent which 





three disciplines approach the whole human being in the overall endeavor to choose the moral 
good by choosing to perceive, desire, and act in coherence with universal Reason (138). “Above 
all, the discipline of desire in Marcus is related first and foremost to the way in which we are to 
greet the events which result from the overall movement of universal Nature, which are produced 
by what Marcus calls the ‘exterior cause’” (Citadel 138; Meditations VIII, 7 qtd. in Citadel 138). 
The exercise of the discipline of desire works to cohere human reason through acceptance and 
consent to the occurrences in the realm of those phenomena which are indifferent to us, the cause 
of which comes from outside the self. The discipline of desire in Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations 
works to accept and work to desire the conditions and events that are occurring to himself in a 
particular existential moment. This emerges out of a principle of Stoic physics that “the cosmos 
is but a single living entity, endowed with a unique consciousness and will” (Citadel 141). All 
events which we encounter—“whether I am ill, or lose my child, or am the victim of an 
accident”—occur and implicate the whole of the cosmos (141). This is because all phenomena 
and events have been interwoven with the All since “the most ancient of causes” (Meditations 
qtd. in Citadel 140). The current moment can be understood as Destiny insofar as this moment is 
occurring as a result of the unfolding of the pattern of causes which are the cosmos (140). This 
assumes a universal Reason that guides this process, of which the human “guiding principle” is a 
reflection and takes its place as part of the pattern.  
 For the Stoic philosopher there is a fundamental principle that all of reality coheres with 
itself. Following on this intuition the philosopher is able to “perceive love of self and accord with 
oneself in each movement of a living being as much as in the movement of the universe as a 
whole, or in the perfection of the sage” (Citadel 141). The Stoic love that Hadot described here is 





animals, humans, celestial phenomena, etc.), each of the parts loves the other, and the parts love 
the Whole (142). Continuing with the image of interwoven patterns, Hadot places “to love” in 
context of everyday language use in the ancient world as carrying the meaning “to be 
accustomed to” indicating a sense of ‘fittingness’ or ‘habituation’ between each of the parts 
(142). In the relations between parts and the All there is “harmony” such that all that happens to 
the parts benefits the All, while “everything that is ‘prescribed’ for each part is, almost in the 
medical sense of the term, ‘prescribed’ ([Meditations] V, 8) for the health of the Whole, and 
consequently for all the other parts as well” (142). Disciplining desire means to re-place the 
moment or event occurring in the present moment within the perspective of the All or the Whole. 
In the same movement the philosopher also becomes aware of the presence of the Whole within 
that moment or event (142). In refusing to accept the moment or event as given in the Whole, the 
philosopher breaks up ‘the cohesion’ of the All. On the contrary, accepting these circumstances 
means to accept this event as being present and an exhibition of the will and the love of universal 
Reason (the All) has for its part—the philosopher. Bringing one’s reason into coherence with the 
All—bringing oneself and the All to health—means to identify one’s will with that of the All and 
to will the events as they are (142). Through the ever-growing self’s awareness of itself—“that 
infinitesimal point within the immensity”—through the discipline of desire transformed through 
and becomes identical with universal Reason (182).  
Conclusion 
 This chapter addressed how inquiries into nature and the cosmos are integral in the 
formation of frameworks for orienting oneself in the lifeworld and social complex (Arnett and 
Holba 9; Arneson 77). Physics when practiced as a spiritual exercise brought about “the 





others in relations of communication (Happiness 96). With physics supporting the spiritual 
practice of taking a view from above, routine concerns and interactions were brought into the 
perspective of being parts and expressions of the Whole wherein meanings of the human 
condition abandoned to this place and time can be renegotiated with others. In Hadot’s 
scholarship this theme had been present throughout all his works. However, a full-scale excursus 
took shape in his final published book, The Veil of Isis: An essay on the History of the Idea of 
Nature (2006). In the image of Pierre Courcelle, one of Hadot’s mentors, Hadot framed the work 
by tracing the development of meanings of the Heraclitean aphorism “Nature loves to hide” (x, 
Kahn 33). This began with the evolution of the meaning of the Greek work phusis to the ‘secrets 
of nature’ and up through the present moment to the ‘the mystery of being.’   
 Phusis began as a general term for Pre-Socratic “investigations of nature” that marked the 
conception of a process of development or formation/transformation (Veil 32). With Plato, the 
meaning of phusis became aligned with that of a divine art (22). Thus formed the relationship 
between nature and art that framed humankind’s relationship to nature throughout historical 
moments. For Plato, phusis or the operations and development of nature were a divine art that 
could not be known. Aristotle marked a significant distinction between human art and nature. In 
human art the principle of transformation is external to the material. Transformation involves 
“violence” insofar as it is forced upon materials (24). Phusis in nature is initiated and directed by 
an “inner motion” and form (23). In both cases the processes of phusis were invisible, regular 
and methodical. Hadot traced this to the development of the idea that nature held secrets. 
 The idea that nature held secrets also involves an opposition. Secrets are held back from 
others and are tightly guarded. This led to the development of the personification and divination 





these secrets was the purview of philosophy and science. Hadot characterizes the attempts at 
revealing the secrets of nature as Promethean or Orphic. The two attitudes are not a strict 
division, but rather “equally essential” in the investigations of nature and are often found 
together in the same person and attempts at understanding (Veil 98).  
 The Promethean attitude is based in an understanding of the relationship between 
humanity and nature to be generally hostile. Through technological and mechanical means the 
researcher will forces nature to give up its secretes so they can be used for the purposes of 
humankind. The Orphic attitude is based in the idea that humanity is a part of nature. The secrets 
of nature can be known through human art insofar as human art – the poem, the painting, the 
philosophical discourse – is a participation in the same creative and generative process of nature 
(Veil 92). Hadot found that in the current moment the function of observing, explaining and or 
theorizing regarding natural and visible phenomena has been largely co-opted to the inheritors of 
the Promethean attitude, the ‘hard’ sciences. The poets and the philosophers of the present 
moment are the inheritors of the existential aspect of the cosmos that gives witness and 
participates in the “the inexplicable surging forth of reality” (Veil 314). The Promethean and the 
Orphic continue to co-appear as frameworks of interpretation for orienting oneself in the 
lifeworld and social complex (Arnett and Holba 9; Arneson 77) . The Promethean framework 
privileges ‘power’ and ‘dominance’ whereas the Orphic privileges ‘communal’ and 
‘collaborative’ for understanding the communicative relations between human beings and nature 
and cosmos. 
 The final section of this chapter expands on the phenomena of physics practiced as a 
spiritual exercise. This section reviewed Hadot’s explication of how physics functioned as a 





Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations. In the Timaues the practice of physics was highlighted as 
conjectural exercise that brought a diversionary pleasure in the shape of poiētic play and 
participation in the creative impulse of the universe through the spoken word thus forming and 
re-forming the inner attitude of all participants.  
 Through the Meditations the discipline of desire was closely associated with the 
development of the inner attitude of being indifferent to indifferent things, which facilitated the 
Stoic in re-placing his actions in the context of the Whole. Macfarlane displays a contemporary 
understanding and practice that resonates with this Stoic attitude. In Macfarlane the metaphorical 
view from above is taken from ‘below’ and is integral in negotiating meaning in and through the 
mode of human communication in the Anthropocene moment. 
 As Macfarlane demonstrates in Underland (2019) human relationships of/in 
communication are influenced by the contours of the earth and cosmos we inhabit. As the 
contours of the earth are transformed in the Anthropocene epoch humans undergo disjointed 
experiences of place and time. (75). Negotiation of meaning and formulating responses in human 
communication to the present terrestrial conditions involves understandings of our relationship 
with nature and the cosmos. In re-placing the current circumstances with the perspective of the 
All the philosopher becomes aware of the vastness of the All present in the world and others. 







Pierre Hadot’s Philosophy of Communication 
“That there would be room once again in 
our contemporary world for philo-sophers in 
the etymological sense of the word, that is, 
seekers of wisdom. They would . . . search 
not for happiness—it seems that that is no 
longer fashionable—but for a life that is 
more conscious, more rational, and more 
open to others and the immensity of the 
world.” (Happiness 112) 
 
  
 Pierre Hadot has repeatedly pointed out that philosophy as a way of life is inextricable 
from the existential conditions of the person, the community, and the cosmos. As such, his work 
is directly connected to human communication. A guiding question and theme, “Is modern man 
still able to understand the texts of antiquity and live according to them?” runs throughout 
Hadot’s engagement with ancient philosophy (Way of Life 278). Throughout his writings Hadot 
reveals a holistic philosophy of communication: it is a discourse that leverages ideas and 
practices from ancient philosophy for the formation of “interpretive frameworks” for navigating 
meaning in the present historical moment (Arnett and Holba 9). The philosopher—a seeker of 
wisdom—engages in spiritual exercises for the purpose of transforming his entire being—mind, 
body, soul—toward the model of wisdom as embodied in the model of the sage. The sage model 
as ideal guides the philosopher in the ever-incomplete task of orienting themselves in the social 
complex to include a vision of the cosmos (Arneson 77).  
 In explicating Hadot’s philosophy of communication, the first section of this chapter is 
dedicated to setting a picture of the contemporary conditions of human communication. The 
‘big’ questions of meaning in life emerge in and through the banal conditions of everyday life, to 





5). Questions such as “how do I live?” “What does death mean for me and for my loved ones?” 
emerge at inconvenient times demanding a human response (MacIntyre 125). 
 The second section of this chapter outlines Hadot’s holistic philosophy of communication 
in four elements framed as Hadot’s response to his own question, “Is modern man still able to 
understand the text of antiquity and live according to them?” (Way of Life 278). The four 
elements for a philosophia of the present moment include: 1) an enduring philosophical attitude 
of eclecticism, 2) an updated model of a sage, 3) the spiritual exercise of being in the present 
moment, and 4) recognition of corporeal/linguistic expressivity as the condition(s) for/of 
philosophy as a way of life.  
 To conclude the 2nd section, I outline a holistic communication ethics drawn from the 
works of Hadot. Hadot understood ethics to be inextricable from the broader existential 
phenomenon of philosophy as a way of life. The practice of spiritual exercises as philosophy 
involves the transformation of the practitioner’s being in working toward the level of being of 
the sage (Happiness 177). Philosophia, in other words, was a practice of self-transformation at 
the level of being. To outline a holistic communication ethics of self-transformation I turn to 
Hadot’s critique of Michel Foucault’s rendering of aesthetics of existence. The section concludes 
by turning to Arnold Davidson and the beginnings of an extended conversation between Foucault 
and Hadot. 
Describing the Contemporary Historical Moment 
 Hadot interpreted ancient philosophical discourse in the context of production. His 
contributions to understanding human communication in the contemporary moment must be 
situated in the conditions of the present historical moment (Arnett and Holba 12). This section 





communicative and terrestrial aspects. The work of Matthew Crawford on the human capacity 
for attention, Zygmunt Bauman on a culture of the ‘hunter,’ and Robert Macfarlane serve to 
paint a picture of the conditions of the contemporary human communicator attempting to orient 
himself and find meaning in the “multidimensional composition of human relationships” that is 
the social complex (Arneson 77). 
Attention 
 Crawford is the author of Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work 
(2009) and followed up that work with The World beyond Your Head: On Becoming an 
Individual in an Age of Distraction (2015). Crawford’s project in The World beyond Your Head 
is an exercise in philosophical anthropology aimed at tracing the scaffolding undergirding the 
current “age of distraction” (8). In the “age of distraction,” the human faculty of ‘attention’ is 
difficult to develop (8). Yet, attention is precisely that faculty which “joins us to the world” 
(131). Where attention is placed indicates what a person values. Crawford observes that the 
content of the attention is nearly irrelevant. Rather, “Our distractibility seems to indicate that we 
are agnostic on the question of what is worth paying attention to—that is, what to value” (5 
original emphasis). In other words, the stimulation itself is of value and not the content. This 
leads to a situation of persons perceiving that they have gained liberation from traditional 
societal structures (religious, geographical, and civic) awash in choices with a “cognitive 
environment” characterized as “by turns anxious, put-upon, distracted, exhausted, enthralled, 
ecstatic, self-forgetting” (World 8). Autonomy values freedom and removes us from the authority 
structures that help us navigate that freedom. 
  Responding to the question “How should I live?” involves asking how the ideal person 





femininity, etc.) takes action in this situation/life. Crawford identifies a tension in the present 
historical moment between the ideal Western autonomous self and objects that are external to the 
mind including other people (World 26). The autonomous self strives “to secure its freedom by 
rendering the external world fully pliable to its will . . . this [is] accomplished by treating objects 
as projections of the mind” that are duly pliable to the will of the mind (Crawford, World 26). On 
the other hand, objects external to the mind are perceived as restraints to the freedom of the 
autonomous self (26).  
 The primary objects that constrain the ideal of Western self are “things,” “inheritance,” 
and “other people,” as Crawford identifies in the major divisions of his book (World 26). 
Crawford identifies the self in the present historical moment as being “saturated” in the mental 
projections carrying out the business of life in a “highly mediated existence” (26). In Crawford 
the pliability of mental projections has folded back on the self so that “we ourselves have been 
rendered pliable—to whoever has the power to craft the most bewitching representations or to 
control the portals of public space through which we must pass to conduct the business of life” 
(27). Crawford notes that these two states of existence, a pliable self and the enlightenment ideal 
of autonomy, are at odds with our fundamental “situatedness” in the world (26).  
 We are born into a world, environment, culture, cosmos, and language that is always 
already in existence. To learn and to attain freedom is to allow oneself to be “led out” (World 
127) under the authority of linguistic structures, social structures, and the knowledge to hand of 
the long-time practitioners (e.g., masters of a craft, elders, educators). In an environment 






 A fundamental problem for human communication in the present moment emerges in this 
tension between learning new things and autonomy. Attention is developed through learning 
which requires acknowledgement of our linguistic situatedness with others in the world. The 
ability to attend to things is a faculty that is both developed through and required for human 
communication. The autonomous self does not value this self-discipline, and the world of 
enticements can keep this fundamental activity of being human severely underdeveloped. With a 
severely reduced capacity of shared narrative ground for being in communication, responding to 
questions such as “How should I live?” becomes an exhausting task (Crawford 127; Butchart 10-
11). In this situation, is it any wonder that people attempt to move on quickly when the passion 
and abrupt intrusion of questions about the meaning in life emerge in daily interactions 
(MacIntyre 125)? 
 Bauman’s construct of “liquid modernity” resonates with Crawford’s description of the 
tensions in both freedom and attention. For Bauman, ‘culture’ refers to “a set of preferences 
suggested, recommended and imposed on account of their correctness, goodness or beauty” (5). 
At the beginning of the historical moment of the Enlightenment, culture was “missionary” in the 
service of guiding all of humanity toward an ‘enlightened’ universal condition where people of 
the lowest classes were to be freed from the rule of “prejudice and superstition” for the purpose 
of continuing the advancement of society(6). Missionary culture soon assumed an educational 
mode and relationship that was: 
“a planned and expected agreement between those possessing knowledge (or at least 
confident of being in possession of it) and ignoramuses (or those thus described by the  
confident aspirants to their education); an agreement furnished, incidentally with only 





newly formed ‘educated class,’ seeking the right to fashion the ‘new and improved’ order 
rising from the ashes of the ancient régime.” (Bauman 9)  
The missionary culture soon brought new life and dimensions by spreading through colonization 
in the United States coupled with new social evolutionary theories. The burden of the cultured 
was to “convert the rest of the inhabitants of the globe” to the social order and ‘enlightened’ 
culture of the Western developed nation, e.g. Great Britain (9). Institutions and bureaucracies 
were duly set up in the new territories to assist the mission and establish “the intended product (a 
populace turned into a ‘civic body’)” (10). After a missionary culture is in place, a nation’s 
culture then shifts from a missionary agent—in the form of educators, priests—o a conservative 
force to maintain the “civic body”—such as a justice system (10).  
 The Enlightenment project and the conservative maintenance stages of culture are 
characterized by societal assumptions about the task. Bauman offers the transition to “‘liquid 
modernity’ alongside ‘postmodernity’, ‘late modernity’, [and] ‘second’ or ‘hyper’ modernity” 
(11). Liquid modernity is marked by open-ended stimulation for the purpose of occupying a 
person’s attention. Culture is marked not by the content of the al products, but rather how wide 
one’s tastes are and how much one can consume (Bauman 1-3). “Liquid modernity” describes 
the condition of “compulsive and obsessive ‘modernization’, as a result of which, like liquid, 
none of the consecutive forms of social life is able to maintain its shape for long” (Bauman 11). 
The impetus of culture then is moved from the societal task to the realm of personal choice and 
personal responsibility, thus making choice the central and “unavoidable duty of life” (12).  
 For an individual living in a “liquid modern” culture this condition of “constant change” 
becomes the norm. During the Enlightenment, the ‘good’ rested in achieving a state of 





were judged to be necessary for the process of creating an ‘enlightened’ civic body. The goal in 
liquid modernity is people’s continual participation in the never-ending hunt for stimulation and 
constant access to another choice (Bauman 23). Bauman here points to the constant shifting 
norms of fashion, be it clothing, art, or digital platforms of interaction. The person in the hunt—
each of us—must constantly track the ever-shifting symbols denoting belonging. This moves 
persons to acquire and consume the ‘next’ before the current pursuit comes to an end. The thrill 
of the hunt through the constant stimulation must be kept up. Movement becomes essential, and 
the game becomes one not of societal action taken toward an “enlightened” condition, but of 
keeping up or surviving in an ever-changing environment (24). The self as hunter in liquid 
modernity is in “the pursuit of constantly elusive fashion” (Bauman 30). The continual hunt 
“does not give sense to life. . . . It merely helps to banish the question of life’s meaning from our 
minds” (30). Reflection on these questions takes one away from the hunt and arrests one from 
moving on to the next stimulation: reflection is a death sentence.  
Intermittently, an event momentarily sideline’s the hunter—a significant injury, loss of 
income, death of a loved one, etc. Filling the vacuum left by the hunt and its stimulation are the 
questions of meaning of a life, primarily, “How should I live?” Bauman paints a bleak picture of 
this space:  
When such an opportunity finally presents itself, that is at moments of dropping out of, or 
being excluded from the hunter’s way of life, it is as a rule too late for reflection to 
influence the course of one’s life and the life of those around. It is too late to object to the 
‘actually existing’ shape of one’s life, and certainly for any questioning of its sense to 





The problem for human communication is that learning to live in liquid modernity prizes the 
individual hunter’s way of life in which the persistent questions of meaning are constantly kept 
at bay. As Macfarlane explains, “untimely surfacings” mark and present experiences of 
disjointed time and place. 
Untimely Surfacings 
 Macfarlane’s work displays a combination of analytic and poetic ways of understanding 
one’s lived-experience. Macfarlane’s most recent work, Underland: A Deep Time Journey 
(2019) sees the Orphic and Promethean attitudes intertwine as he writes in an attempt to 
approach the Anthropocene epoch (13).  
“[T]he Anthropocene should be considered a new Earth epoch, on the ground that 
‘mankind will remain a major geological force for many millennia, maybe millions of 
years to come.’ As the Pleistocene was defined by the action of ice, and the Holocene by 
a period of relative climatic stability allowing the flourishing of life, so the Anthropocene 
is seen to be defined by the action of Anthropos: human beings, shaping the Earth at a 
global scale.” (Underland 75) 
Characteristic of the Anthropocene is the occurrence of disturbing change at the planetary level 
where both time and place are disrupted. “‘[C]risis’ exists not as an ever-deferred apocalypse but 
rather as an ongoing occurrence” (14).  
Examples that mark disjointed time and place are the phenomena Macfarlane terms 
“untimely surfacings” (Beneath). For example, the appearance of Arctic methane deposits 
emerge with the thawing of the permafrost, “the imprints of ancient structures—Roman 
watchtowers, Neolithic enclosures” come into view in Britain from aerial views, and a Cold War 





ice cap is emerging with its “hundreds of thousands of gallons of chemical contaminants” is re-
emerging (Underland 14). As the ground under our feet is displaced so emerges the immense 
sense of “deep time” (15).   
Macfarlane describes “deep time” as the “dizzying expanses of Earth history that stretch 
away from the present moment” and is “measured in units that humble the human instant: epochs 
and aeons, instead of minutes and years” (Underland 15). Rather than freezing action in the face 
of a vast picture of time Macfarlane argues that engaging “deep time” spurs us onto “re-
imagining [the present moment]; countermanding its quick greeds and furies with older, slower 
stories of making and unmaking . . . bringing us to consider what we are leaving behind for the 
epochs and beings that will follow us” (15). The urgent disjointed present condition appears in 
the illustrative example of sealing and storing “radioactive uranium pellets encased in iron, then 
encased in copper” in Yucca Mountain above a fault named Ghost Dance (7). The half-lives of 
the uranium are projected to be millions of years: 
“The timescale of the hazard is such that those responsible for entombing this waste must 
now face the question of how to communicate its danger to the distant future. This is a 
risk that will outlast not only the life of its makers but perhaps also the species of its 
makers. How to mark this site? How to tell whatever beings will come to this desert place 
that what is kept in this rock sarcophagus is desperately harmful, is not of value, must 
never be disturbed?” (7, original emphasis) 
Macfarlane gives voice to Hadot’s rendering of a lived physics. As those responsible for the 
Yucca Mountain site are working out the problem of marking meaning for the future they are 
simultaneously working out the meaning of this site in and through communication for the 





136). Macfarlane dives beneath the surface investigating the ‘underlands’ of the earth, vivifying 
the Anthropocene epoch in a way that opens the possibility of orienting ourselves 
corporeally/linguistically in the life world with others in accord with a renewed vision of the 
cosmos. 
 The picture Crawford, Bauman, and Macfarlane paint of the current historical moment is 
that the questions continue to emerge but contemporary communicators are left without personal 
motivation and competence for reaching out to others, stimulation is valued over content, and 
people find themselves without time and without models for how to reflect and engage the 
ongoing and inherent process of responsivity in a situation and responsibility  to others in the 
social complex (Arneson 30). Hadot’s holistic philosophy of communication assists present-day 
communicators in finding resources to develop attention and respond to the questions of the 
human condition corporeally and linguistically in the lifeworld. 
Pierre Hadot’s Philosophy of Communication 
 Hadot’s philosophy of communication is holistic as he attends to the health of one’s 
whole being. By ‘whole being’ he means that philosophy practiced as a way of life in the ancient 
model was therapeutic for the inextricably intertwined body, mind, soul, cosmos, and 
community. Debra Hawhee reminds us that the now perceived hard lines between ‘segments’ of 
this whole was a later introduction by scholars. In the ancient practice, these were more fluid in 
the ancient practice such that philosophical instruction at Plato’s Academy took place in the 
gymnasium (Hawhee 4). Philosophia, then, was the result and the ongoing confirmation of an 






 The spiritual exercises, such as meditation on death, attentiveness to the present moment, 
achieving a view from above, and dialogue, are educative. As such, spiritual exercises are 
intended to form the practitioner to the “fundamental inner attitude” and required the “entire 
spirit, one’s whole way of being” (Way of Life 59, 21). As in the example of Alcibiades and 
Socrates in Plato’s Symposium, the experience of wisdom—coming to the awareness of one’s 
unknowledgeable state, incoherence of personal and communal action, and desire toward 
wisdom—calls for the application of reasoned logos, passionate desire and formative potential of 
persuasive speech carried in and through the spoken word. 
  Socrates was a midwife whose dialectical and erotic irony opened his dialogue partner to 
the risk and fear of exposure of one’s own lack of wisdom. Going forward in the conversation, 
Socrates took on the responsibility for his partner by bringing his dialogue partner to the point of 
crisis—the point at which the person becomes a living problem for himself—which for Socrates 
marked the beginning of awareness and health. 
 Socrates, as well as many others recognized as philosophers during antiquity, were 
recognized for their way of life, not for any works, if at all, they wrote. The relationship between 
written philosophical discourse and philosophia is a Stoic distinction that Hadot revealed is 
exemplified in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. As hypomnēmata (notes written to and for 
himself) they were specially and vividly formulated ‘dogmas’ of the fundamental Stoic 
principles by which Marcus lived his life. In writing them and in speaking them he re-embodied 
them, thus rekindling his intention and choice of life to judge, desire, and act on himself and with 
others in a way that was coherent with universal Reason. Philosophy as a way of life was a 
corporeal/linguistic interweaving of the therapeutic, the personal, and the communal expressed in 





 Hadot’s philosophy of communication is holistic. He approaches philosophy as 
therapeutic because embodied practice is rooted in a choice made in response to existential 
conditions and the recognition of a lack of wisdom—a response to ‘how do I live well?’—
motivated in a desire toward an ideal wisdom in practice. Hadot relies on the model of the sage 
for the purpose of engaging the incomplete and therefore possible task of orienting oneself in the 
social complex as part of and an expression of the cosmos.  
Living and Communicating Philosophically 
 Hadot’s philosophy of communication is brought to life as a philosophia for the present 
moment. This is outlined in four characteristics: the fate of the philosophical attitude up to and 
including the current historical moment, a sage model for 2020, attention of the present moment, 
and task of the philosopher. To live philosophically is to exhibit linguistic/corporeal expressivity 
of the dense tenets of communicative engagement enmeshed in the everyday life of the social 
complex. This incomplete task is made possible as one lives in and through the “meaning-full 
experience” of human communication (Arneson 25).  
Enduring Philosophical Attitude and Practice 
 The phenomenon of ‘philosophy’ has been one of the primary phenomena associated 
with wisdom or knowledge in the Western tradition. Hadot’s investigation of the contours of 
philosophy’s context of production brings into relief the bonds of philosophical discourse that in 
the ancient context were tethered to philosophy as a way of life that was carried out in a context 
of primary orality. In other words, philosophy as embodied was essentially communicative. On 
several occasions Hadot explained the phenomenon of philosophy as occurring between two 
poles: one that privileges the creation and shaping of philosophical discourse for the sake of 





discourse in service of this purpose (Happiness 56-60; Ancient 260). In explicating philosophia 
Hadot pointed to the disconnect in the present moment between the phenomenon of ‘philosophy’ 
and the capacity to offer a way of living or at least resources for responding to 21st century 
conditions as presented above. This picture is furthered in the disparity between “philosophy and 
the teaching of philosophy” that Hadot experienced in his own education (Way of Life 278). This 
led Hadot to wonder whether or not philosophy as a phenomenon has become perceived to be a 
luxury.  
 The luxury of philosophy is the perception that in the face of human “concerns, their 
sufferings, their anguishes, the perspective of death that awaits them, and awaits those they love” 
philosophical discourse of the present moment appears as “vain chatter and ridiculous luxury” 
(Happiness 188). Though moved to the side in Hadot’s rendering of the development of the 
phenomenon of systemizing discourse philosophy and the concurrent emergence of the 
university, the attitude of philosophy as a way of life has remained present throughout his works 
(Ancient 254-255; Happiness 55-56). Using askēsis, or a transformational practice, as a marker 
Hadot frequently comments that the works of Soren Kierkegaard, Michel de Montaigne, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Henri Bergson, 
Michel Foucault, and Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein display the continuance of the concept 
of philosophia. Hadot read ancient philosophical discourse as an integration of the ideas and the 
literary genre, and he read Wittgenstein—a philosopher whose works are most associated with 
analytic philosophy—as practicing the same integration (Introduction 17). 
 Hadot associated the apparent structureless form of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations (1953) as functioning therapeutically. “Wittgenstein continues [from the Tractatus 





peace to metaphysical worry. . . [Philosophical Investigations] wished to act little by little on our 
spirit, like a cure, like a medical treatment. The work therefore does not have a systematic 
structure, strictly speaking” (Wittgenstein 973 qtd. in Davidson Introduction 17-18 emphasis 
added). Hadot found Wittgenstein’s investigation of language games helpful as Hadot himself 
investigated the language games—rules and structures of meaning in context of 
production/utterance—of philosophical discourse inancient philosophy as “ways of life”:  
“[I]t was in relation to language games that I first had the idea that philosophy is also a 
spiritual exercise because, ultimately, spiritual exercises are often language games, in 
which one tells oneself a phrase to provoke an effect, whether on others or on oneself, 
hence under certain circumstances and with a certain goal. Moreover, in the same 
context, Wittgenstein also used the expression ‘form of life.’ This also inspired me to 
understand philosophy as a form or way of life.” (Happiness 135) 
With the help of Hadot’s approach to interpretation, and the recognition of the philosophical 
attitude embodied by scholars mentioned above, we have come to a richer understanding of 
ancient philosophical discourse and its practice within the context of the contemporary moment. 
The philosophical attitude continues, so what of practicing the spiritual exercises bereft of the 
context and community of the schools of antiquity. 
The Sage in 2020 
 The community of practitioners, the philosopher’s school, was essential for the spiritual 
development of the individual philo-sophos in the ancient context. As discussed in chapters two 
and three, this format acknowledged the primacy of the formative capacity of the embodied 
spoken word for the spiritual progress of the practitioner, which is the primary goal of 





philosopher to hear him speak, question him, and carry on discussions with him and other 
disciples in a community that always serves as a place of discussion”? (Way of Life 62). Reading 
‘alone’ the contemporary seeker of wisdom will become aware of his lack of wisdom and desire 
for it by following the models of those mentioned above who continued the philosophical 
attitude in their historical moment. “Montaigne, Goethe, Nietzsche . . . too, were alone, but in 
accordance with their circumstances and innermost needs, they chose the ways of life of ancient 
philosophy as their models” (Ancient 277). In other words, the essentials are available and can be 
adaptable to meet current conditions of the need to train the capacity of attention and to address 
the ever-emergent questions of meaning in life. 
 Borrowing from Nietzsche, Hadot gained the view that the schools and subsequent 
traditions of philosophical discourse act for the present-day reader as “experimental laboratories” 
of the experiences and consequences that the various ancient ways of life have to offer 
(Nietzsche qtd. in Ancient 277-278). Hadot encouraged contemporary readers to adopt the 
attitude of eclecticism, in other words, students are able to benefit simultaneously from both an 
Epicurean and/or Stoic model in approaching the conditions of the present moment (Ancient 
277). This is so because conditions change and philosophy as embodied is therapeutic insofar as 
it addresses the conditions of the lived-body in the lifeworld and social complex (Arneson 77). 
Experiments of the ancients provide time-tested and honed models for practicing stepping away 
from the hunt (Bauman), developing attention (Crawford) to the moment, and in communication 
with others develop responses to the questions of meaning. In and through communication one 
orients oneself in the life world and social complex through internal and external discourse and 





found outside the ancient context of the schools and are practicable for seeking wisdom in the 
present moment. 
 When the outdated “cosmological and mythical elements” of the schools are 
“transcended” the fundamental attitude of approaching the search for wisdom becomes primary 
(Ancient 278; Citadel 309). Hadot posited, “these models [Cynic, Neoplatonic, Stoic, Epicurean] 
correspond to fundamental attitudes which all human beings find necessary when they set about 
seeking wisdom” (Ancient 278). The models are finite and universal, “which are found in various 
forms, in every civilization, throughout the various culture zones of humanity” (278). As we 
have seen, the attitude, existential choice, and consequent way of life of a school was modeled in 
the figure of the sage.  
 According to Hadot the model of the sage for the present moment must model and inspire 
the ongoing orientation of the practitioner’s embodied, therefore communicative and communal, 
way of life (Happiness 117). Hadot’s own attempts at living the Neoplatonic maxims of Plotinus 
as he was writing the book on Plotinus (Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision 1963) allowed him to 
come away acknowledging that an emphasis on separation of the soul and body did not meet the 
needs of the present day. Rather, “Since 1970 on, I have felt very strongly that it was 
Epicureanism and Stoicism which could nourish the spiritual life of men and women of our 
times, as well as my own” (Way of Life 280).  
Stripping the model of the sage down to the essential characteristics and responsive to the 
current conditions Hadot outlined a contemporary sage-model characterized by “cosmic 
consciousness,” “inner peace,” and an increased capacity for the “love of mankind” (Happiness 
117). The “love of mankind” is the motivation in all the schools to make and re-make the choice 





keeps the All or the Whole or universal Reason in mind (Happiness 117). Motivated with a 
vision, the sage reaches out to others to attempt to relieve them from the two primary anguishes 
of life—anxiety and fear—by guiding them to contemplation of the same cosmic vision which 
motivates him. Keeping the vision of the whole in mind, the sage has transcended a partial ego-
oriented vision as he attains a view from above that puts his actions and life in a humbling 
perspective that likewise births in the soul a freedom from those fears which equates to an inner 
peace (117-118).  
 Hadot wrote that the love of mankind and inner peace must contend with “revolt 
grumbling inside” as the contemporary philosopher (philo-sophos)—the one seeking wisdom 
following the example of the sage—views the full landscape of human suffering, such as human 
trafficking, the opioid crisis in the United States, war-torn regions and oppressed populations, 
and the effects of the Anthropocene epoch on current and future generations (Happiness 119). In 
love the philosopher cannot turn away from the human suffering all the while struck by his 
“powerlessness to reform anything” (119). For in the Stoic sense, the love of mankind refers to 
the realization that “no being is alone, but that we are parts of a Whole, constituted by the totality 
of human beings as well as by the totality of the cosmos” (Citadel 311). In other words, the 
fundamental human condition is not isolation, but rather we are in-relation with others and are 
thus already communicative (Butchart 134). 
  Loving mankind and the cosmos and bringing our intention into coherence with 
universal, Reason is also loving the part of the whole that we are. Thus, bringing inner peace to 
oneself through the spiritual exercises of attention, dialogue, and meditation is inseparable from 
bringing other beings into coherence with reason because all are already in an affective, 





than the road of detachment or indifference as in the ancient era to bring peace of mind, the 
modern philosopher must be concerned “to act well without being misled by hatred, anger, or 
pity” (119). Hadot was adamant on this point, “I nevertheless believe that without inner peace, 
no action can ultimately be effective” (Happiness 119). For only the person or persons who have 
formed the inner attitude in the spiritual exercises of being authentically present to oneself—
meditation and attention—can bring their whole being to be present with others in dialogue and 
in living philosophically (Way of Life 91).   
The Present Moment 
 Hadot had several conversations with Jeannie Carlier and Arnold Davidson and they 
ended up being some of his final conversations on his own thought, as he died shortly thereafter 
on April 24, 2010 in Orsay, France. The published collection of these conversations appeared 
under the title The Present Alone is Our Happiness (2011) indicating the prominent position this 
universal spiritual attitude figured in ancient philosophy and in Hadot’s diagnosis and 
prescription for philosophers (philo-sophos) in the present moment. As seen in chapter three of 
this project the spiritual exercise of being attentive to the present moment was fundamental to 
living philosophically. Attentiveness to the present moment was intimately tied to the therapeutic 
function of the spiritual exercises for both gathering and focusing the self and its expansion 
(Ancient 189; Citadel 118). Attention to the present moment—a pillar of practice for the 
Epicureans and the Stoics—was deployed to overcome the fear and anxiety of the future and the 
past (Way of Life 87).  
 Tied to this exercise in coming to realize the abundance of the present moment was the 
exercise of meditation on one’s own death which brought one to realize the “value and 





responded to a conventional life that was “inauthentic” and “darkened by unconsciousness and 
harassed by worry” as one’s inner discourse was dispersed (Way of Life 83). As it was then so it 
is now: “Today, we are even more inwardly divided than was Plotinian man” (Plotinus 113). 
What we might call ‘routine’ concerns of the daily life—having food, shelter, work, health care, 
concern for children and/or parents—are compounded in the present moment by conditions to 
which both Crawford and Bauman give voice. Particularly the valuation of stimulation over 
content and an underdeveloped capacity for attention, and of being responsive to the 
corporeal/linguistic expressivity of/with others in human communication amidst a ‘liquid 
modern’ culture of the hunter that disincentivizes reflection. Hadot’s description is consistent 
with theirs as he relays in closing out an essay on the present moment, 
“[I]t was not in order to satisfy some historical or literary curiosity, but to describe a 
spiritual attitude: an attitude which, for ourselves and for modern man in general, 
hypnotized as we are by language, images, information, and the myth of the future, 
seemed to us to provide one of the best means of access to this wisdom [of the present 
moment], so misunderstood and yet so necessary. The call of Socrates speaks to us more 
now than ever before: ‘Take care for yourself.’ This call is echoed by Nietzsche’s 
remark: ‘Is it not the case that all human institutions’ – to which we might add: ‘as well 
as the whole of modern life’ – are intended to prevent mankind from feeling their life by 
means of the constant dispersion of their thoughts.’” (Way of Life 235) 
Philosophy as a way of life exercised in attention to the present moment (e.g. in meditation), or 
in the exercise of contemplation on death, opens for present day readers a way to “train ourselves 
for that unique act of wisdom”—doing the good with and for others—as one moves through the 





to language, embedded as part of the cosmos and is in communication “the mode and means 
through which human being makes sense of its experience of having-to-be” (Butchart 12-13). 
For the ancient and the modern philo-sophos the task carried out in communication is never 
complete. 
Philosophy as a Way of Life: 
The Incomplete Task of Corporeal/Linguistic Expressivity 
 
  Transformation of the practitioner’s “whole way of being” begins in a lack of wisdom 
which opens and keeps open the possibility for seeking wisdom, i.e., living philosophically as a 
way of life (Davidson 21). The completion of the philosophical task as modeled in the 
myth/figures of sages is deemed by all philosophical models as nearly unattainable. The 
impossibility of the task of becoming a sage, thus a perpetual philo-sophos, secures the ground of 
transformation—or the ‘space’ where the task of philosophy is worked out and lived—as the 
“lived-body” tethered to the life-world that is the “site of communicative tasks to be performed 
by the embodied subject” (Arneson 24).  
 The philosophical task (seeking wisdom) is indivisible from the lived-body. As 
embodied, philosophy as a way of life—seeking wisdom through spiritual exercises that form 
and reform an embodied self in concert with an operative understanding of nature, the cosmos, 
and self-in-relation with all—is communicative engagement in and through corporeal/linguistic 
expressivity (Arneson 25; Butchart 5). For Hadot philosophy is learning “how to live a human 
life” which is inextricable from the human condition (Happiness 188).  
 Philosophy as a way of life in the ancient world took shape as a “living conversation” 
occurring “person to person” and “was not cut off from daily life” (Happiness 188). In other 
words, philosophy as a way of life relied on and was carried out in and through a lived-body—





“Without a body-lived and a lived-body there is no communication—no self, no meaning, no 
discourse, no community, no culture” (27). “Human communication” continues Arneson, 
“intertwines the body with thought/language/expressivity in a phenomenal field. . . Meaning 
arises in lived experience, which is created, negotiated, and shared with others in embodied 
linguistic expressivity” (27). “Embodied linguistic expressivity” enmeshed in the life-world with 
others is the condition of possibility for living philosophically, i.e seeking wisdom in the “living 
conversation” of everyday life. For living philosophically in the present moment, it is a necessary 
condition that philosophy as a way of life remain incomplete. 
 Hadot has variously noted the generative and inherent contradiction of the perfection of 
the philosophical life/philosophy in daily life. “The drama of the human condition is that it is 
impossible not to philosophize, and at the same time it is impossible to philosophize,” and again, 
“it is precisely in this daily life that [the philosopher] . . . must seek to attain that way of life 
which is utterly foreign to the everyday world” (Happiness 189, Way of life 58). For example, 
experiencing a moment of corporeal/linguistic expressivity appearing to be in coherence with 
universal Reason and the Whole while in the next moment confronted by the necessities, 
passions, fears and anxieties that are inherent to embodiment. These remind and re-embody the 
philosopher’s lack of wisdom.  
 A lack of wisdom, or a lack of identity with the corporeal/linguistic expressivity 
embodied in the sage-model, is the opening revealing that “human essence is with” and that 
“Com-muni-cation” indicates relation with other people as ontologically primary (Butchart 134). 
A lack of wisdom is the necessary condition for living and communicating philosophically. 





 Aware of his own lack of wisdom Socrates turned to others in his search. His 
conversations occurred as he walked in the city, rested outside the walls, in battle, at drinking 
parties, and just before he drank the hemlock. Socrates and his dialogue partner(s) are in-relation 
on the condition of the experience and awareness of a lack of wisdom and the desire toward 
wisdom both of which are corporeally and linguistically expressed on the “terrain” of the lived-
body as meaning is negotiated and renegotiated in and through human communication (Arneson 
25). Following the conversation in Plato’s Symposium Socrates, to continue his search for 
wisdom, turns again, necessarily, to the banalities of everyday life—washing himself and 
conversing with others in the city—the communicative ground and means of the search for 
wisdom. 
 
Toward a Holistic Communication Ethics of the Present Moment 
 “As far as lived ethics is concerned, the point is obviously not to be content with an 
ethical theory, but to practice it. For the Stoics, what matters is above all what they call 
the duties, that is, the duties of everyday life. We thus have to deal with spiritual 
exercises, or with what I call spiritual exercises, that is, practices intended to transform 
the self, and make it reach a higher level and a universal perspective, thanks in particular 
to physics, the awareness of one’s relation to the world, or thanks to the awareness of 
one’s relation with the whole of humanity, which implies the duty of taking the common 
good into account.” (Happiness 177) 
 Pierre Hadot preferred to situate his conception of ethics within what he calls a general 
“existential interest” in ancient philosophy and philosophy as a way of life in the present moment 





people, or in things” (Happiness 175). Hadot considered ‘ethical’ or ‘ethics’ to be inextricable 
from the practice of philosophy as a way of life, and too limited a descriptor for the phenomenon 
that was ancient philosophy and the concept of living it for the present moment. Pat Arneson’s 
description resonates with Hadot’s understanding of the inextricable intertwining of ethics and 
embodiment: “A person cannot separate herself from the ethical dimension of life; one’s ethics 
are always learned and communicated both corporeally and linguistically with the power 
dynamics of the social complex” (80). Ethics lived and “communicated corporeally and 
linguistically” took shape as the spiritual exercises (chapter three) as they called on and 
(trans)formed the practitioner and community at the level of being (80).  
 Chapter one reviewed Hadot’s historical context and intellectual development as he came 
to the question, “is modern man still able to understand the texts of antiquity and live according 
to them?” (Way of life 278). Hadot’s scholarship can be viewed as a sustained response to that 
question. To that end his scholarship assists an understanding of ancient Greek and Roman 
philosophical texts as support for exercising philosophy through embodied spiritual exercises. 
Spiritual exercises, such as attention, meditation, and dialogue were inseparable from an 
operable theory and vision of nature and the cosmos. This situated the philosopher and others as 
members of the larger human community and as parts and expressions of the cosmos. Ethical 
considerations are part of existential transformation of the self and others as members of the 
human and cosmic whole. 
 For adopting and adapting ancient practices for the present Hadot prescribed an eclectic 
approach. For example, a person in the present moment has access to and can choose from the 
various models of philosophical life and attitudes toward wisdom—Stoic, Epicurean, 





with anxiety and fear—bringing peace to the soul, acknowledging oneself and others as parts and 
expressions of the All or Whole, and by attaining consciousness of the present moment and 
thereby a consciousness of one’s own lack of knowledge and desire for it (chapter 5). 
 In chapter five I argued that Hadot’s philosophy of communication is holistic as it 
addresses the embodied incomplete task of orienting oneself in the social complex and the 
lifeworld through the therapeutic spiritual exercises that act in and through one’s 
corporeal/linguistic expressivity attentive to temporal and terrestrial conditions. (Arneson 25).  
 Arnett, Fritz, and Bell present a figure of communication ethics that is a pragmatic 
necessity in the contemporary historical moment (1). Their model of communication ethics 
asserts that communicative practices protect and promote a construct of the ‘good.’ In a liquid 
modern historical moment the many and various forms of the good are ever shifting and in 
contention revealed in and practiced and expressed in human communication (Bauman 30).  
Arnett, Fritz, and Bell foreground the necessity of engaging others in learning as minimal 
agreement is worked out to meet, together, the needs of the existential moment (Arnett, Fritz, 
and Bell (xi-xvii). This allows for a multiplicity of appropriate responses to existential 
conditions. In the present moment this is poignantly demonstrated in the patchwork of responses 
to the pandemic by the different states and communities in the United States. With a minimal 
agreement of curbing the rate of the spread and protecting the national economy the responses, 
the timing and specific restrictions of travel and prescriptions for cover have varied. 
Organizations such as schools and other community organizations (e.g. athletic/health clubs) are 
navigating instruction and interaction in the digital/online communicative environment—most 
for the first time. In navigating emergent historical conditions Hadot contributes to a 





 The ideal of the philosopher was filled-out in the myth/figure of the sage. In chapter 2, I 
reviewed Hadot’s distinction between the philosopher and the sage. The sage is considered the 
model of the school. For example, in the Stoic understanding the sage’s corporeal/linguistic 
expressivity were part of the production of “all the events of the universe” because in complete 
coherence with universal reason (Citadel 76). The sage was at a different and “higher level” of 
being than that of the philosopher (Happiness 177). Coherent, thus already in accordance with, 
without the possibility of presenting corporeal/linguistic expressivity other than universal Reason 
(in the Stoic sense). However, the existence or attainment of the sage is an ideal that was 
considered to be unattainable because unlike the sage the philosopher was subject, as we all are, 
to the human condition of the passions and the responsibility of the everyday existence of life as 
part of a community. Hadot identified the philosopher as the person that is simultaneously aware 
of, 1) his lack of wisdom, and 2) his innate desire for wisdom (chapter 2). The way toward 
wisdom was in the practice of the spiritual exercises which were expressed 
corporeally/linguistically and worked to transform the practitioner’s level of being, in other 
words, the transformation of the self. 
 In Hadot’s rendering of the differences between philosophical discourse and philosophy 
lived as a way of life—philosophia—the existential exercise of the choice to live philosophically 
gives birth to philosophical discourse which in turn leads back to the existential choice, as, “by 
means of its logical and persuasive force, and the action it tries to exert upon the interlocuter—
[philosophical discourse] incites both masters and disciples to live in genuine conformity with 
their initial choice” (Ancient 3, emphasis added). A theme central to self-transformation for 
Hadot is the issue of cosmic consciousness and transcendent wisdom embodied/modeled in the 





ancient models of life in understanding self-formation. Unfortunately, Foucault’s premature 
death did not allow for an extended conversation between he and Hadot. Hadot did write a short 
piece on the convergences and divergences between Foucault’s aesthetics of existence and his 
own understanding of philosophy as a way of life.  
 Hadot critiques Foucault’s conception of the spiritual exercises and techniques of the self 
as “focused far too much on the ‘self,’ or at least on a specific conception of the self’ (Way of 
Life 207). Hadot couches his critique of Foucault’s description of the practitioner finding a 
certain amount of pleasure in the self in a mistranslation of the Greek based on the understanding 
of the Stoic principle of joy. On Hadot’s interpretation, joy for the Stoic is not ‘found’ in the self, 
rather it is found through virtue, which may or may not be pleasurable for the self. Referring to 
the same letter of Seneca Hadot articulates that the text supports a reading that the Stoic finds joy 
not in the self, but rather in “‘the best portion of the self,’ in ‘the true good’” (Seneca qtd. in Way 
of Life 207). This is consistent with the Stoic view of the coherence of human reason with 
Universal reason and each human being as part and expression of the Whole or the All. “The 
‘best portion of oneself,’ then, is, in the last analysis, a transcendent self. Seneca does not find 
his joy in ‘Seneca,’ but by transcending ‘Seneca’; by discovering that there is within him – 
within all human beings, that is and within the cosmos itself – a reason which is a part of 
universal reason” (Way of Life 207). We see here again, Hadot’s emphasis on the Stoic ‘way of 
life’ as perhaps best suited for adaptation to the present historical moment. However, even an 
Epicurean ethics called for physics as a spiritual exercise in combatting the fear of death and the 
‘gods’ (208). 
 Hadot’s point of departure from Foucault’s conception of the “aesthetics of existence” is 





cosmos (Way of Life 208). “Such a cosmic perspective radically transforms the feeling one has of 
oneself” (208). For Hadot the “psychic content” then of the “aesthetics of existence” and the 
practice of spiritual exercises within a sense of the whole of the cosmos is going to be different.  
Hadot’s critique includes also Foucault’s concept of “writing of the self” derived from the 
spiritual exercise of writing down notions to give pleasure to the soul by recording the notes of 
wisdom of the past. This would relieve the soul of its worries over the future by enjoying the 
“possession of a past” collected in the “spiritual notebooks”—the genre of hypomnemata which 
Hadot discusses as the same genre of the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (Citadel 24-25). This 
point of departure is minor, yet influential for the practitioner’s understanding of the practice. 
 Hadot focused on the practices of the self in bringing attention to the present moment. In 
chapter 3 I reviewed Hadot’s understanding of the spiritual exercises as bringing relief from the 
fears and anxieties brought on through considerations of both the past and the future. Hadot’s 
critique of Foucault’s interpretation of the spiritual exercise of writing “what-has-already-been-
said” has two points. The first is that Foucault’s rendering of the practice opens the way for a 
(re)turn to a pleasurable past that simultaneously covers over the “fundamental philosophic 
attitude” and purpose of being in the present moment (209). Second, Foucault’s rendering of 
writing misses the specificity of what was written down in the ancient practice. “In other words, 
when one writes or notes something down, it is not an alien thought one is making one’s own. 
Rather, one is utilizing formulae considered as apt to actualize what is already present within the 
reason of the person writing, and bring it to life” (210). These point to the fundamental 
difference between Hadot and Foucault on the spiritual exercises for the present moment.  
 Hadot’s critique of Foucault serves to highlight Hadot’s conception of the holistic and 





“Writing, like the other spiritual exercises, changes the level of the self, and universalizes it” 
(Way of Life 211, emphasis added). Therapeutic, as the practices exercised and thus changed 
one’s being; holistic insofar as the self recognizes itself and others as part of the whole of 
humankind and the cosmos. “This is a new way of being-in-the-world, which consists in 
becoming aware of oneself as a part of nature, and a portion of universal reason” (211) 
“In this way, one identifies oneself with an ‘Other’: nature, or universal reason, as it is 
present within each individual. This implies a radical transformation of perspective, and 
contains a universalist, cosmic dimension, upon which, it seems to me, M. Foucault did 
not sufficiently insist. Interiorization is a going beyond oneself; it is universalization.” 
(211)  
This discussion hinges on Hadot’s understanding of the ‘movement’ of self-transformation 
occurring as an interior-to-exterior movement that is clearly characterized in ancient Stoic 
spiritual exercise of taking the view from above (chapters 4 and 5). Briefly, the philosopher 
brings attention to the self—reflecting on actions, reflection on death—in so doing coming to the 
simultaneous awareness of her or his lack of wisdom and desire for wisdom. Simultaneous with 
this awareness is the realization that one is but a part and expression of the All or the Whole. 
Thus, the philosopher proceeds to a view from above with an operative vision of the cosmos and 
his and other’s place in it. Cosmic consciousness and the transcendent myth/figure of the sage 
are dimensions of practice of philosophy in the present moment for Hadot which is a divergence 
from Foucault’s aesthetics of existence. Though significant, the differences between the concepts 






“To summarize: what Foucault calls ‘practices of the self’ do indeed correspond, for the 
Platonists as well as for the Stoics, to a movement of conversion toward the self. One 
frees oneself from exteriority, from personal attachment to exterior objects, and from the 
pleasures they may provide. One observes oneself, to determine whether one has made 
progress in this exercise. One seeks to be one’s own master, to possess oneself, and find 
one’s happiness and freedom in inner independence. I concur on all these points.” (Way 
of Life 211) 
This shared project could be characterized as turning, again, to ancient models of life in help for 
navigating the conditions of the present historical moment. With that in mind Arnold Davidson 
approaches the beginnings of a dialogue.  
 Arnold Davidson poses a question at the intersection of Hadot and Foucault on the 
mobilizing force of transcendent wisdom. “Is there an imminent equivalent of transcendent 
wisdom? Can you have a relationship with yourself that has the strength and mobility of wisdom, 
but without being transcendent?” (La Repubblica). Davidson’s question is thought provoking in 
two ways. Firstly, in human communication scholarship Davidson’s question presents an 
opening to extended conversation between Foucault and Hadot on philosophy, communication, 
embodiment, ethics, practice and/or habitus, and community. For this project, Davidson’s 
question raises the issue of motivation or mobility for choosing, over and again, to practice the 
spiritual exercises toward the model of the sage.  
 In response to the question posed, Davidson looks to Foucault’s aesthetics of existence as 
a path forward for living contemporary philosophy as a way of life. Echoing Hadot’s critique 
from Philosophy as a Way of Life Davidson points out that Foucault’s aesthetics of existence can 





Rather, Davidson points out that Foucault notes that this conception of the self-transformative 
practices are intended to be married to a critical dimension that is not juridical. “According to 
Foucault, the need for an aesthetic of existence is related to the need for a technique of the self, a 
life technique that involves a new attitude towards ourselves, a critical attitude” (La Repubblica). 
Disabused of the cult of the self, Davidson concludes that “our task is to rediscover history and 
to invent the exercises for ourselves” (Lr ta Repubblica). The contemporary task outlined by 
Davidson is helped along by Hadot’s rediscovery of philosophia and the corporeal/linguistic 
practice of the spiritual exercises. 
 In posing the question Davidson noted Hadot’s continual reminders that philosophia is 
only viable insofar as it addresses therapeutically human conditions of the present moment—
embodied thus subject to the passions, communal thus communicative and embedded in relations 
of communication, lacking wisdom, and abandoned to temporal and terrestrial conditions. As the 
conditions change so do the models of the sage, “I want to remind you that Hadot himself says 
that a correct conception of the sage must take into account the new historical conditions” (La 
Repubblica). In my reading of Davidson ‘the sage’ of Hadot in the contemporary moment 
functions as a symbol for the attraction-force of transcendent wisdom in Hadot’s rendering of 
ancient philosophical practice.  
 Motivation, or the desire to change is inextricable with awareness, love for humankind, 
and cosmic consciousness (Ancient 220; Citadel 311). Ethics lived and “communicated 
corporeally and linguistically” took shape as the spiritual exercises (chapter three) as they called 
on and (trans)formed the practitioner and community at the level of being. 
 Corporeal/linguistic expressivity, awareness in/of the present moment, love for 





philosophy of communication, also serve to form an opening for an extended conversation and 
development of a holistic communication ethics in our time. In my reading of Hadot an adapted 
cosmic consciousness (via physics as a spiritual exercises) for the present moment does not 
necessarily need to be tied transcendent wisdom—as in God, or gods—but rather a functioning 
view from above that transcends the limits of self, but immanent in that it’s mobility factor is in 
being responsive and responsible to one’s terrestrial surroundings and the larger world and the 
community. 
Conclusion 
  This chapter set forth Pierre Hadot’s holistic philosophy of communication that attends 
to the health of the individual and the community through the practice of spiritual exercises that 
recruit and transform one’s entire being. A holistic philosophy of communication works at the 
nexus of mind, body, soul, and cosmos; is ever-incomplete; and works with and in an 
understanding of “human being as essentially an exposure that lacks a closed identity” and 
“keep[s] sight of the opening, wound, or lack that remains at the heart of any community and all 
communication” (Butchart 136). A holistic philosophy of communication is responsive to the 
present moment that experiences increased levels of anxiety, with underdeveloped capacity of 
attention for relational development with anything and anyone ‘outside our head’ in cultural 
forms that privilege the hunt over reflection, and disjointed conditions of time and space. These 
conditions make it difficult to recognize and form responses to the fundamental questions that 
confront each of us: How do I live a good life? What does death mean? What purpose is there in 
this life? Hadot’s work offers insight into adopting and adapting ancient philosophical attitudes, 
working toward inner peace, attaining a view from above, and fostering a love of mankind all 





communication. The conclusion of this section outlined the beginnings of a holistic 
communication ethics that foregrounds minimal agreement, love for humankind, cosmic 
consciousness and attention to the present moment. Practiced together these are intended to 
therapeutically exercise self and other in the uncertain conditions of the current moment. 
  So how do we practice? As simple and cliché as it sounds, we learn from Hadot that 
living philosophy as a way of life in the present moment involves reading the ancients (of any 
wisdom tradition), reflecting on one’s own communicative engagement in one’s relations, form 
the intent to ‘do the good’ for oneself and for/with others, and acknowledging the presence of 
others as we talk with them and work out meaning in the everyday embodied and earthly 
situations of life.  
 Michael Chase, student, translator, and friend of Hadot wrote a memorial article on the 
occasion of Hadot’s death in 2010. In it, he recounted several instances of Hadot’s own 
engagements with students, friends, and strangers: “friendly, non-condescending” and “simple” , 
“self-deprecating” and “humorous” (Chase). One instance that stood out to Chase is a banal and 
everyday example of living philosophy as a way of life. 
“On one occasion, he invited Isabel [Chase’s wife] and me to lunch, along with half a 
dozen others; we were to meet at his office at the Collège de France. We all showed up, 
and Hadot began to lead the whole bunch of us off to the restaurant. In the hallway, 
however, he came across a lost-looking young couple, obviously foreigners, and asked 
them if he could help them. They were looking for the cafeteria, they told him timidly, 
and Pierre Hadot, instead of merely giving them directions, insisted on accompanying 
this unknown couple all the way to the cafeteria, leaving his ‘invited’ guest to twiddle 





The search for wisdom, or responses to the questions above, occurs with others by risking the 
uncertainty of communication in the everyday “living conversations” in line at the coffee shop, 
at the farmer’s market, with colleagues and classmates, at the ballgame, at athletic practices 
(Happiness 188). Reading Hadot is an invitation to live and communicate philosophically. 
 Arnold I. Davidson introduces Hadot’s book on Plotinus by framing the experience as 
“Reading Hadot Reading Plotinus” (Plotinus 1). In reading Hadot’s work one is aware of two 
ongoing and simultaneous processes. The first process is Hadot’s engagement of ancient 
philosophical discourse as he practices writing and reading as a spiritual exercise for nourishing 
his own spiritual progress. Reading Hadot is similar to what he says of reading the Meditations 
of Marcus Aurelius, “it is extremely rare to find a person training himself to live and to think like 
a human being. . . Marcus is talking to himself, but we get the impression that he is talking to 
each one of us” (Citadel 313). The second process is the ongoing invitation for us, his readers, to 
step out of the hunt and, with others in and through human communication respond to the 







Practicing a Holistic Philosophy of Communication & Communication Ethics 
 The first section of this epilogue provides a review of the chapters. The closing section 
functions as an opening for future research and practice in human communication.  
Review of Chapters 
 This chapter has introduced the life and work of Pierre Hadot. Hadot asks the question, 
“is modern man still able to understand the texts of antiquity, and live according to them” (Way 
of Life 278). Through this education under Paul Henri and Pierre Courcelle Hadot was exposed 
early to the systematic work of Thomas Aquinas and the great mystics of the Catholic 
Intellectual tradition. This put him in a position to read ancient texts within their own context to 
revisit the phenomenon of ancient philosophy, or philosophia. Philosophia is an embodied way 
of life, lived out in community of practitioners, that has attendant spiritual practices for the 
intention of forming the “inner attitude” and orienting the practitioner in the life-world (Way of 
Life 59). This way of life is an existential choice rooted in a view of the cosmos (Ancient 3). In 
the present historical moment, the texts that have come to be understood as the texts of 
philosophy were produced for the support of this initial choice of a way of life situated and were 
not constrained by the purpose of the creation of a fully coherent system of thought.  
 Hadot’s understanding and practice of interpretation affirms the goal of working toward 
objectivity in the process of interpretation. A person engaging with the text is certainly situated 
in their own moment, however they can, with rigor, place the text in question back in its literary 
genre, environment, and culture in working out what the author intended to convey aided by the 
understanding that ancient rules of literary production were more codified than present, e.g. 





hypomnēmata as notes for support in practice (see ch. 3). While some mistakes are errors there 
are some that have been shown to be fruitful in opening up gaps for new meaning. Hadot regards 
these errors as “Creative mistakes” (Way of Life 71, 75). Perhaps the most consequential example 
of the result of a creative mistake is the emergence of the distinction between infinitive “being” 
and participle “being” from Plato’s Parmenides (Way of Life 75).  
 Chapter two reviewed the distinction between those who love wisdom (philosopher) and 
those who have achieved a state of wisdom (sage). Hadot discusses this distinction in two book-
length studies of philosophers; Plotinus (Neoplatonism) in Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision 
(1993) and Marcus Aurelius (Stoic) in The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius 
(1998). For Plotinus the sage-experience is fleeting and rare. For Marcus Aurelius and the Stoics 
sage status had been achieved but only by one or maybe two people. However, progress toward 
wisdom was possible as a condition of desiring. In the middle-way of lack, desire, and atopos—
“strange, extravagant, absurd, unclassifiable, disturbing” (Ancient Philosophy 30)—way of living 
is most vivid in the received myth/figure of Socrates, the prototypical philo-soph of the Western 
tradition. 
 Hadot drew attention to Socrates’ words and actions to show that care for the soul and 
care for the public life are not mutually exclusive tasks. Socrates’ search for wisdom was to 
engender souls that were awake to their own lack of knowledge. For Socrates, latent in all of us 
is the desire to know and do the good. Socrates’s task then is to act as a midwife and help birth 
the soul into awareness that one doesn’t know what one thought. As dialogue partner, Socrates 
takes on the role of risk and responsibility of continuing the questioning at the point of crisis. In 
the erotic sphere Socrates shifts from being the lover pursuing the young boy, to the beloved as 





pursuits continue simultaneously. At the point of revelation, Socrates stepped aside, revealing at 
once the interlocutor’s lack of knowledge and their love for the pursuit of wisdom (Way of Life 
162). 
 Chapter three turned to Hadot’s explication of the lived exercises of the practitioner. This 
review of the phenomenon of spiritual exercises began by further situating them in the context of 
philosophia. In that context practicing spiritual exercises was identical to living a philosophical 
life. This is consistent with the practice of acknowledging those as philosophers who did not 
write any ‘philosophy’, e.g. Socrates, Plotinus, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius before his 
Meditations were widely available.  
 The spiritual exercises functioned as therapeutic practices by responding to the human 
condition—“a state of unhappy disquiet” or of “alienation, dispersion and unhappiness”—
emergent especially in the passions , e.g. wealth, power, food, sex, etc.(Way of Life 102; Ancient 
198). The exercises confirmed the already formed choice to live a way of life.  The exercises 
common to the ancient schools of philosophy were: attention, meditation, dialogue, inner 
discourse, training for death and physics (more in chapter 4). The exercises overlap with each 
other in exercising two movements soul in coming to self-consciousness: bringing attention to 
itself and to expanding the self toward a “cosmic consciousness” (Way of Life 85). Through his 
rendering of spiritual exercises Hadot brought his readers to an awareness “of philosophy not 
only as a concrete, practical activity but also as a transformation of our way of inhabiting and 
perceiving the world” and to highlight the recurrences of this attitude throughout the history of 
philosophy (Ancient 270).  
  Chapter four addressed how inquiries into nature and the cosmos are integral in the 





Holba 9; Arneson 77). Physics when practiced as a spiritual exercise brought about “the 
realization of the presence of the world and of our belonging to the world” of, with, and for 
others in relations of communication (Happiness 96). With physics supporting the spiritual 
practice of taking a view from above, routine concerns and interactions were brought into the 
perspective of being parts and expressions of the Whole wherein meanings of the human 
condition abandoned to this place and time can be renegotiated with others. Hadot outlined the 
relationship between humans, nature, and the cosmos by tracing the development of meanings of 
the Heraclitean aphorism “Nature loves to hide” (x, Kahn 33; Veil of Isis).. 
 Emergent from the aphorism is the idea that nature held secrets, which sets up an 
opposition between humans and nature. Revealing the secretes was the purview of philosophy 
and the sciences. Hadot characterizes the attempts at revealing the secrets of nature as 
Promethean or Orphic. The two attitudes are not a strict division, but rather “equally essential” in 
the investigations of nature and are often found together (Veil 98). The Promethean attitude is 
based in an understanding of the relationship between humanity and nature to be generally 
hostile. Through technological and mechanical means the researcher will forces nature to give up 
its secrets so they can be used for the purposes of humankind. The Orphic attitude is based in the 
idea that humanity is a part of nature. The secrets of nature can be known through human art 
insofar as human art—the poem, the painting, the philosophical discourse—is a participation in 
the same creative and generative process of nature (Veil 92). Negotiation of meaning and 
formulating responses in human communication to the present terrestrial conditions involves 
understandings of our relationship with nature and the cosmos. In re-placing the current 





becomes aware of the vastness of the All present in the world and others. Human communication 
is thus (re)oriented toward the expression of the All in others. 
 Chapter five set forth Pierre Hadot’s holistic philosophy of communication that attends to 
the health of the individual and the community through the practice of spiritual exercises that 
recruit and transform one’s entire being. A holistic philosophy of communication works at the 
nexus of mind, body, soul, and cosmos; is ever-incomplete; and works with and in an 
understanding of “human being as essentially an exposure that lacks a closed identity” and 
“keep[s] sight of the opening, wound, or lack that remains at the heart of any community and all 
communication” (Butchart 136). A holistic philosophy of communication is responsive to the 
present moment that experiences increased levels of anxiety, with underdeveloped capacity of 
attention for relational development in cultural forms that privilege the hunt over reflection, and 
disjointed conditions of time and space. These conditions make it difficult to recognize and form 
responses to the fundamental questions that confront each of us: How do I live a good life? What 
does death mean? What purpose is there in this life? Hadot’s work offers insight into adopting 
and adapting ancient philosophical attitudes, working toward inner peace, attaining a view from 
above, and fostering a love of mankind all born in the understanding that we are fundamentally 
in relation with others in human communication.  
 As simple and cliché as it sounds, we learn from Hadot that living philosophy as a way of 
life in the present moment involves reading the ancients (of any wisdom tradition), reflecting on 
one’s own communicative engagement in one’s relations, form the intent to ‘do the good’ for 
oneself and for/with others, and acknowledging the presence of others as we talk with them and 
work out meaning in the everyday embodied and earthly situations of life. Reading Hadot is an 






Practicing Holistic Communication Ethics: An Opening 
 Across the United States most communities are now required to practice—out of 
necessity—a form of social distancing that calls us to avoid gathering together. The necessity is 
for protection of self and others in the uncertain conditions of a global pandemic to which 80,000 
deaths worldwide are already attributed. The nature of COVID-19 is highly contagious and is 
able to persist on surfaces for far longer than other viruses of similar genetic construction such as 
influenza (World Health Organization). We are put in the position of having to practice a form of 
‘social distancing’ in order to stop the spread or ‘flatten the curve’ of the infection rate. Other 
restrictions include wearing a face covering in public and frequent hand sanitizing/washing.  
 ‘Social distancing’ restrictions include maintaining a distance of six feet or two meters 
apart from individuals which has necessarily caused the shutdown (or limited to take-out and 
delivery service) of all locations that could be environments where the virus could easily spread. 
This includes all schools, restaurants, bars/pubs, movie-theatres, barber shops/hair salons, and 
community health organizations such as the YMCA and any business that is ‘non-essential.’ All 
organized athletics and especially team sports, are considered non-essential and they certainly 
qualify as places of potential spread of the virus. As a lead coach for a smaller community 
rowing club that services a range of programs and people from middle school up to people in 
their 70’s (there is one woman in her 90’s) I and the coaching staff (four people) are navigating 
the uncharted virtual environment to find ways of practicing community in a time when the 
primary purpose for gathering—rowing—is not able to happen. 
 Navigating the current moment through a holistic communication ethics begins in the 
“minimal agreement” of responsibility for slowing the infection rate of COVID-19 and brings 





agreement with the task of learning and a holistic communication ethics brings the spiritual 
exercises of cosmic consciousness and attention to the present moment as therapeutics for self 
and community as we attempt to meet the conditions of the current moment. 
 In the present moment questions arise that combine financial pragmatic concerns and 
questions for philosophical reflection with human communication and philosophia as an entry 
point. The rowing club currently has programming and is able to employ two full-time coaches 
whose responsibilities include among others, facility and equipment maintenance, creation and 
staffing of all programs, and recruitment. 6 All of these activities are born out of the organizing 
activity of rowing on the water, travelling, and competing against other clubs in the region. The 
financial uncertainty comes with the possibility of not being able to generate income hrough 
summer rowing opportunities. Income from the summer programming serves as the backbone for 
the annual budget.7 Without the income from summer programming it is a possibility that the 
club might not be able to support the same level of programming or coaching once the state and 
then club deems it safe to gather again. 
 Coexistent with the financial uncertainty are the questions that resonate with individuals 
and with the community of the rowing club; “What is the form of a club without its primary 
reason for organizing?” “How do we practice this community virtually?” “What is best for the 
organization and its members?” as a coach I ask, “What is my purpose?”. The personal and 
community questions come out of an acknowledgement that for many, if not all, of our club 
members rowing is a practice that is an exercise in human flourishing. 
 
6 The rowing club is just one of numerous organizations experiencing similar conditions, so I will speak of the club 
at which I coach as a specific example of a general situation in hope that it contributes to learning and responding to 
the current conditions. 





 Rowing is an embodied, thus communicative and communal practice that brings people 
together in nature and a common purpose. Thus considered, rowing can be a contemporary form 
of a spiritual exercise when practiced with intent: it is therapeutic as it exercises one’s whole 
being, it is communal, brings attention to the present moment, and exercises one’s relation to 
nature and the cosmos. As with the spiritual exercises as outlined by Hadot the exercises are 
interwoven with each other and overlap in practice. 
 Firstly, to achieve the purpose of rowing well with others an individual rower must take 
care for herself. She must perform the technical aspects of the rowing stroke well, she must take 
responsibility for her physical health—hydration, nutrition, weather appropriate clothing, etc.—
and the equipment and seat assigned to her in the boat. However, she is only one part of the 
whole. Moving a boat well together the personal care and awareness must open up to an 
awareness of the whole. Once aware, she recognizes others in the boat calling forth both 
responsibility and responsivity with and for others in and through corporeal/linguistic expression 
(Arneson 29). 
 Secondly, rowing well together calls for attention to the present moment. Rowing is a 
sport that is done outside on a body of water in narrow boats (about hip-width from gunwale to 
gunwale), In addition to being responsive to her teammates in the boat the rower and the boat is 
responding to the natural conditions. Wind, water, sun, rain, snow, temperature are all conditions 
the boat and the rowers toward which the boat and the rower must be responsive. Recreational 
and commercial boat-traffic creating wake, debris floating in the water, the speed and direction 
of the flow of the river, and other obstacles such as navigational buoys and bridge abutments are 
all a part of the ‘field’ that rower is interacting with. To be able to respond and row well, the 





and fears of the past and the future—work, school, family, financial—that will call her attention 
away from exercising her whole embodied being in this moment with others. The third way in 
which rowing can be practiced as a contemporary spiritual exercise is potentially as an opening 
into understanding and exercising one’s being in relation to the cosmos. 
 Hadot notes that the practice of philosophy in the lived spiritual exercises is a, 
“transformation of our way of inhabiting and perceiving the world” and to highlight the 
recurrences of this attitude throughout the history of philosophy (Ancient 270). In the 
contemporary moment Robert Macfarlane demonstrates and documents this in Underland 
(2019). Visiting spaces and witnessing phenomena in the structures deep in the earth beneath our 
feet with others Macfarlane shows how the relations of human communication and societal 
practices shift in response to our engagement with nature and the cosmos (13-15). The rower 
changes surfaces as she steps into the boat and helps shove the boat off the dock. With the 
change in the ‘ground’ under her feet, her perceptions change. In combination with others, in the 
present moment, physical exertion, and inhabiting the world differently on the water 
therapeutically exercises her being in self and community transformation.  
 In chapter 5, I presented an outline of what a holistic communication ethics in the present 
moment could look like. The outline started is based in the idea that ethics are inseparable from 
corporeal/linguistic expressivity. Ethics is lived and worked out in the lifeworld and social 
complex. To that end, Hadot addressed ethics as intricately a part of lived philosophy as an 
exercise of being. Practicing a holistic communication ethics in the present moment understands 
that human being, as embodied is communal and communicative. Practicing ethics then, is a 
fundamentally a therapeutic exercise of being in an through corporeal/linguistic expressivity. A 





others through self-transformation on the model of a sage. This includes an expanding love for 
humankind and cosmic consciousness. This in mind, questions emerge; how do we practice a 
holistic communication ethics in the present moment that necessitates physical distance from 
each other and separation from the therapeutic spiritual exercise of rowing and the organizing 
principle that brings club members together? 
 At this moment, the coaches and club members have more questions and uncertainties 
than responses to the conditions.  What I offer here is a picture of our attempts at a response 
through the perspective of a holistic communication ethics that protects and promotes the ‘good’ 
of embodied community, attention to the present moment, and cosmic consciousness. It is an 
ever-incomplete task that acknowledges multiple possibility as the conditions shift daily. 
 Similar to other rowing clubs across the country the coaches and the club are offering 
times for meetings through video conferencing, such as Zoom and Google Hangouts. In the boat 
the rower learns to take of herself through attention and practice of the responsibilities of her 
position in the boat. This brings her to an awareness that she is only part of the boat and that her 
practices move her to awareness, responsibility, and responsivity with other practitioners 
attempting to practice a similar life.  
 We have held two styles of online meetings. The first is where we have each other on the 
screen while we complete a communal workout. The second is a lecture/discussion on rowing 
technique, nutrition, college recruiting, and other points. Without the spatio-temporal-
communicative feedback from others and the conditions of rowing together in the boat, we 






 The capacity for practicing attention to the present moment in the form of rowing is what 
suffers most in the virtual environment. Though different for each rower the practices of rowing 
physically call the rower to attention, assisting in coming to the realization of the inexhaustible 
of the present moment—the walk into the boathouse, the warmup run, or shoving-off from the 
dock combined with that first stroke of the day. Our attempts at a partial response have been to 
schedule individual meetings with all the junior (ages 14-18) rowers and those of the adults that 
want them. The purpose here is to check-in on training questions, and how each is handling the 
transitions in school and family/home life. These check-ins serve functionally to bring attention 
to the absence of the practice in the present moment and talk about it with each other. In place of 
the usually practice, in the current time the conversation about the absence is a linguistic 
expression that acknowledges the corporeal absence of the practice. 
 For Hadot, cosmic consciousness occurs through practicing the spiritual exercise of 
physics, or inquiries into nature and a practitioner’s relationship to it. The practitioner is able to 
reorient his interpretive frameworks in perceiving others as parts and expressions of the whole—
the whole of the human community, and the whole of the cosmos. This, again, happens as one 
begins with attention on the self as he recognizes the part of himself that is and participates in the 
all or whole of nature and the cosmos. This realization expands as it recognizes in others the 
same part of the whole, community and cosmos.  
 As the rower steps into the boat and shoves-off onto the water, her relationship to the 
surrounding area is changed. By exercising this different perspective the rowers can see herself 
and others as part of a bigger picture in the terrain they usually inhabit. Though shutting down 
the club meant keeping us away from rowing as a spiritual exercise it was the appropriate action 





spread in even a small way, it is the appropriate action to take for the good of the whole club, 
community, and cosmos. 
Implications for continued research 
 The sketch above is a short sketch of directions for future human communication 
research. Hadot’s work can bring additive insight to the ongoing scholarly conversations in 
communication and hermeneutics, organizational communication, and interpersonal 
communication. 
 Hadot’s unique approach to the interpretation of texts was reviewed in chapter one. Hadot 
revealed ‘philosophy as a way of life’ by re-placing texts in their own historical moment, literary 
genre and environment/culture of production. In referencing the rhetorical and literary rules of 
composition with an understanding of the practices of the philosophical school of which it was a 
part, Hadot gains a perspective on the limits that bound the author. These includes a society that 
continued to privilege orality. Approaching texts of philosophical discourse Hadot argues that 
jettisoning objectivity as such from historical method has allow for the development of 
interpretive practices resulting in “genuine aberrations” pointing to Hans-Georg Gadamer 
specifically (Nietzsche 76). Starting with Gadamer’s description of Gadamer’s description of 
hermeneutics as, “understanding and interpretation . . . have to do with the basic relationships of 
human beings to each other and to the world” and that philosophia is grounded in the “living 
words and daily interchanges” drawing out an extended conversation between Hadot and 
Gadamer on hermeneutics and historical consciousness has potential to contribute to issues of 
interpretation, human communication, and understanding (Gadamer 157).8 
 
8 A consequence of this specific discussion would be to develop further the human communication-ontology 





 Definitions of ‘community’ in Hadot’s work are specific to the Greek and Hellenistic 
schools (see Ancient) and general when referring to a ‘community of practitioners’ when 
referring to small groups of master and students (such as the Stoics and Neoplatonist instruction 
at the tail end of the ancient historical moment. However, the general concept of human 
community and/or the cosmos is integral to the practice of the spiritual exercises. Developing 
Hadot’s concept of ‘community of practitioners’ can be fruitfully put into conversation with 
organizational communication scholarship, particularly literature of the communicative 
constitution of organization (CCO) paradigm.9 For example, a fruitful project would be a 
continuation of the sketch above on the intersection of a holistic communication ethics and 
questions of the shifting contours of a ‘community of practitioners’—a rowing club—from the 
perspective of the communicative constitution of organization.  
 Hadot’s description of dialogue as a spiritual exercise may contribute to the conversation 
in interpersonal communication. In the ancient practice of philosophia, dialogue was a specific 
practice. Dialogue was entered into between master and student or between two students. 
Importantly dialogue could only occur if both interlocuters agreed to undergo the process. For 
Hadot, Socrates serves as the model as he first gains the assent of his interlocutors before leading 
them to awareness of their own lack of wisdom. As a spiritual practice dialogue and “inner 
discourse” (simply for Hadot the words one says to oneself) were intertwined with practicing 
“authentic presence, to oneself and to others” (Way of Life 91). Authentic presence with others 
was conditioned through practicing authentic presence in dialogue with others, and conversely 
being able to be present with others in dialogue resulted from practicing authentic presence with 
 






oneself by training one’s inner discourse (91). In the ancient model of life embodied presence 
was assumed as the primary mode of interaction between people. Hadot’s scholarship could 
contribute to ongoing conversations regarding intersubjective intentionality and authenticity in a 
communicative environment saturated with digital technology.10 This conversation would be 
especially timely as interpersonal interactions are expressed through digital/virtual media so as to 
prevent the spread of COVID-19.  
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